21-Mar-93 0:04:27-GMT,6523;000000000001 Received: from rutvm1.rutgers.edu by aramis.rutgers.edu (5.59/SMI4.0/RU1.5/3.08) id AA29707; Sat, 20 Mar 93 19:04:26 EST Message-Id: <9303210004.AA29707@aramis.rutgers.edu> Received: from RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (IBM VM SMTP R1.2.1MX) with BSMTP id 9713; Sat, 20 Mar 93 12:12:44 EST Received: from RUTVM1.BITNET (NJE origin LISTSERV@RUTVM1) by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (LMail V1.1d/1.7f) with BSMTP id 7988; Sat, 20 Mar 1993 12:12:42 -0500 Date: Sat, 20 Mar 1993 12:12:01 EST Reply-To: "PSYCOLOQUY: Refereed Electronic Journal of Peer Discussion" Sender: "PSYCOLOQUY: Refereed Electronic Journal of Peer Discussion" From: Stevan Harnad Subject: New way to receive PSYCOLOQUY Comments: To: PSYCOLOQUY To: Multiple recipients of list PSYC Here is a third way to receive PSYCOLOQUY (aside from direct subscription through Listserv and institutional access through Usenet as sci.psychology.digest). If this new form of access interests you, please recommend to your institutional library that they get the software. (It is all, of course, free of charge, and will help lighten your library's heavy financial burden for periodicals.) -- ed. ------------------------------------------------------------------ Date: Fri, 19 Mar 1993 10:54:19 EST Reply-To: "Publishing E-Journals : Publishing, Archiving, and Access" From: James Powell Subject: Automated Electronic Journal Acquisition (Also posted to PACS-L) Automated Electronic Journal Acquisition: A UNIX Based Approach Automatic acquisition of electronic journals in libraries is critical to the success of electronic journals. I first realized this last fall when I was asked to put together a system to support an electronic newsletter that was updated almost daily. Upon review of our existing system, I found that it simply would not be practical to acquire a daily newsletter in this way. Having watched the growth of interconnected distributed systems such as gopher and World-Wide Web, it seemed to me that this is the way electronic acquisitions should work: acquisition of an electronically distributed journal or article collection should be automatic. However, most electronic journals received at the University Libraries of VPI & SU are received by a special account via electronic mail and moved from that account to a simple menu system. The entire system is based on a help facility for an IBM mainframe, but the essential ingredient is a knowledgeable person to manage the data. The system I developed is extremely simple to implement on any UNIX system and requires no human intervention once it is set up. It uses UNIX mail, gopher and WAIS along with a few simple shell script programs to manage new issues automatically. Here is how it works: A userid is setup for each new electronic journal to be received. A new directory is added to the gopher file structure to accommodate the new journal, and any back issues are added at that time. In this menu, two special menu items are required, one for browsing new issues and a second for searching the current article collection using WAIS. Using a shell script run by the UNIX cron program, any new mail for the electronic journal userid is collected nightly and moved to the gopher file system. The WAIS index for this title is also rebuilt so that the new articles or issues are incorporated into the database. At some predefined period of time, a second shell script is run by cron, moving an "expired" subset of the new data to a permanent location in the gopher menu. E-mail to Received on UNIX Moved to new issues directory in local userid mail server gopher menu by cron executed script +-----------+ +-----------------+ +-------------------------+ | New Issue |--> | UNIX spool file |--> | a gopher data directory |--> +-----------+ +-----------------+ +-------------------------+ +---------------+ +-------------------------------+ --> | WAIS database |--> | Permanent gopher subdirectory | +---------------+ +-------------------------------+ cron calls script Periodically, cron runs a second script to reindex articles to move articles to a permanent location. A system like this could be extended further. For example, information about the frequency of publication could be included in a program. If issues lapsed, acquisitions could be notified by electronic mail. Likewise, acquisitions could be notified of the arrival of each new issue by e-mail. Many assumptions were made: 1. Journals received were distributed by electronic mail. 2. Libraries would be willing to use WAIS for indexing the text. (Alternately, if they have a system running NeXTSTEP, they can use its indexing system. However, the main advantage of the NeXT indexing system is its support of boolean searching which is now available in some versions of WAIS). 3. Acquisition would take place on UNIX platforms. (It is highly dependent upon the automated cron program and UNIX mail.) 4. The library would be using a gopher menu system for end-user access. As a result of these assumptions, the methods discussed may work in part or completely on non-UNIX systems. As an information provider, I know that we need to help libraries lead the way in the early years of electronic publishing. Placing more of the workload on the computer makes sense whenever possible. Automating the electronic journal acquisition process is one way libraries can reduce the perceived burden of managing a new resource that some might consider exotic. Automatic acquisition also provides the full benefits of electronic journals to the end-user, such as timeliness and full text searching capabilities. Resolving this problem for libraries will serve to make electronic journals a more attractive format for end-users. The scripts and crontab entries for this system will be made available through the Scholarly Communications Project of Virginia Tech anonymous FTP archive at borg.lib.vt.edu in /pub/ejacq. James Powell >>> Library Automation, University Libraries, VPI&SU >>> JPOWELL@VTVM1.CC.VT.EDU O+> >>> jpowell@borg.lib.vt.edu - NeXTMail welcome here >>> Owner of VPIEJ-L, a discussion list for Electronic Journals 21-Mar-93 5:17:00-GMT,19001;000000000001 Received: from rutvm1.rutgers.edu by aramis.rutgers.edu (5.59/SMI4.0/RU1.5/3.08) id AA15099; Sun, 21 Mar 93 00:16:59 EST Message-Id: <9303210516.AA15099@aramis.rutgers.edu> Received: from RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (IBM VM SMTP R1.2.1MX) with BSMTP id 0349; Sun, 21 Mar 93 00:15:44 EST Received: from RUTVM1.BITNET (NJE origin LISTSERV@RUTVM1) by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (LMail V1.1d/1.7f) with BSMTP id 0797; Sun, 21 Mar 1993 00:15:43 -0500 Date: Sun, 21 Mar 1993 00:15:53 -0500 Reply-To: psyc@pucc.bitnet Sender: "PSYCOLOQUY: Refereed Electronic Journal of Peer Discussion" From: Stevan Harnad Subject: psycoloquy.93.4.15.frontal-cortex.2.neafsey (346 lines) Comments: To: psyc@pucc.bitnet To: Multiple recipients of list PSYC psycoloquy.93.4.15.frontal-cortex.2.neafsey Saturday 20 March 1993 ISSN 1055-0143 (14 paragraphs, 28 references, 340 lines) PSYCOLOQUY is sponsored by the American Psychological Association (APA) Copyright 1993 E.J. Neafsey FRONTAL CORTEX, THE MIND, AND THE BODY Commentary on Abbruzzeze et al. on Frontal-Cortex E.J. Neafsey Department of Cell Biology, Neurobiology & Anatomy Loyola University Medical Center 2160 S. First Avenue Maywood, IL 60153 USA eneafsey@lucpug.it.luc.edu 1.0 INTRODUCTION 1.1 In any discussion of frontal lobe function it is absolutely imperative to keep in mind the "motor outputs to the body" generated by the frontal lobe regions in question. Otherwise the discussion tends to leap quickly into abstract theories of higher cognitive function or descriptions of complex, self-contained cortico-cortical networks that appear utterly unconnected to the more mundane level of sensorimotor processing that describes what's really going on. Hughlings Jackson's (1887-88) assertion that the nervous system is "a sensori-motor mechanism from bottom to top; that every part of the nervous system represents impressions or movements, or both" applies most especially to the frontal lobe, precisely because it has so often been linked to "purely mental" higher cognitive activities. Irving Diamond (1979) expressed this Jacksonian view in another way when he argued that the "motor cortex" is best conceived not as restricted to the precentral gyrus but rather as layer V of the entire cerebral cortex. This is true because layer V, no matter where it is, contains neurons that project to subcortical "motor" targets such as the spinal cord, brainstem, or hypothalamus. (Diamond likewise argues that layer IV everywhere is the "sensory cortex" and that layers II and III everywhere are the "association cortex.") 1.2 For the target article (Abbruzzese et al., 1993), then, it is important to remember that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the orbitofrontal cortex have descending motor outputs that provide important clues about their functions. The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex projects directly to the superior colliculus (Goldman and Nauta, 1976), a midbrain structure that has a prominent role in the control of eye and head movements (Sparks, 1991). The orbitofrontal cortex, in contrast, projects directly to brainstem and and spinal visceral motor structures related to the autonomic nervous system and is also an important olfactory and visceral sensory area (see review by Neafsey, 1990). 