Packet switching: store-and-forward routing across multiple physical networks ... across multiple organizations
The Internet: Key Design Principles

1. Support interconnection of networks
   – No changes needed to the underlying physical network
   – IP is a logical network

2. Assume unreliable communication
   – If a packet does not get to the destination, software on the receiver will have to detect it and the sender will have to retransmit it

3. Routers connect networks
   – Store & forward delivery

4. No global (centralized) control of the network
Network protocol layers

Networks are modular. Protocol layers communicate with their counterparts. Low-level attacks can affect higher levels.
IP Protocol Stack

Internet protocol stack

1. Physical
   - Ethernet MAC, 802.11, ARP
   - Connectors, voltage levels, ...

2. Data Link
   - Ethernet MAC, 802.11, ARP

3. Network
   - IP

4. Transport
   - TCP, UDP

5. Application
   - SMTP, IMAP, HTTP, FTP, ...
   - BGP, DNS, NTP

6. Operating system

7. Applications & libraries
Data Link Layer
Layer 2 (Ethernet/Wi-Fi switches) generally has weak security

- MAC Attacks – CAM overflow
- VLAN Hopping
- ARP cache poisoning
- DHCP spoofing
Link Layer: CAM overflow

Monitor all traffic on a LAN
Layer 2: Ethernet Switches

Cisco Nexus 9516 Switch
- 1/10/40 GbE
- 21-rack-unit chassis
- Up to 576 1/10 Gb ports

TP-Link Switch
- 8 1-GbE ports
Ethernet MAC addresses

Ethernet frames are delivered based on their 48-bit MAC* address
– Top 24 bits: manufacturer code assigned by IEEE
– Bottom 24 bits: assigned by manufacturer
– ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff = broadcast address

Ethernet MAC address ≠ IP address

*MAC = Media Access Control address – used as a link-layer address by Ethernet, Wi-Fi, and Bluetooth
How does an Ethernet switch work?

A switch contains a **switch table** (MAC address table)
- Contains entries for known MAC addresses & their interface

**Forwarding & filtering:**

*a frame arrives for some destination address D*

1. Look up $D$ in the switch table to find the interface
2. If found & the interface is the same as the one the frame arrived on
   - **Discard** the frame (**filter**)
3. If found & $D$ is on a different interface
   - **Forward** the frame to that interface: queue if necessary
4. If not found
   - **Forward** to **ALL** interfaces

As attackers, we want this to happen. That way, we get to see all network traffic
The switch table

A switch is self-learning

- **Switch table** (MAC address → interface): initially empty
- Whenever a frame is received, associate the interface with the source MAC address in the frame
- Delete switch table entries if they have not been used for some time

Switches must be fast: can’t waste time doing lookups
  - They use CAM – **Content Addressable Memory**
  - Fixed size table
CAM overflow attack

Exploit size limit of CAM-based switch table

• Send bogus Ethernet frames with random source MAC addresses
  – Each new address will displace an entry in the switch table
  – macof tool: ~100 lines of perl

• With the CAM table full, legitimate traffic will be broadcast to all links
  – A host on any port can now see all traffic
  – CAM overflow attack turns a switch into a hub

• Countermeasures: **port security**
  – Some managed switches let you limit # of addresses per switch port

*dsniff: collection of tools for network auditing and penetration testing*
https://monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/
Link Layer: VLANs & VLAN hopping

Join VLANs you are not a member of
VLANs

• A switch & cables creates a local area network (LAN)

• We use LANs to
  – Isolate broadcast traffic from other groups of systems
  – Isolate users into groups
  – What if users move? What if switches are inefficiently used?

• Virtual Local Area Networks (VLANs)
  – Create multiple virtual LANs over one physical switch infrastructure
  – Network manager can assign a switch’s ports to a specific VLAN
  – Each VLAN is a separate broadcast domain
VLAN Trunking

VLANs across multiple locations/switches

- **VLAN Trunking**: a single connection between two VLAN-enabled switches carries all traffic for all VLANs
**VLAN Hopping Attack**

- VLAN trunk carries traffic for *all* VLANs

- Extended Ethernet frame format
  - 802.1Q for frames on an Ethernet trunk = Ethernet frame + VLAN tag
  - Sending switch adds VLAN tag for traffic on the trunk
  - Receiving switch removes VLAN tag and sends traffic to appropriate VLAN ports based on VLAN ID

**Attack:** *switch spoofing*

Devices can spoof themselves to look like a switch with a trunk connection and become a member of all VLANs

