On the Risks and Rewards of Coordination in Multiagent Reinforcement Learning

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A Multiagent Planning Problem
Learning & Coordination Problems

- Coordination of agent activities an important focus of multiagent learning (and RL)
  - (identical interest) stochastic games provide one useful model for studying such problems (multiagent? multi-agent? multi agent? MDPs)

- Known models:
  - Bayesian, FP, etc. models used to learn joint policies
  - in many cases, convergence to equilibrium assured

- Unknown models:
  - MARL techniques often used
  - convergence for some methods known, others seem to work reasonably well empirically

The Curse of Multiple Equilibria

- One difficulty with “typical” MARL models
  - even if convergence to equilibrium assured, the equilibrium reached may be undesirable
  - influenced by structure of game

Penalty Game (Claus+Boutilier 97)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>a0</th>
<th>a1</th>
<th>a2</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>k</td>
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<tr>
<td>b1</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>b2</td>
<td>k</td>
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Convergence to Optimal Equil.? 

Opt In or Out Game
Avoiding Suboptimal Equilibria

- A number of methods proposed to avoid convergence to suboptimal equilibria
  - CB96, LR00, KK02, WS02
  - generally, adopt an optimistic bias in exploration, ignoring the penalties or missed opportunities, in an effort to reach optimal equilibrium
  - e.g., [Penalty Game]: if player A persists in a0, this will eventually cause B to adopt b0 (optimal) using any standard RL algorithm
  - what price is paid? larger chance of accruing penalties before convergence...

Optimal Exploration

- Some heuristic methods may guarantee convergence to optimal equil. (e.g., WS02)
- But what is the right performance metric?
  - common debate in (single agent) RL
- Tradeoff: is the price paid (penalties, lost opportunities) worth the gain offered by convergence to optimal (or better) equilibrium?
  - depends on discount factor, horizon, odds of converging to specific equilibrium, etc.
- Optimal exploration in MARL: *address explicitly!*
Bayesian Perspective on MARL

- Bayesian view of RL: optimal exploration easily formulated [Dearden et al., bandit problems]
- We have adopted this point of view for MARL
- However, several new components required
  - priors over models (incl. opponent strategies)
  - action selection as a POMDP
    - value of information (incl. what is learned about opponent strategies)
    - object level value (incl. how action choice impacts what opponent will do)

Basic Setup

- Assume a stochastic game
  - states $S$, fully observable
  - players $i \in \{1,\ldots,N\}$
  - action sets $A_i$, joint action set $A = X A_i$
  - dynamic $Pr(s, a, t)$
  - stochastic reward functions $R_i$
  - strategies $\sigma_i$, strategy profiles $\sigma, \sigma_i$

- In MARL setting:
  - each agent experience has form $<s, a, r, t>$
Agent Belief State

- Each agent has belief state $b = <P_M, P_S, s, h>$
  - $P_M$: density over space of possible models (games)
  - $P_S$: density over space of opponent(s) strategies
  - $s$: current state of the system
  - $h$: relevant history (i.e., that required to predict opponent moves given strategy beliefs)

- Update $b'$ given experience tuple $<s, a, r, t>$
  - $P'_M(m) = \alpha \Pr(t, r | a, m) P_M(m)$
  - $P'_S(\sigma_i) = \alpha \Pr(a_i | s, h, \sigma_i) P_S(\sigma_i)$
  - $h'$ is suitable update of relevant history
  - combines Bayes RL and Bayes strategy learning

Simplifying Assumptions

- Factored local models $P_{(R)s}$ and $P_{(D)s,a}$
  - assume local densities are Dirichlet, independent
  - allows very simple updating of $P_M$

- Some convenient prior $P_S$
  - we use simple fictitious play-style beliefs (no history)
  - locally factored, independent at each state
  - more general models feasible
  - interesting question: what are reasonable, feasible classes of opponent models
Tradeoffs in Optimal Exploration

- Given belief state \( b \), each action \( a_i \):
  - has expected object level value
  - provides info. which can subsequently be exploited

- Object level value:
  - immediate reward
  - predicted state transition (expected value)
  - impact on future opponent action selection

- Value of Information:
  - what you learn about transition model, reward
  - what you could learn about opponent strategy
  - how this info impacts future decisions

POMDP Formulation

- Tradeoff can be made implicitly by considering long-term impact of action on belief state and associating value with belief states

\[
Q(a_i, b) = \sum_{a_{-i}} \Pr(a_{-i} \mid b) \sum_{t} \Pr(t \mid a_i \circ a_{-i}, b) \\
\sum_{r} \Pr(r \mid a_i \circ a_{-i}, b) [r + \gamma V(b(s, a, r, t))] \\
V(b) = \max_{a_i} Q(a_i, b)
\]
**Computational Approximations**

- Solving belief state MDP intractable
- Myopic model (one step lookahead)
  - account for impact of action on next belief state
  - execute action with maximum myopic Q-value
  
  \[
  V_m(b) = \max_{a_i} \int \int Q(a_i, s \mid m, \sigma_{-i}) P_M(m) P_S(\sigma_{-i})
  \]

- Sampling techniques used to evaluate integrals
  - sample games from \( P_M \), solve corresponding MDP
  - can sample strategies (or use expectation if simple)
  - other tricks can be used (importance sampling, repair, sampling belief states, exploit repeated games, etc.)

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**Computational Approximations**

- Other approaches include using the rather different *Q*-value sampling approach to estimating EVOI [Dearden et al.]
  - see paper for details
  - approximates in very different way by sampling models, computing optimal Q-values, and determining whether these values are sufficient to change the optimal action choice at current state

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Empirical Results

- Tested the Bayesian approach using both:
  - one-step lookahead (BOL)
  - naïve VPI sampling (BVPI)
- Compared—on several repeated games and stochastic games—to several algorithms:
  - KK (Kapetanakis and Kudenko, AAAI-02)
  - OB, COB (Claus and Boutilier, AAAI-98)
  - WoLF-PHC (Bowling and Veloso, IJCAI-01)
  - much more general algorithm
- Compare using total discounted reward accrued
Penalty -20, Discount 0.75

Penalty -100, Discount 0.95 (Infrmd)
Chain World

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Chain World, Discount 0.75

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Chain World, Discount 0.95

Opt In (Low Noise), Discount 0.75
Opt In (Low Noise), Discount 0.99

Opt In (Med. Noise), Discount 0.75
Summary

- Bayesian method seems to perform well compared to other methods tested
  - algorithms designed to “force” convergence to optimal equilibrium pay a very large price
  - WoLF (which doesn’t force optimality) fares much better than algorithms designed for these problems!

- In sequential games:
  - BVPI shows better online performance than WoLF
  - CW: BVPI converges to optimal policy, WoLF doesn’t
  - OI (low): BVPI and WoLF converge to optimal policy sometimes sometimes not
Conclusions

- More thought needed on the objectives of MARL
- Bayesian technique explicitly addresses the tradeoff between exploration and exploitation
  - including “joint” exploration and exploitation
- Generally, performs better than other approaches wrt discounted reward
  - may sacrifice convergence to optimal (stochastically) if the cost outweighs the gain
  - but often does converge to optimal
  - very flexible model
    - priors; opponent models; discount/horizon; etc.

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