2.0 DORSOLATERAL PREFRONTAL CORTEX AND "LOOKING" 2.1 The target article attributed the excessive perseverative errors on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST-PE) in schizophrenics to dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) damage or malfunction. I agree with Abbruzzeze et al. that the fundamental deficit following damage to this region is exactly this type of perseveration. The authors, however, do not attempt to "explain" why such perseverative errors occurred in either schizophrenics or following DLPFC damage. In contrast, another recent study of schizophrenics that also found perseverative deficits using a different task (oculomotor delayed response; Park and Holzman, 1992) went further and attributed the increased errors to impaired "spatial working memory," echoing Goldman-Rakic's (1987) interpretation of similar deficits on the same task in monkeys with DLPFC lesions. I have previously argued against such an interpretation, basing my objection on an extensive review of the prefrontal literature that hod found many studies explicitly rejecting a "memory hypothesis" (Neafsey, 1990). Instead, most studies strongly supported an "interference hypothesis" related to "excessive distractability." 2.2 This basic deficit was identified long ago by Malmo (1942), who originally proposed the "interference hypothesis" to explain frontal lobe delayed response deficits in monkeys. Pribram (1973) reaffirmed the viability of this hypothesis, asserting that it was "as it has been for three decades, the most viable and useful in explaining the effects of resection of the dorsolateral frontal cortex of primates." Evidence that the delayed response deficits in prefrontal primates are NOT memory deficits is provided by the COMPLETE RESTORATION of delayed response performance to normal levels in prefrontal animals by a variety of simple strategies that reduced "interfering" distractions or enhanced motivation. These included turning off the lights in the animal chamber during the delay (Malmo, 1942), delivering an additional food reward at stimulus presentation before delay begins (Finan, 1942), lightly sedating the monkeys with Nembutal (Wade, 1947), making them hungrier or colder (Pribram, 1950), or running sham release trials with no reward to extinguish responses to release after the delay (dogs; Konorski and Lawicka, 1964). 2.3 This last experiment (Konorski's dogs) is most revealing. Dogs were held by their trainer in front of three feeding tables (left, center, right). A clicking sound emanated from the "correct" table. The clicking sound stopped, a delay ensued, and then the dog was released. If he went to the correct table, he was fed. After training, normal dogs performed this task easily, while prefrontal dogs made many perseverative errors (often going to the same table every time no matter where the clicking was). What is most illuminating, however, is what the prefrontal dogs did AFTER they initially went to the incorrect table. With a choice of two remaining tables to approach, they ALWAYS went to the correct table! This demonstrates a perfectly intact memory, thereby eliminating any spatial working memory deficit explanation. 2.4 Guitton et al. (1985; also see Butter et al., 1989) showed that unilateral DLPFC lesions in man impair SUPPRESSION of saccades to the contralateral side. These subjects could not inhibit looking at a target that appeared on the screen even though they knew the task required them to look away from it because the "real target" would subsequently appear on opposite side. Thus, a simple sensorimotor deficit (can't inhibit looks = distractability => interference) can have devastating "cognitive" effects. This sensorimotor concept of DLPFC function is consistent with the target article's description of how schizophrenics could not easily "shift" ("look away"?) to a new response set during the WCST. 3.0 ORBITOFRONTAL CORTEX AND "FEELING" 3.1 The target article attributes the excessive perseverative errors on the object alternation test (OAT) in subjects with obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) to malfunction of the orbitofrontal cortex. In my opinion, any such explanation for these deficits must take into account several recent striking findings about the orbitofrontal cortex indicating that its primary role lies in the realm of affect and emotion. 3.2 The first important fact about the orbitofrontal cortex is that its primary motor output is directed at the autonomic and endocrine systems (see review by Neafsey, 1990). This includes DIRECT projections to brainstem and spinal autonomic "centers" such as the solitary nucleus of the vagus, periaqueductal gray, laterodorsal tegmental nucleus, and the sympathetic preganglionic neurons in the thoracic intermediolateral cell column (Terreberry and Neafsey, 1987; Hurley et al., 1991). These findings firmly plant the orbitofrontal cortex in the sensorimotor sphere. 3.3 The second and perhaps most important fact about the orbitofrontal cortex is that this is where EVR's primary brain damage is located. EVR is a patient who sustained bilateral damage to his orbitofrontal cortices during surgical removal of a brain tumor (Eslinger and Damasio, 1985). Despite intact and even above average or superior intelligence, memory, language, etc. following surgery, EVR was radically changed for the worse. 3.4 At the time of his operation EVR was a financial officer with a small company and a respected member of his community. He was married and the father of two children; his brothers and sisters considered him a role model and a natural leader. After the operation, EVR lost his job, went bankrupt, was divorced by his wife, and moved in with his parents. He subsequently married a prostitute and was divorced again within two years. Extensive psychological evaluations found no deficit; in fact, he was superior or above average on most tests (e.g., Verbal IQ of 125; Performance IQ of 124; normal MMPI; no difficulty on Wisconsin Card Sorting Test). He was also able to discuss the economy, foreign affairs, financial matters, and moral dilemmas sensibly and intelligently. Despite these normal findings, EVR was often unable to make simple, rapid decisions about what toothpaste to buy, what restaurant to go to, or what to wear. He would instead become stuck making endless comparisons and contrasts, often making no decision at all or a purely random one. 3.5 The clue that has led to a plausible explanation for EVR's puzzling combination of consistently poor decisions with superior cognitive abilities was the unexpected finding that he (and five other similar cases; Damasio et al., 1990) totally lacked sympathetically mediated skin conductance responses to both neutral and emotional visual images. A normal individual displays a much larger skin conductance response to a picture of a horribly mutilated automobile accident victim than he does to a picture of a table, for example. EVR's skin conductance recording was a flat line to both images -- no response at all, no distinction. In fact, at the end of the testing session EVR "noted that he had not experienced the kind of 'feeling' that he thought he ought to have in relation to some stimuli, given their content" (Damasio et al., 1990). (Interestingly, EVR did display skin conductance changes when he had to verbally describe the pictures as he viewed them.) 3.6 Luria and Homskaya (1964) had described similar frontal patients lacking skin conductance responses some years ago; Nauta (1971) insightfully termed their deficit "interoceptive agnosia" -- an ignorance due to the absence of normal visceral and somatic bodily responses that function as critical cues to the meaning or value of situations and thoughts. In other words, because EVR lacks normal physiological responses, he also lacks normal, immediate, intuitive, "gut feelings" to guide him through his decisions about either important or trivial matters. [This analysis recalls William James's so-called peripheral theory of the emotions (James, 1890); even critics of "peripheral" theories of emotion (e.g., Reisenzein, 1983) admit that physiological responses intensify emotional experience.] Damasio termed EVR's deficit "acquired sociopathy" because sociopaths also respond inappropriately to social situations and, interestingly, often show impaired or absent skin conductance responses (Damasio et al., 1990; Hare et al., 1978). My own laboratory (Frysztak and Neafsey, 1991) has reported similar reduced autonomic and behavioral fear responses in rats following frontal lesions. 3.7 A possible link between EVR and the OCD subjects studied in the target article is EVR's inability to make decisions because he became "stuck making endless comparisons and contrasts" as mentioned above. This is reminiscent of obsessive-compulsive behavior and suggests that an absence or diminution of normal emotion or feelings allows cognitive, "rational" evaluation to proceed endlessly because no "value" or "emotional preference" for one alternative can be established that stops the process. Perhaps the OCD subject cannot alternate because the "correct" choice lacks its normal emotional weight or force because it cannot be adequately "somatically marked" (Damasio et al., 1990) by normal amplitude physiological responses. 