![Diagram of VLAN Hopping Attack](Image)
Avoiding VLAN Hopping

• Disable unused ports & assign them to an unused VLAN
  – *Stops an attacker from plugging a device into an unused port*

• Disable auto-trunking
  – *Stops an attacker from masquerading as a switch*

• Explicitly configure trunking on switch ports that are used for trunks
  – *Allows legitimate connected switches to work*
ARP Cache Poisoning
(ARP Spoofing)

*Intercept traffic for other IP addresses*
Find MAC address given an IP address

- We need to send a datagram to an IP address
- It is encapsulated in an Ethernet frame and a MAC address

| MAC destination | MAC source | type | IP header | IP data | CRC |

- How do we know what MAC address to use?
Address Resolution Protocol (ARP)

ARP table
- Kernel table mapping IP addresses & corresponding MAC addresses
- OS uses this to fill in the MAC header given an IP destination address
- What if the IP address we want is not in the cache?

ARP Messages
- A host creates an ARP query packet & broadcasts it on the LAN
  - Ethernet broadcast MAC address: ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
- All adapters receive it
  - If an adapter’s IP address matches the address in the query, it responds
  - Response is sent to the MAC address of the sender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HW Protocol (ethernet)</th>
<th>Protocol type (e.g., IPv4)</th>
<th>MAC addr length</th>
<th>query/response</th>
<th>sender MAC addr</th>
<th>sender IP addr</th>
<th>target MAC addr</th>
<th>target IP addr</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

ARP packet structure

see the `arp` command on Linux/BSD/Windows/macOS
ARP Cache Poisoning

• Network hosts cache any ARP replies they see … even if they did not originate them … on the chance that they might have to use that IP address

• Any client is allowed to send an unsolicited ARP reply
  – Called a gratuitous ARP

• ARP replies will overwrite older entries in the ARP table … even if they did not expire

• An attacker can create fake ARP replies
  – Containing the attacker’s MAC address and the target’s IP address
  – This will direct any traffic meant for the target to the attacker
  – Enables man-in-the-middle or denial of service attacks

See Ettercap – a multipurpose sniffer/interceptor/logger
https://github.com/Ettercap/ettercap
Defenses against ARP cache poisoning

- **Ignore replies** that are not associated with requests
  - But you have to hope that the reply you get is a legitimate one

- **Use static ARP entries**
  - But can be an administrative nightmare

- **Enable Dynamic ARP Inspection**
  - Validates ARP packets against DHCP Snooping database information or static ARP entries
DHCP Server Spoofing

Configure hosts with your chosen network settings
DHCP (Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol)

Computer joins a network – needs to be configured
  – *Broadcasts* a *DHCP Discover* message

A DHCP server picks up this requests and sends back a response
  • IP address
  • Subnet mask
  • Default router (gateway)
  • DNS servers
  • Lease time

Attack:
spoof responses that would be sent by a valid DHCP server
DHCP Spoofing

- Anybody can pretend to be a DHCP server
  - Spoof responses that would be sent by a valid DHCP server
  - Provide:
    - False gateway address
    - False DNS server address

- Attacker can now direct traffic from the client to go anywhere

- The real server may reply too
  - If the attacker responds first, he wins
  - Attack the server first – delay or disable the real server: denial of service attack
Defenses

Some switches (Cisco, Juniper) support **DHCP snooping**
- Switch ports can be configured as “trusted” or “untrusted”
- Only specific machines are allowed to send DHCP responses
- The switch will use DHCP data to track client behavior
  - Ensure hosts use only the IP address assigned to them
  - Ensure hosts do not fake ARP responses
Network Layer (IP) vulnerabilities
Network Layer: IP

Responsible for end-to-end delivery of packets

• No guarantees on message ordering or delivery

• Key functions
  – **Routing**
    • Each host knows the address of one or more connected routers (gateways)
    • The router knows how to route to other networks
  – **Fragmentation & reassembly**
    • An IP fragment may be split if the MTU size on a network is too small
    • Reassembled at its final destination
  – **Error reporting**
    • ICMP messages sent back to the sender (e.g., if packet is dropped)
  – **Time-to-live**
    • Hop count avoids infinite loops; packet dropped when TTL = 0
Source IP address

No source IP address authentication

• Clients are *supposed* to use their own source IP address
  – Can override with raw sockets
  – Error responses will be sent to the forged source IP address

• Enables
  – Anonymous DoS attacks
  – DDoS attacks
  • Send lots of packets from many places that will cause routers to generate ICMP responses
  • All responses go to the forged source address
Attacks on routers