4.0 CONCLUSION 4.1 The fundamental problem with attempting to understand frontal cortical function using the computer-inspired, functionalist models of contemporary cognitive science is that such models are by definition "disembodied." As a result, the brain as well as the mind tends to become disembodied, even "ghostly," in the traditional, dualistic, Cartesian fashion, (Ryle [1949/1984] notwithstanding). Far better are attempts rooted in the views of Hughlings Jackson, for whom the brain from "bottom to top" never lost its fundamental and basic bodily orientation. Human beings think and know in an inescapably and inherently bodily manner, even at the "highest levels" of the prefrontal cortex. As Gleick (1992) notes in his biography of Richard Feynman, the physicist legendary for his intuitive understanding of the abstract and unimaginable theories of quantum mechanics, "Those who watched Feynman in moments of intense concentration came away with a strong, even disturbing sense of the physicality of the process, as though his brain did not stop with the gray matter but extended through every muscle in his body." REFERENCES Abbruzzese, M., Ferri, S., Bellodi, L., and Scarone, S. (1993) Frontal lobe dysfunction in mental illness. PSYCOLOQUY 4(9) frontal-cortex.1. Butter, C.M., Rapcsak, S., Watson, R.T., and Heilman, K.M. (1989) Changes in sensory inattention, directional motor neglect and "release" of the fixation reflex following a unilateral frontal lesion: a case report. Neuropsychologia, 26:533-545. Damasio, A.R., Tranel, D., and Damasio, H. (1990) Individuals with sociopathic behavior caused by frontal damage fail to respond autonomically to social stimuli. Behav. Brain. Res. 41: 81-94. Diamond, I.T. (1979) The subdivisions of neocortex: A proposal to revise the traditional view of sensory, motor, and association areas. In J.M. Sprague and A.N. Epstein (Eds.), "Progress in Psychobiology and Physiological Psychology," volume 8, Academic Press, New York, pp. 1-43. Eslinger, P.J. and Damasio, A.R. (1985) Severe disturbance of higher cognition after bilateral frontal lobe ablation: patient EVR. Neurology 35:1731-1741. Finan, J.L. (1942) Delayed response with a predelay reinforcement in monkeys after removal of the frontal lobes. Amer. J. Psychol., 55:202-214. Frysztak, R.J. and Neafsey, E.J. (1991) The effect of medial frontal cortex lesions on respiration, "freezing," and ultrasonic vocalizations during conditioned emotional responses in rats. Cerebral Cortex 1:418-425. Gleick, J. (1992) "Genius. The Life and Science of Richard Feynman." Random House, Inc., New York, p. 244. Goldman, P.S. and Nauta, W.J.H. (1976) Autoradiographic demonstration of a projection from prefrontal association cortex to the superior colliculus in the rhesus monkey. Brain Res., 116:145-149. Goldman-Rakic, P.S. (1987) Circuitry of primate prefrontal cortex ad regulation of behavior by representational memory. In F. Plum (Ed.), "Handbook of Physiology. Section 1: The Nervous System. Volume V. Higher Functions of the Brain, Part 1", pp. 373-417. Guitton, D., Buchtel, H.A., and Douglas, R.M. (1985) Frontal lobe lesions in man cause difficulties in suppressing reflexive glances and in generating goal-directed saccades. Exp. Brain Res., 58:455-472. Hare, R.D. (1978) Electrodermal and cardiovascular correlates of psychopathy. In "Psychopathic Behaviour: Approaches to Research." Edited by R.D. Hare and D. Schalling. Wiley, New York, pp. 107-143. Hurley, K.M., Herbert, H., Moga, M.M., and Saper, C.B. (1991) Efferent projections of the infralimbic cortex of the rat. J. Comp. Neurol. 308:249-276. Jackson, J.H. (1887-88). Remarks on evolution and dissolution of the nervous system. The Journal of Medical Science 33:25-48. As cited by Anne Harrington (1987) in "Medicine, Mind, and the Double Brain." Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, p. 211. James, W. (1890) "The Principles of Psychology." 2 vols. Henry Holt and Company, New York. Konorski, J. and Lawicka, W. (1964) Analysis of errors by prefrontal animals on the delayed-response test. In J.M. Warren and K. Akert (Eds.), "The Frontal Granular Cortex and Behavior", McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, pp. 271-294. Luria, A.R. and Homskaya, E.D. (1964) Disturbances in the regulative role of speech with frontal lobe lesions. In J.M. Warren and K. Akert (Eds.), "The Frontal Granular Cortex and Behavior", McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, pp. 353-371. Malmo, R.B. (1942) Interference factors in delayed response in monkeys after removal of frontal lobes. J. Neurophysiol., 5:295-308. Nauta, W.J.H. (1971) The problem of the frontal lobe: a reinterpretation. J. Psychiat. Res., 8:167-187. Neafsey, E.J. (1990) Prefrontal autonomic control in the rat: anatomical and electrophysiological observations. In "The Prefrontal Cortex: Its Structure, Function and Pathology." Edited by H.B.M. Uylings, C.G. Van Eden, J.P.C. De Bruin, M.A. Corner, and M.G.P. Feenstra. Progress in Brain Research 85:147-166. Elsevier, Amsterdam. Park, S. and Holzman, P.S. (1992) Schizophrenics show spatial working memory deficits. Arch. Gen. Psychiat. 49:975-982. Pribram, K.H. (1950) Some physical and pharmacological factors affecting delayed response performance of baboons following frontal lobotomy. J. Neurophysiol., 13:373-382. Pribram, K.H. (1973) The primate frontal cortex - executive of the brain. In K.H. Pribram and A.R. Luria (Eds.), "Psychophysiology of the Frontal Lobes", Academic Press, New York, pp. 293-314. Reisenzein, R. (1983) The Schacter theory of emotion: Two decades later. Psychological Bulletin 94:239-264. Ryle, G. (1949/1984) The concept of mind. Chicago : University of Chicago Press. Sparks, D.L. (1991) Sensori-motor integration in the primate superior colliculus. Seminars in the Neurosciences 3:39-50. Terreberry, R.R. and Neafsey, E.J. (1987) The rat medial frontal projects directly to autonomic regions of the brainstem. Brain Res. Bull. 19:639-649. Wade, M. (1947) The effect of sedatives upon delayed responses in monkeys following removal of the prefrontal lobes. J. Neurophysiol., 10:57-61. 21-Mar-93 5:21:09-GMT,12410;000000000001 Received: from rutvm1.rutgers.edu by aramis.rutgers.edu (5.59/SMI4.0/RU1.5/3.08) id AA15121; Sun, 21 Mar 93 00:21:08 EST Message-Id: <9303210521.AA15121@aramis.rutgers.edu> Received: from RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (IBM VM SMTP R1.2.1MX) with BSMTP id 0351; Sun, 21 Mar 93 00:19:54 EST Received: from RUTVM1.BITNET (NJE origin LISTSERV@RUTVM1) by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (LMail V1.1d/1.7f) with BSMTP id 0815; Sun, 21 Mar 1993 00:19:53 -0500 Date: Sun, 21 Mar 1993 00:20:10 -0500 Reply-To: psyc@pucc.bitnet Sender: "PSYCOLOQUY: Refereed Electronic Journal of Peer Discussion" From: Stevan Harnad Subject: psycoloquy.93.4.16.reading-inference.10.garnham (210 lines) Comments: To: psyc@pucc.bitnet To: Multiple recipients of list PSYC psycoloquy.93.4.16.reading-inference.10.garnham Sunday 21 March 1993 ISSN 1055-0143 (9 paragraphs, 5 references, 204 lines) PSYCOLOQUY is sponsored by the American Psychological Association (APA) Copyright 1993 Alan Garnham DICHOTOMY OR NOT DICHOTOMY?: THAT IS THE QUESTION Reply to Keenan on Garnham on Reading-Inference Alan Garnham Laboratory of Experimental Psychology University of Sussex Brighton BN1 9QG, UK +44-273-678337 alang@epunix.sussex.ac.uk 1.0 INTRODUCTION 1.1 No one can quibble with Keenan's (1993: 2.2.1) claim that if two theories are similar in one or more respects they may still differ in others. However, her application of this idea to the case of minimalism vs. constructionism, and her conclusion that the two can, after all, be contrasted with one another, is based on a misunderstanding of what I (Garnham, 1992) meant by claiming that minimalism vs constructionism is a false dichotomy in theories of inference during reading. 2.0 WHY THE DICHOTOMY IS A FALSE ONE 2.1 My point was that the dichotomy is a false one because minimalism and constructionism aren't theories about the same thing. Minimalism is a theory specifically about inference making and, at heart, a theory about which inferences are made during reading. It has nothing to say about the processes by which inferences are made -- except that those inferences are made automatically, in a particular technical sense of that term. Furthermore, there is general agreement that this claim is at best unsubstantiated and more probably incorrect. Neither does minimalism have much to say about what constitutes an inference. For example, although it claims that inferences establishing local coherence are made, it makes no attempt to specify what counts as establishing local coherence. 2.1 Constructionism is, to the best of my knowledge, not a theory at all. The label "constructionist" (or, better, "constructivist") can be applied to certain theories that McKoon and Ratcliff (1992: M&R) contrast with minimalism, but the claim that constructive processes contribute to inference making is only part of those theories. More particularly, it is not a claim that explains which inferences are made but, rather, one that explains how certain inferences are made, or how they would have to be made, if they were made properly (see below). My own view (see e.g. Garnham & Oakhill, 1993) is that what is needed is not a theory of inference making per se, but a theory of text and discourse comprehension, namely, the mental-models theory. According to that theory, constructive processes, as defined by Bransford, Barclay and Franks (1972: see Garnham, 1992: 3.2 for details), are a crucial part of text comprehension. In particular, constructive processes contribute to the making of many inferences in the course of comprehension. Note, however, that the claim is that constructive processes contribute to inference making, not that they constitute it. 2.3 Having identified the constructive nature of processes that contribute to inference making, the mental models theory holds that when one considers many of the inferences that M&R agree are drawn "automatically" during reading, constructive processes contribute to the making of them. This is not so much an empirical claim as an analytic one -- based on a detailed examination of what the inferences comprise. For example, the local coherence of a text in which "John stirred his coffee" is followed by "The spoon was dirty and tainted it" is, for most readers, underwritten by the general knowledge that spoons are used to stir coffee. This combination of information explicit in the text with relevant background knowledge, to produce a representation of the situation that the text is most probably about, is the hallmark of constructive processing. Of course, analysis cannot show that readers engage in constructive processing when they read a text containing these two sentences. It cannot even show that local coherence between the two might not, in some sense, be established by nonconstructive processes (see below). Even when it has analysed inferences, a theory of text comprehension still has to make empirical claims about whether, or under what circumstances, such inferences are made. However, by recognizing the need to provide an account of what constitutes an inference, the mental models theory is well placed to consider the kinds of process that must underlie the making of particular inferences, if they are made. 3.0 FOUR "DIFFERENCES" BETWEEN MINIMALISM AND CONSTRUCTIONISM 3.1 It is useful to consider Keenan's four proposed points of contrast between minimalism and constructionism in more detail, since they help to highlight possible disagreements about what inferences are made. Her first contrast is between minimalism's claim that few inferences are made and constructionism's claim that many are. In fact, only minimalism makes any claim about how many inferences are made. Although adherents of constructionist theories have often suggested that many inferences are made as a matter of course during reading, such theories need make no such claim. Indeed, it is reasonable to extend M&R's suggestion about the strategic nature of inference making to all inferences. If M&R's automatic inferences are not automatic in the technical sense, there may be circumstances in which even those inferences are not made -- perhaps, for example, when readers gets to the end of a page of text and realize they have taken nothing in from it. My own hunch, admitted unsubstantiated, is that there is a mode of reading that corresponds to one described by what I (Garnham, 1992: 2.1) identified as the precursor to M&R's minimalism. That is to say, a mode in which readers make just those inferences that are necessary for a coherent interpretation of the text and no more. 3.2 Keenan's second contrast is between the local inferences of minimalism and the local plus global inferences of constructionism. However, minimalism does not claim that global inferences are unnecessary for a proper interpretation of a text. It does not even claim that they are never made as a matter of course, since apparent local incoherence can sometimes only be resolved by global considerations, and M&R imply that it will be so resolved. Thus, the question of local vs local and global inferences is just another one about which inferences are made when. Hence, it is a question about which constructionism per se need have nothing to say. 3.3 The third contrast is between theories that focus on a representation of the linguistic form of the text being read and those that focus on a representation of the situation described by the text. Keenan (1993: 2.1) agrees with my remark (Garnham, 1992: 2.1) that minimalism is not a new position but points out that it provides a useful reminder of a striking aspect of the data on inference in reading. In a similar vein, I would argue that mental models theory provides a useful reminder of what should be an obvious point about text comprehension. When we read a simple descriptive text about the real world or an imaginary one, the information we extract from the text is information about that world. If we read (and understand) a newspaper article about, say, the events in Sarajevo on a certain day, we set up a mental representation of those events -- a mental model of a situation in the world. We are not primarily interested (unless, for example, we are literary theorists) in the linguistic form of the text. And although detailed processing guided by the form of the text is needed to create a mental model, no viable theory of text comprehension can be based on the idea that the aim of the processes it describes is to create a representation of the linguistic form of the text. That this point is not always obvious to psycholinguists is partly explained by the history of their discipline, and its preoccupations. 3.4 Finally, Keenan claims that minimalism posits little use of background knowledge in inference making while constructionism holds that there is extensive use of such knowledge. This claim is difficult to interpret because the background knowledge that must be used to make an inference is determined largely by the pieces of information to be linked. The inference connecting "John dropped the delicate glass pitcher on the hard floor" and "he went to fetch a broom" inevitably makes use of background knowledge about what happens when delicate glass objects hit hard floors. One interpretation of Keenan's claim would be that minimalists believe that background knowledge is little used, since few inferences are made. But on this interpretation the fourth contrast is just a special case of the first. Another possibility is that minimalism claims that readers try to avoid invoking background knowledge by using alternative heuristic strategies to establish local coherence. For example, instead of using constructive processes to interpret pronouns, they might use strategies such as subject assignment (take the pronoun to refer to the subject of the previous clause) or parallel function (take the pronoun to have the same grammatical role as its clause and its antecedent in its clause). Such nonconstructive processes may indeed be used by readers, but they will inevitably lead to errors of interpretation in one of the sentences in pairs such as: Max confessed to Bill because he wanted a reduced sentence. Max confessed to Bill because he offered a reduced sentence. 3.5 Greene, McKoon and Ratcliff (1992) have indeed put forward a hypothesis of this kind about pronoun assignment, based on the idea that there is often a preferred antecedent for pronouns in the reader's "focus of attention." Furthermore, Greene et al. claim that pronouns are not properly interpreted when the focus of attention fails to determine a unique referent -- at least, they are not properly interpreted when readers rely on "automatic" comprehension processes. Ironically, however, the experimental findings Greene et al. use to support this notion may have a strategic explanation. Their subjects were not forced to read for comprehension and could readily perform the probe task by simply registering the main content words. They did not need to look at the pronouns at all. REFERENCES Bransford, J.D., Barclay, J.R. & Franks, J.J. (1972). Sentence memory: A constructive versus interpretive approach. Cognitive Psychology, 3, 193-209. Garnham, A. (1992). Minimalism versus constructionism: A false dichotomy in theories of inference in reading. PSYCOLOQUY 3(63) reading-inference-1.1 Garnham, A. & Oakhill, J.V. (1993). Modeles mentaux et comprehension du langage. In M-F. Ehrlich, H. Tardieu & M. Cavazza (Eds.), Les modeles mentaux: Approche cognitive des representations. (pp.23-46). Paris: Masson. Greene, S.B., McKoon, G. & Ratcliff, R. (1992). Pronoun resolution and discourse models. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 18, 266-283. Keenan, J.M. (1993). Thoughts about the minimalist hypothesis. PSYCOLOQUY 4(2) reading-inference.3 McKoon, G. & Ratcliff, R. (1992). Inference during reading. Psychological Review, 99, 440-466. AUTHOR NOTE: My work on mental models has been supported by ESRC grant C 0023 2439 "Mental models and the interpretation of anaphora". Thanks to Jane Oakhill for comments on an earlier draft. 21-Mar-93 5:27:29-GMT,13601;000000000001 Received: from rutvm1.rutgers.edu by aramis.rutgers.edu (5.59/SMI4.0/RU1.5/3.08) id AA15335; Sun, 21 Mar 93 00:27:28 EST Message-Id: <9303210527.AA15335@aramis.rutgers.edu> Received: from RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (IBM VM SMTP R1.2.1MX) with BSMTP id 0362; Sun, 21 Mar 93 00:26:13 EST Received: from RUTVM1.BITNET (NJE origin LISTSERV@RUTVM1) by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (LMail V1.1d/1.7f) with BSMTP id 0851; Sun, 21 Mar 1993 00:26:12 -0500 Date: Sun, 21 Mar 1993 00:26:29 -0500 Reply-To: psyc@pucc.bitnet Sender: "PSYCOLOQUY: Refereed Electronic Journal of Peer Discussion" From: Stevan Harnad Subject: psycoloquy.93.4.17.reading-inference.11.garnham (238 lines) Comments: To: psyc@pucc.bitnet To: Multiple recipients of list PSYC psycoloquy.93.4.17.reading-inference.11.garnham Sunday 21 March 1993 ISSN 1055-0143 (11 paragraphs, 9 references, 232 lines) PSYCOLOQUY is sponsored by the American Psychological Association (APA) Copyright 1993 Alan Garnham AN IMPARTIAL VIEW OF INFERENCE MAKING Reply to Zwaan & Graesser on Garnham on Reading-Inference Alan Garnham Laboratory of Experimental Psychology University of Sussex Brighton BN1 9QG, UK +44-273-678337 alang@epunix.sussex.ac.uk 1.0 INTRODUCTION 1.1 I agree with Zwaan and Graesser (1993: title) that "there is no empirical evidence that some inferences are automatically or partially encoded in text comprehension." They recognize that I agree with them on the first point, about automaticity, but they believe I disagree on the second, about partial encoding. 