• Routers are just special-purpose computers
  – People may keep default passwords or not use strong passwords
  – Router OS may not be kept updated

• Subject to attacks:
  – Denial of Service (DOS)
    • Flood the router (e.g., lots of ICMP packets from lots of sources)
  – Routing table poisoning
    • Either by breaking into a router or by sending modified routing data update packets
Transport Layer (UDP, TCP) vulnerabilities
TCP & UDP

UDP: User Datagram Protocol
- Stateless, connectionless & unreliable
- Anyone can send forged UDP messages

TCP: Transmission Control Protocol
- Stateful, connection-oriented & reliable
- Every packet contains a sequence number (byte offset)
  - Receiver assembles packets into correct order
  - Sends acknowledgements
  - Missing packets are retransmitted
TCP connection setup: three-way handshake

**Client**
- Create SYN segment
  - SYN=1
  - Random initial seq # (client_isn)
  - No data

**Server**
- Allocate TCP buffers & variables
- Create SYN-ACK segment
  - SYN=1
  - ACK = client_isn + 1
  - server_isn = random #
  - No data

Allocate TCP buffers & variables
Create ACK segment
- SYN = 0
- ACK = server_isn + 1
- Data optional

Server knows the client has the sequence #
Connection is established!
Why random initial sequence numbers?

If predictable, an attacker can create a TCP session on behalf of a forged source IP address.

Random numbers make this attack harder – especially if the attacker cannot sniff the network.
Denial of service: SYN Flooding

An OS will allocate only a finite # of TCP buffers

- **SYN Flooding attack**
  - Send lots of SYN segments but never complete the handshake
  - The OS will not be able to accept connections until those time out

- **SYN Cookies**: Dealing with SYN flooding attacks
  - Do not allocate buffers & state when a SYN segment is received
  - Create initial sequence # = \( \text{hash(src_addr, dest_addr, src_port, dest_port, SECRET)} \)
  - When an ACK comes back, validate the ACK #
    Compute the hash as before & add 1
  - If valid, then allocate resources necessary for the connection & socket
Denial of service: Reset

- Attacker can send a **RESET** (RST) packet to an open socket
- If the server sequence number is correct, then the connection will close
- Sequence numbers are 32 bits
  - Chance of success is $1/2^{32} \approx 1$ in 4 billion
  - But many systems allow for a large range of sequence numbers
  - Attacker can send a flood of RST packets until the connection is broken
Network Routing Protocols
Routing protocols

**OSPF: Open Shortest Path First**
- Interior Gateway Protocol (IGP) within an autonomous system (AS)
- Uses a **link state routing algorithm** (Dijkstra’s shortest path)

**BGP: Border Gateway Protocol**
- Exterior Gateway Protocol (EGP) between autonomous systems (AS)
- Exchanges routing and reachability information
- **Distance vector routing protocol**
BGP sessions maintained via TCP links

Pairs of routers exchange information via semi-permanent TCP connections

- One connection for each link between gateway routers
  - External BGP (eBGP) session
  - Also BGP TCP connections between routers inside an AS
    - Internal BGP (iBGP) session
Route selection

- A, B, C: transit ASes – ISPs & backbone
- W, X, Y: stub ASes – customers

BGP route selection
- Policies allow selection of preferred routes
- Otherwise, pick the route with the shortest path
- If there’s a tie, choose the shortest path with the closest router
BGP Hijacking

• **Route advertisements are not authenticated**
  – Anyone can inject advertisements for arbitrary routes
  – Information will propagate throughout the Internet
  – Can be used for DoS or eavesdropping

(Partial) Solutions

– **RPKI** *(Resource Public Key Infrastructure) framework*
  • Each AS obtains an X.509 certificate from the Regional Internet Registry (RIR)
  • AS admin creates a **Route Origin Authorization** (ROA)
  • ROA is signed by the AS’s private key
  • Advertisements without a valid, signed ROA are ignored

– **BGPsec**
  • Integral part of BGP protocol
  • Each hop in the AS path is protected with a signature

See RFC 6480

See RFC 8206
Pakistan’s attack on YouTube in 2008

• YouTube service was cut off the global web for over an hour

• Pakistan Telecom received a censorship order from the telecommunications ministry to block YouTube
  – The company sent spoofed BGP messages claiming to be the best route for YouTube’s range of IP addresses
Pakistan’s attack on YouTube in 2008