2.0 ON AUTOMATICITY 2.1 Zwaan and Graesser point out that my arguments against automaticity (Garnham, 1992: 2.3) "could be strengthened by taking a more theoretical perspective on automaticity" (1993: 1.1). Indeed, it was only lack of space, and the knowledge that Glenberg and Mathew (1992) had commented extensively on the notion of automaticity, that prevented me from developing this point. My comment that if McKoon & Ratcliff (M&R) (1992) were right about automaticity nonminimal inferences "should be distinguishable from minimal inferences using the normal criteria for differentiating automatic and strategic processing" (1992: 2.3) was intended as an allusion to just the kind of theoretical perspective that Zwaan and Graesser have in mind (e.g., that of Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). I also agree with Zwaan and Graesser (1993: 2.3) that the question of whether inferences are drawn automatically is, in principle, an empirical one, although I am less sanguine than they that the issue is easily resolvable using the kind of dual task methodology they hint at. 3.0 PARTIAL ENCODING OF INFERENCES 3.1 On the notion of partly encoded inferences, Zwaan and Graesser have overinterpreted my endorsement (Garnham, 1992: 6.2) of M&R's notion of partly encoded inferences and, hence, overestimated my agreement with M&R. Mine was intended only as a general endorsement of the attempt to "[break] away from an oversimplistic view of inference making"; I was not endorsing the particular way M&R have tried to do so. In fact, I do not have a notion of partly encoded inferences but, rather, one in which the processes that contribute to an inference occur at different times. M&R's notion of inferences being encoded at different strengths rests, in my view, on their failing to make a clear distinction between a methodology (priming) and the phenomenon it is used to investigate (inference making). More generally, it rests on the failure, which I was only able to hint at in my target article (Garnham, 1992: 6.5), to draw a distinction between a computational theory of text comprehension and an account of the representations and processes used in inference making. 3.2.0 COMPONENTS OF INFERENCE MAKING 3.2.1 I will attempt to clarify my own position before turning to problems with the notion of partly encoded inferences. Consider the standard mental-models account of a spatial inference from, say, "the spider is to the left of the caterpillar" and "the caterpillar is to the left of the ant" to "the spider is to the left of the ant." The theory claims that, at least under some circumstances, the first two sentences will be encoded into a mental analogue of the three-item "array" the sentences describe. Does the setting up of the array constitute the making of the inference about the spatial relation between the spider and the ant? That relation is, in a sense, encoded into the array. But if the information about the spider being to the left of the ant is to guide behavior, it must be read out of the array. The processes that do this reading out are by no means trivial. So it could be argued that the inference is not completed until this reading out occurs. The question is not about when inferences are first partially encoded and when they are encoded more strongly (Zwaan & Graesser, 1993: 3.2), but about when the component processes of inference making occur. Because there can be several component processes, and because they may be invoked at different times, it can be misleading to say that the inference is made at a particular time. 3.2.2 It should be obvious from this characterization that I by no means want "to throw the baby out with the bathwater" (Zwaan & Graesser, 1993: 1.2, see also 3.1) and dispense with online studies of inference making. Indeed, the identification of component processes of inference making increases the complexity of the questions that have to be addressed in online studies. Which processes occur immediately? When do the others occur? Which, if any, are automatic, in the technical sense? How do we find evidence for particular processes having taken place? 3.3.0 INFERENCES ENCODED WITH DIFFERENT STRENGTHS 3.3.1 M&R's notion of a partially encoded inference is quite different from the one I have just sketched. The idea is not based on an analysis of inference making into component parts. It focuses on the final product of the inference making process, conceived as an inferred proposition, or set of propositions (e.g. "the spider is to the left of the ant"), and it assumes that the different strengths at which it can be encoded reflect different degrees to which the inference has been made. 3.3.2 M&R's notion of degree of encoding has, in fact, two components: specificity of information inferred and strength of memory trace (see e.g. 1990: 316-320). However, it is misleading to refer to a less specific inference as a partial encoding of a more specific one. Someone reading "the container held the cola" may infer that the container is either a glass or a bottle or a can or..., rather than simply inferring that it is a bottle (see also Gumenik, 1979, and cf. Anderson & Ortony, 1975). However, in this case, the more specific inference is not weakly encoded; it is simply not warranted, and, on Gumenik's evidence, it is not encoded at all. M&R are right to distinguish specificity from strength and to note that inferences vary in their specificity, but they are wrong to characterize less specific inferences as weak encodings of more specific ones. 3.3.3 M&R support their claims about strength of encoding primarily with data from priming experiments. In the simplest case, speeded response (or false positive response in a probe task) to "spoon" after reading "John stirred his coffee" would be taken as evidence for the inference "John used a spoon to stir his coffee," and no speeding of the response (or no increase in false positives), relative to a control condition, would be taken as evidence that the inference had not been made. Under different circumstances, the response to "spoon" might be speeded (or the false positives increased) by different amounts. This pattern of findings might suggest that the inference is encoded at different strengths. 3.3.4 The idea that information in memory is more or less available is a truism. However, there are problems in interpreting data from priming experiments in the way M&R do. First, although it is not always apparent in an experimental situation, inferences from real texts lead to the encoding of information about particular people, particular things, particular places, particular times, and so on. To a subject in an experiment, a sentence such as "John stirred his coffee" has little significance, but if it were used to describe a situation in the world, it would be about a particular person called John and a particular coffee he had at a particular time. Very often, such a sentence would be the reader's only source of information about the event it described. So if information about the (probable) use of a spoon in this particular event is encoded, it requires the addition of information into the mental model of the event by constructive processes. And although this part of the model is constructed from elements that already exist in memory -- information about spoons in general, for example, and their use in stirring coffee -- activation of these elements does not, in itself, count as partial encoding of the inference. The inference has not been encoded at all until at least a start has been made on constructing the appropriate part of the mental model of the specific situation (John's use of the spoon). Once this part of the model has been constructed, it may be more or less readily available, but even if it is comparatively unavailable, because its memory trace is weak, the inference has still been made. More generally, speeded or false positive response to an inference-related word in a priming experiment does not necessarily indicate that the inference has been made. Neither need the making of an inference be reflected in the "priming" of particular words. 3.3.5 The simplest case in which priming must not be confused with inference making is when the probe word is associatively or semantically related to a word in the text that supports the inference. This problem is widely recognized, however, and almost invariably controlled for. Another possibility, which I have hinted at above, is that explicit information about a particular person (John) engaging in a particular act of coffee stirring makes available to the reader general knowledge about coffee drinking. This knowledge includes information about things (sugar and milk or cream) being added to coffee and the subsequent need for the coffee to be stirred. It also makes available information about spoons being the typical instruments for stirring coffee. So information about spoons could become active, and produce priming for "spoon," before or without the encoding of the particular information that, in the particular act of coffee stirring being described, a spoon was used. There is indeed some evidence that the activation of knowledge structures can prime words linked with them (e.g. Sharkey & Mitchell, 1985). Amount of priming could, therefore, be a reflection of how strongly the relevant background knowledge is activated, and not of the encoding of an inference. 3.3.6 Conversely, making an inference need not result in the "priming" of a probe word. Priming presumably arises from the activation of either an entry in the mental lexicon or a concept. The inference that John used a spoon to stir his coffee results in a representation of a particular object (the spoon in question) and its role in a particular event. The relation between the representation of an object in a mental model and the activation of the lexical entries of words that could be used to describe that object, or of general concepts under which the object falls, is not well understood. It is not impossible, however, that the activation, if any, would not be detected in a priming experiment. REFERENCES Anderson, R.C. & Ortony, A. (1975). On putting apples into bottles: A problem of polysemy. Cognitive Psychology, 7, 167-180. Garnham, A. (1992). Minimalism versus constructionism: A false dichotomy in theories of inference in reading. PSYCOLOQUY 3(63) reading-inference-1.1. Glenberg, A.M. & Mathew, S. (1992). When minimalism is not enough: Mental models in reading comprehension. PSYCOLOQUY 3(64) reading-inference-2.1. Gumenik, W.E. (1979). The advantage of specific terms over general terms as cues for sentence recall: Instantiation or retrieval? Memory and Cognition, 7, 240-244. McKoon, G. & Ratcliff, R. (1990). Dimensions of inference. In A.C. Graesser & G.H. Bower (Eds.), Inference and text comprehension (The psychology of learning and motivation, Vol. 25, pp. 313-328). San Diego: Academic Press McKoon, G. & Ratcliff, R. (1992). Inference during reading. Psychological Review, 99, 440-466. Shiffrin, R.M. & Schneider, W. (1977). Controlled and automatic human information processing: II. perceptual learning, automatic attending, and a general theory. Psychological Review, 84, 127-190. Sharkey, N.E. & Mitchell, D.C. (1985). Word recognition in a functional context: The use of scripts in reading. Journal of Memory and Language, 24, 253-270. Zwaan, R.A. & Graesser, A.C. (1993). There is no empirical evidence that some inferences are automatically or partially encoded in text comprehension. PSYCOLOQUY 4(5) reading-inference.6. AUTHOR NOTE: My work on mental models has been supported by ESRC grant C 0023 2439 "Mental models and the interpretation of anaphora. Thanks to Jane Oakhill for comments on an earlier draft. 21-Mar-93 5:40:18-GMT,15740;000000000001 Received: from rutvm1.rutgers.edu by aramis.rutgers.edu (5.59/SMI4.0/RU1.5/3.08) id AA15439; Sun, 21 Mar 93 00:40:17 EST Message-Id: <9303210540.AA15439@aramis.rutgers.edu> Received: from RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (IBM VM SMTP R1.2.1MX) with BSMTP id 0373; Sun, 21 Mar 93 00:39:02 EST Received: from RUTVM1.BITNET (NJE origin LISTSERV@RUTVM1) by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (LMail V1.1d/1.7f) with BSMTP id 0887; Sun, 21 Mar 1993 00:39:01 -0500 Date: Sun, 21 Mar 1993 00:39:15 -0500 Reply-To: psyc@pucc.bitnet Sender: "PSYCOLOQUY: Refereed Electronic Journal of Peer Discussion" From: Stevan Harnad Subject: psycoloquy.93.4.18.fodor-representation.4.wallis (272 lines) Comments: To: psyc@pucc.bitnet To: Multiple recipients of list PSYC psycoloquy.93.4.18.fodor-representation.4.wallis Sun 21 March 1993 ISSN 1055-0143 (12 paragraphs, 11 references, 266 lines) PSYCOLOQUY is sponsored by the American Psychological Association (APA) Copyright 1993 Charles S. Wallis MENTAL REPRESENTATION AND COGNITIVE SCIENCE Reply to DeWitt and to Pietroski on Wallis on Fodor-Representation Charles S. Wallis Department of Philosophy University of Rochester Rochester, NY 14627 crlw@troi.cc.rochester.edu 1.0. PIETROSKI 1.1. Pietroski (1993) agrees that Fodor's (1990) theory of mental representation proves inapplicable to the cited work from cognitive science. However, Pietroski asserts that Fodor's intent as well as his commitments require only that he provide a theory of representation for states like beliefs. Pietroski adds that a different, (possibly) compatible theory of representation will help one to understand the work in cognitive science to which I allude. Hence, Pietroski concludes that by pointing out the inapplicability of Fodor's theory of representation to vast areas of cognitive science, my target article (Wallis 1992) is misdirected. For Pietroski, the relevant worry is over Gricean "non-natural" meaning. 1.2. I worry that philosophers of cognitive science pay too little attention to actual, Nobel prize winning work in cognitive science. Equally worrisome is that, on Fodor's account, the outputs of at least some of these "other" processes are Fodorian beliefs. Indeed, properties like barnhood are exactly the sort of "inferred representations" to which Fodor claims to address himself (Fodor 1991, pp.255-57). In my target article, I surveyed various contemporary theories of these "other" processes to see (1) whether any result in Fodor's brand of mental representation, and (2) just how much explanation one can do without Fodor's mental representation. I take it that it should embarrass Fodor that his account does not assign representational content to the outputs of a process like object recognition given the best current theory of that process. Pietroski, however, does not share my worries, so I put aside this disagreement and turn to the barn example, the one case that Pietroski finds interesting. 1.3. Pietroski suggests (section 5) that Fodor remains unscathed by my barn case because, "suppose agents come to believe (because they look closely) that the building in question is only an inch deep. This would break the large-red-(etc.)/B-token connection, at least for the object at hand, without breaking the barn/B-token connection." I find two problems here. First, if the only way to break the facsimile to Sb connection is by having another belief (that barns have a depth greater than one inch, that the object is too thin to be a barn, and/or etc.), then Fodor becomes a content holist. Second, if one could break the facsimile to Sb connection without breaking the barn to Sb connection merely by gaining a new belief about a particular instance, then one could break the barn to Sb connection without breaking the facsimile to Sb connection by falsely believing a barn (perhaps because of the testimony of a friend) to be a facsimile. This last problem is part of the reason Fodor wants "to do it in terms of nomic relations among properties rather than causal relations among individuals" (Fodor 1990, p.102). 1.4. Defining representation in terms of lawlike relations between properties raises its own potential problems for Fodor that I do not mention in my article. For a state to have nomic relations between the property of barnhood and the property of Sb-hood, all manner of barns must cause Sb. So red barns, green barns, barns shaped like giant question marks, barns shaped like balls of yarn, etc., must all cause Sbs. Hence, for Fodor, one cannot recognize red barns as barns unless one can recognize any instance of a barn as a barn. Fodor might add a ceteris paribus clause to the law in an attempt to rule out barns that neither he nor I recognize as barns. I have commented upon the deficiencies of that strategy elsewhere (Wallis, forthcoming). 1.5. Regardless of the problems (or lack thereof) in appealing to properties, the appeal to properties does not help with the first problem: holism. Pietroski, I think, agrees with me that for Sb to count as a barn representation for Fodor, it must be the case that (A) one can somehow rule out every kind of facsimile and (B) the mechanism whereby one rules out facsimiles does not necessitate one's having any other contentful states (i.e. mental representations). The former, (A), is required by Fodor's definition. I hold that (B) is necessary for Fodor to avoid content holism with regard to the mental. Indeed, one can make the following substitutions into Fodor's definition of content holism: The language of thought would be content holistic if "no expression in [the] language [of thought] can have [a content] unless... at least one other [expression] does" (Fodor & Lepore 1992, 257-260). As a result, having a belief that "Yonder lies a barn" cannot require my having other beliefs, such as the belief that "Barns have a depth greater than one inch." 1.6. Pietroski might offer Fodor's defence against the sort of holism accusations I raise here and in my target article. Pietroski might note that Fodor could respond by saying: The functional role (the beliefs and the inferences one makes from them) does not determine the content identity of Sb; content identity gets determined by the fact that the system's tokening of Sbs satisfies the definition for representation with respect to barns. One gets the bad version of holism only when one identifies having a content with having some particular functional role. Fodor might add that he makes appeals to functional role, but that on his account functional role only mediates the system's satisfaction of the representational definition with respect to barns; the functional role does not determine the content. Many different functional relationships might well mediate the satisfaction of the definition. So Fodor's account would be holistic, but not in the bad way, because it does not identify content with some specific functional role (Fodor, 1991, pp.268-71, 301-3) 1.7. Facsimiles are problems for Fodor precisely because ruling them out (even to the extent to which humans are capable of doing do) seems to involve a great deal of knowledge. It is no accident, in my opinion, that Pietroski finds it relevant that "one cannot KNOW (pace Wallis) that (all) large red buildings having extended triangular bodies are barns" (section 4). Fodor/Pietroski have admitted that they need everything -- the system's entire cognitive apparatus -- in order to determine mental representational content. In fact, they need the system and the super-theory by which one could detect all facsimiles. They need lots and lots of beliefs, most (all?) of which must be true. False beliefs, or too few beliefs, will let facsimiles slip by. Indeed, Fodor/Pietroski cannot accept the following scenario involving too little knowledge: Knowing only that barns are red-extended-triangle-on- top-of-extended-rectangle buildings in which farmers keep livestock, I walk out to a good facsimile, and look inside. I see nothing, saying, "Wow, this barn is sure empty." I note that the walls are weak and thin, saying, "Wow, this barn is sure flimsy." I walk away. Nor can they allow the following scenario involving false belief: I know incredible amounts about the king. I think about him often in my dealings with him. I even know that the king has an evil look-alike. However, I falsely believe that the look-alike, not the king, has a small birthmark -- their only difference. Fodor must reject this story, because one can break the king to 'king' connection by revealing the birthmark without breaking the look-alike to 'king' connection. Hence, according to Fodor's account I have never thought of the king as the king. Rather, I think always of the king as the look-alike. 1.8. Are the above scenarios a problem for Fodor? Consider the following dark confessions of the Fodorian soul: "Now, consider the following (slight) difference between me and my almost-Twin; he thinks "You never find water in Pepsi bottles" [note deleted] and I don't think this. So then there are likely to be environments... in which he would have 'water' thoughts where I would not... This is, of course, a real problem for a naturalistic semantics; maybe it's the ultimate problem for a naturalistic semantics" (Fodor 1991, p.302). How, then, might Fodor deal with this problem? "I don't want to consider how an informational theory might hope to cope with this problem; suffice it to say that you get some room to wiggle if you think of the denotation in terms of the nomic relations among properties (instead of covariances among their instantiations) since you might then argue that the Pepsi guy and the non-Pepsi guy are both subsumed by a water 'water' law despite the postulated differences between them. (Remember these are ceteris paribus laws." (Fodor 1991, pp.302-303). In appealing to functional roles, one inherits the problem (from functional role semantics) of determining the relevant functional roles for assigning content. So, appealing to functional roles does not necessarily solve the disjunction problem, as one may have false beliefs or incomplete sets of beliefs. One therefore cannot determine the relevant functional roles and hence solve the disjunction problem simply by somehow resorting to nomic relations among properties (forget the problems there) and ceteris paribus clauses (forget the problems there). I conclude that Pietroski has not seen Fodor unscathed, even on the assumption that Fodor need have nothing to say about my other cases. I now turn to DeWitt's commentary. 2.0. DEWITT 2.1. I agree with DeWitt's (1993) claim (section 3.5) that representation "has important implications for foundational issues in cognitive science... [a]nd these foundational issues are potentially more worrisome than they are generally given credit for." However, I would defend Fodor and philosophy against the charge that they consider mental representation "an idle puzzle" (DeWitt, section 3.5). 2.2. DeWitt first raises concerns regarding the causal efficacy of mental representations given that the physical properties of a system's state (and not the representational properties) seem to cause a system's state transitions. I note that the causal status of mental representations is an instance of the problem of the causal efficacy of mental properties, a problem faced by dualists (the problem of interaction between mental and physical substances) and reductive physicalists alike. Moreover, this problem has not gone unnoticed in philosophy. A brief list of recent attempts by philosophers to address this problem would include Cummins (1989), Dretske (1988), Fodor (1990), Skillen (1984), Sosa (1984), and myself (Wallis, forthcoming). 2.3. DeWitt suggests that Fodor's commitments give him particular problems as regards the causal efficacy of mental representations; he concludes that Fodor must find a naturalized theory of mental representation to save his career project from collapse. It is true that Fodor needs a naturalized theory of mental representation in order to make his overall position work. However, a great many philosophers and cognitive scientists would find their career projects damaged by a the failure to develop a naturalized theory of mental representation. Though the causal efficacy of mental representations is a problem, I find no reason to single out Fodor. 2.4. Turning to DeWitt's allegation of vacuous circularity with regard to explanations of cognition in terms of mental representation, I think that even allowing for his necessary brevity he overstates the case. DeWitt claims (3.4) that lacking a naturalized account "mental representations are, roughly, those things that cognitive agents have. In turn, the usual definition of cognition, and hence of cognitive agents, makes essential use of the notion of representation." However, merely lacking a definition (of mental representation) does not commit one to vacuously circular explanations. In "Le Malade Imaginaire," Moliere points to the seeming vacuous circularity of the medical knowledge of his time. Moliere's doctoral candidate explains the ability of opium to put one to sleep by appealing solely to its "virtus dormitiva," the latin phrase for "sleep-causing power." Representation is not used in this manner in cognitive science. One does not explain object recognition solely by saying that the system has mental representations. Nor does one respond to queries about the nature of mental representation by saying that mental representation consists in the power to recognize objects. One may hold the commitment that cognitive systems have representations without holding either that only cognitive systems represent, or that being had by a cognitive system is sufficient for being a representation. One can in fact maintain the separateness of being a representation from being had by a cognitive system, even if one wants, as Fodor does, to draw a distinction between mental and nonmental systems in terms of the types of representational properties had by their respective states. DeWitt correctly warns against lapsing into circularity in the absence of an adequate definition of representation, but I think his worry that such a lapse has already occurred is overstated. REFERENCES Cummins, R. (1989) Meaning and Mental Representation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. DeWitt, R. (1993) Representation and the Foundations of Cognitive Science. PSYCOLOQUY 4(11) fodor-representation.3 Dretske, F. (1988) Explaining Behavior. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Fodor, J. (1990) A Theory of Content and Other Essays. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Fodor, J. (1991) Replies. In: B. Loewer & G. Rey (eds.) Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. Fodor J. and Lepore, E. (1992) Holism: A Shopper's Guide. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. Pietroski, P. (1993) Fodor Unscathed. PSYCOLOQUY 4(10) fodor-representation.2. Skillen, A. (1984) Mind and Matter: A Problem that Refuses Dissolution in Mind 93 (372) 514-526. Sosa, E. (1984) Mind-body Interaction and Supervenient Causation in Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol 9. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Wallis, C. (forthcoming) Dretske, Representation and the Mental/Non-mental Distinction. The Journal of Experimental and Theoretic Artificial Intelligence. Wallis, C. (1992) Asymmetric Dependence and Mental Representation. PSYCOLOQUY 3(70) fodor-representation.1. 