• Pakistan Telecom sent BGP advertisements that it was the correct route for 256 addresses in YouTube’s 208.65.153.0 network
  – Advertise a /24 network

• That is a more specific destination than YouTube’s broadcast, which covered 1024 addresses
  – YouTube advertised a /22 network

• Within minutes, all YouTube traffic started to flow to Pakistan

• YouTube immediately tried countermeasures
  – Narrowed its broadcast to 256 addresses … but too late
  – Then tried an even more specific group: 64 addresses
  
  Advertise a /26 network ⇒ priority over /24 routes
  • Routes for more specific addresses overrule more general ones
  – Route updates finally fixed after 2 hours
An internet traffic diversion rerouted data through Russia and China and disrupted Google services on Monday, including search, cloud-hosting services and its bundle of collaboration tools for businesses.

Service interruptions lasted for nearly one and a half hours and ended about 5:30 p.m. EST., network service companies said. In addition to Russian and Chinese telecommunications companies, a Nigerian internet provider was also involved.

The diversion “at a minimum caused a massive denial of service to G Suite (business collaboration tools) and Google Search” and “put valuable Google traffic in the hands of ISPs in (internet service providers) in countries with a long history of Internet surveillance,” the network-intelligence company ThousandEyes said in a blog post.
Another BGP Hijacking Event Highlights the Importance of MANRS and Routing Security

By Megan Kruse

Another BGP hijacking event is in the news today. This time, the event is affecting the Ethereum cryptocurrency. Users were faced with an insecure SSL certificate. Clicking through that, like so many users do without reading, they were redirected to a server in Russia, which proceeded to empty the user’s wallet. …

In this case specifically, the culprit re-routed DNS traffic using a man in the middle attack using a server at an Equinix data center in Chicago. Cloudflare has put up a blog post that explains the technical details. From that post:

“This [hijacked] IP space is allocated to Amazon(AS16509). But the ASN that announced it was eNet Inc(AS10297) to their peers and forwarded to Hurricane Electric(AS6939).”
China Telecom, the large international communications carrier with close ties to the Chinese government, misdirected big chunks of Internet traffic through a roundabout path that threatened the security and integrity of data passing between various providers’ backbones for two and a half years, a security expert said Monday. It remained unclear if the highly circuitous paths were intentional hijackings of the Internet’s Border Gateway Protocol or were caused by accidental mishandling.
Domain Name System (DNS) Vulnerabilities
Domain Name System

• Hierarchical service to map domain names to IP addresses

• How do you find the DNS Server for rutgers.edu?
  – That’s what the domain registry keeps track of
  – When you register a domain
    • You supply the addresses of at least two DNS servers that can answer queries for your zone
    • You give this info to the domain registrar (e.g., Namecheap, GoDaddy) who updates the database at the domain registry (e.g., Verisign for .com, .net, .edu, .gov, … domains)
      – Domain registrar: Sells domain names to the public
      – Domain registry: Maintains the top-level domain database

• So how do you find the right DNS server?
  – Start at the root
Root name servers

• The **root name servers** provide lists of authoritative name servers for top-level domains

• 13 root name servers
  – A.ROOT-SERVERS.NET, B.ROOT-SERVERS.NET, …
  – Each has redundancy (via *anycast* routing or load balancing)
    • Each server is really a set of machines

Download the latest list at http://www.internic.net/domain/named.root
Local stub resolver:
- check local cache
- check local hosts file
- send request to external resolver

E.g., on Linux: resolver is configured via the `/etc/resolv.conf` file

External resolver:
- Running at ISP, Cloudflare, Google Public DNS, OpenDNS, etc.
DNS Vulnerabilities

• **Programs (and users) trust the host-address mapping**
  – This is the basis for some security policies
    • Browser same-origin policy, URL address bar

• **But DNS responses can be faked**
  – If an attacker gives a DNS response first, the host will use that
  – Malicious responses can direct messages to different hosts
  – A receiver cannot detect a forged response

• **DNS resolvers cache their results (with an expiration)**
  – If it gets a forged response, the forged results will be passed on to any systems that query it
Pharming attack

Redirect traffic to an attacker’s site by modifying how the DNS resolver gets its information

Forms of attack

1. **Use malware or social engineering to modify a computer’s *hosts* file**
   This file maps *names*→*IP addresses* and avoids DNS queries

2. **Attack the router & modify its DNS server setting**
   Direct traffic to the attacker’s DNS server, which will give the wrong IP address for certain domain names
DNS spoofing attack

Redirect traffic to an attacker via DNS cache poisoning

• An attacker sends the wrong DNS response
  – The DNS resolver requesting it will cache it and provide that to anyone else who asks in the near future

• How does we prevent spoofed responses?
  – Each DNS query contains a 16-bit Query ID (QID) – only 65,536 to guess
    • Response from the DNS server must have a matching QID
  – DNS uses UDP and this was created to make it easy for a system to match responses with requests

• An attacker will have to guess the QID number
  – But numbers were sequential and not hard to guess
  – Fix by using random Query IDs
DNS spoofing via Cache Poisoning

What happens?

– Malicious JavaScript on a web page causes the client to try to look up a.bank.com, b.bank.com, etc.
– At the same time, the attacker is sending a stream of DNS “responses” hoping that one will have a matching query ID (QID)

If the attacker is successful, one of the responses matches up

– But we expect the victim to go to bank.com, not f.bank.com
– However….
  The DNS response can also define a new DNS server for bank.com!
– This overwrites any saved DNS info for bank.com that may be cached
– The attacker can take over any requests to bank.com!
DNS spoofing via Cache Poisoning

JavaScript on a website may launch a DNS attacker

2. Local DNS resolver sends a DNS query to the `com DNS server`.
3. The `com DNS server` sends back a response with the `QID = x_1`.
4. The `attacker` sends 256 responses with random QIDs: `y_1, y_2, ...`
5. `NS bank.com = ns.bank.com`
6. `A ns.bank.com = attacker_IP_addr`

If there is some `j` such that `x_1 = y_j` then the response will be cached.

All future DNS queries for anything at `bank.com` will go to `attacker_IP_addr`.

If it doesn’t work … try again with `b.bank.com`, `c.bank.com`, etc.
Defenses against DNS cache poisoning

• Query IDs used to be predictable
  – Easy to guess
  – Have a web page make a DNS query to a domain under the attacker’s control & look at the QID
  – The attacker can then guess the next one

• Randomize source port # – where DNS queries originate
  – Attack will take several hours instead of a few minutes
  – Will have to send responses to a range of ports
  – But this is tricky in real environments that use NAT (network address translation) and may limit the exposed UDP ports

• Issue double DNS queries
  – Attacker will have to guess the Query ID twice (32 bits)
Defenses against DNS cache poisoning

• Use TCP instead of UDP for DNS queries
  – It’s much harder to inject a response into a TCP stream
  – But
    • Much higher latency
    • Much more overhead at the DNS resolver

• The better long-term solution: DNSSEC
  – Secure extension to DNS that provide authenticated requests & responses
  – Responses contain a digital signature
  – But
    • Adoption has been very slow
    • DNSSEC response size is much bigger than a DNS response, which makes it more powerful for DoS attacks
DNS Rebinding
DNS Rebinding

Attack that allows attackers to run a script to attack other systems on the victim’s private network

• What is the **same-origin policy**?
  – The core web application security model
  – Client web browser scripts can access data from other web pages *only* if they have the same *origin*
  – Origin = same { protocol, host name, port number }

• The policy relies on **comparing domain names**

• If we can change the underlying address:
  – We can send messages to an attacker’s system while the software thinks it’s still going to the same domain
  – This can let us access private machines in the user's local area network
  – Example: access local web services, cameras, thermostats, printers, …
DNS Rebinding

• **Attacker**
  - Registers a domain (attacker.com)
  - Sets up a DNS server
  - DNS server responds with very short TTL values – response won’t be cached

• **Client (browser)**
  - Script on page causes access to a malicious domain
  - Attacker’s DNS server responds with IP address of a server hosting malicious client-side code
  - Malicious client-side code makes additional references to the domain
    • Permitted under **same-origin policy**
      - A browser permits scripts in one page to access data in another only if both pages have the same origin & protocol
    • The script causes the browser to issue a new DNS request
    • Attacker replies with a new IP address (e.g., a target somewhere in the victim’s LAN)
    • The script can continue to access content at the same domain
      - But it really isn’t in the domain!
Defending against DNS rebinding

• Force **minimum TTL values**
  – This may affect some legitimate dynamic DNS services

• **DNS pinning**: refuse to switch the IP address for a domain name
  – This is similar to forcing minimum TTL values
  – But this can mess up load balanced or other dynamic services

• Have the local DNS resolver make sure DNS responses don’t contain private IP addresses

• Server-side defense within the local area network
  – Reject HTTP requests with unrecognized `Host` headers
  – Authenticate users
The end