21-Mar-93 5:44:32-GMT,12101;000000000001 Received: from rutvm1.rutgers.edu by aramis.rutgers.edu (5.59/SMI4.0/RU1.5/3.08) id AA15470; Sun, 21 Mar 93 00:44:31 EST Message-Id: <9303210544.AA15470@aramis.rutgers.edu> Received: from RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (IBM VM SMTP R1.2.1MX) with BSMTP id 0386; Sun, 21 Mar 93 00:43:16 EST Received: from RUTVM1.BITNET (NJE origin LISTSERV@RUTVM1) by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (LMail V1.1d/1.7f) with BSMTP id 0923; Sun, 21 Mar 1993 00:43:15 -0500 Date: Sun, 21 Mar 1993 00:43:29 -0500 Reply-To: psyc@pucc.bitnet Sender: "PSYCOLOQUY: Refereed Electronic Journal of Peer Discussion" From: Stevan Harnad Subject: psycoloquy.93.4.19.fodor-representation.5.mortensen (200 lines) Comments: To: psyc@pucc.bitnet To: Multiple recipients of list PSYC psycoloquy.93.4.19.fodor-representation.5.mortensen Sun 21 March 1993 ISSN 1055-0143 (10 paragraphs, 7 references, 194 lines) PSYCOLOQUY is sponsored by the American Psychological Association (APA) Copyright 1993 Chris Mortensen & Gerard O'Brien REPRESENTATION AND CAUSAL ASYMMETRY Commentary on Wallis on Fodor-Representation Chris Mortensen & Gerard O'Brien Department of Philosophy The University of Adelaide Adelaide, SA 5001, Australia cmortens@adam.adelaide.edu.au gobrien@adam.adelaide.edu.au 1. One popular approach to the naturalization of intentionality is to equate the semantic properties of mental representations with the information they carry, where the information they carry is unpacked in terms of reliable causal covariance. Information-based approaches to semantics, however, have a notorious problem in accounting for cases of misrepresentation. If mental tokens represent their reliable causes, then as long as such tokens are reliably caused they cannot be false. Yet such false tokens are reliably caused all the time. 2. Jerry Fodor (1987, 1990) has addressed the problem of misrepresentation in informational semantics. He argues that an examination of the counterfactual causal relations that surround the tokening of mental states reveals a special kind of nomic dependency that privileges certain of their causes over the rest. In particular, there is a crucial asymmetry, he argues, between (what can be described as) the `true' and `false' causes of a mental state token, since the false causes of such a token are nomically dependent on the true causes but not conversely. This asymmetry is demonstrated by the fact that breaking the true-cause-to-mental-token link breaks the false link, but breaking the false link does not break the true. Thus, Fodor's suggestion is that while representation cannot be simply reduced to information, it can be reduced to information-plus-asymmetric-dependence. 3. Wallis (1993) argues that Fodor's account of representation gives implausible results when applied to cases of misrepresentation in transduction, feature detection and object recognition. In response, we argue that the considerations Wallis brings to bear do not undermine the substantive aspects of Fodor's account as such, but merely suggest that it is in need of more complicated modification. 4. Wallis's argumentative strategy is to begin with an interpretation of the activity of neural states (cells or cell assemblies) inspired by current information-processing theories in that domain. He then seeks to demonstrate that Fodor's theory of representation is unable to sustain this favoured interpretation because circumstances can be contrived such that the interpretation fails to meet the criterion of asymmetric dependence. We maintain, however, that what Wallis highlights in these cases is that Fodor's condition of asymmetric dependence is trivially false as it stands. There will always be a way of breaking the false-cause-to-mental-token link which breaks the true-cause-to- mental-token link. Apart from the utterly trivial ways (either destroying the organism or breaking the false link by means of breaking the true), one can, because true and false causal chains converge at some point if they produce mental tokens of the same representational type, break the false link anywhere after that point. If the first point of convergence is the mental token itself, break the false link by removing the capacity of the organism to have the mental token. Similarly, there are always trivial ways to break the true link that do not break the false one. Since true and false links diverge in their causes at some point, screen the organism from true causes earlier than that point. If the first point of convergence is reception/transduction at or near the skin surface, modify the external environment so that no true stimuli get through, but false stimuli do. 5. Wallis's objections to Fodor in cases of transduction and object recognition fall into these categories, we claim. Considering light transducers (rods) which are also susceptible to heat, Wallis notes that modifying the transducers (rhodopsin) to prevent false heat stimuli from producing characteristic effects is just as apt to prevent true photon stimuli doing the same as vice versa. He also notes the symmetry between environmental modifications to screen true and false stimuli respectively: each can be achieved independently of the other. Considering colour receptors (cones): Wallis notes that colour-response curves overlap, which permits phantom/false phenomena, but also ensures that there is no physically possible way of changing the transduction properties relative to one colour without doing the same for another colour. Again, environmental modifications obviously will show the same symmetries. Considering object recognition, Wallis notes that breaking the barn-facsimile to barn-representation connection (by breaking the internal causal chain at the rectangle-triangle-red-above to barn- representation connection) also breaks the barn to barn-representation connection. And externally, breaking the barn to barn-representation connection by screening the organism from real barns does not inevitably break the barn-facsimile to barn-representation link. 6. The story is more complicated for the case of edge detection. Edge detectors are made of cells which work by decreasing response to angles further from the given angle, or fade-out over a range rather than a sharp spike at a single angle; but an edge detector might also be identified as an assemblage big enough to have only the sharp spike response. Wallis proposes that the spread of response in the former case eliminates any possibility of asymmetry of Fodor's kind. Now what is to count as false/phantom behaviour here? If the true angle is identified as the peak response, a definite A degrees, then any response of that module to a different angle counts as phantom. Here it would seem that it would, at least in principle, be easier to find some way to tune out a given phantom response than to find some way of tuning out peak response without interfering with a given phantom response (a promissory note, admittedly). If the true angle is rather a preferred central range, then only responses from stimuli outside that range count as phantom; but then there is also the problem of why one should identify the latter as abnormal functioning. If, alternatively, an edge detector is big enough to have a sharp response, then it has to be shown that phantom phenomena do occur. Thus, Wallis's argument around these points would seem to deserve an account of precisely what abnormal response he is claiming symmetry for. 7. But if Fodor's view is trivially false, one should consider the possibility that it was merely expressed carelessly. Two obvious modifications present themselves. First, to avoid the objections which turn on linkage breaking in the external environment one simply rules them out: only breakings of causal chains within the skin are to be considered. After all, causal chains outside the skin threaten asymmetry too easily, because it is too easy to break the true link by appropriate screening without breaking the false link. Second, to avoid the objections which turn on linkage breaking beyond the point of commonality in the causal chains, one interprets Fodor as intending the asymmetry to be as follows: the true link cannot be broken without breaking the false link, but there are ways of breaking the false link which do not break the true link. Then, the existence of ways of breaking both is an insufficient objection. 8. Needless to say, one must show that there are the appropriate asymmetries. But at least for transduction and feature detection, this is not so implausible. Interference with the mechanism in `normal' operation of the sensory mechanism ought to throw the whole system off, while arguably there are always some ways to get rid of false stimuli without obstructing normal operations. 9. The modifications proposed here do not overcome one of Wallis's objections to Fodor's account in the case of object recognition: In the language of possibilia, in any nearby possible world in which barn- facsimiles fail to cause the tokening of barn-representations, real barns would also fail to do so. Consequently, the counterfactuals fail to elicit any asymmetry at this level. This problem with Fodor's account has been highlighted by a number of authors (e.g. Godfrey-Smith, 1989; Sterelny, 1990, Chp.6; Jones, Mulaire and Stich, 1991). Fodor's (1990) response is to go beyond pure informational semantics to seek the necessary asymmetry in the causal history of mental state tokens. That is, representation reduces to asymmetric nomic-dependency-plus-actual-casual-history. Barn-facsimile-caused barn-representations are false because they are historically asymmetrically dependent on barn-caused barn-representations. This provides the ontological depth that cannot be accounted for by causal laws alone. 10. Wallis is dismissive of this "line of retreat," but we find his reasons unconvincing. It is surely unreasonable to require a perceptual mechanism to display asymmetric behaviour with respect to a facsimile barn. An object-recognizer ought to be positively fooled by such cases. So if there is any asymmetric condition to separate the normal operation of a barn recognizer from a barn-representation produced by a facsimile barn, it will be causal-historical asymmetry. Moreover, much of Wallis's disquiet at this point seems to be based on a misunderstanding of the explanatory role of mental content in computational cognitive science. He seems to suggest that any theory of mental representation that implicates the causal history of mental states is incompatible with a computational theory of object recognition (e.g. Biederman, 1987). Now this incompatibility would only exist if the content of a representational state played a direct causal role in mental processes. But, according to computational cognitive science at least, mental processes do not have access to the semantic properties of the mental states over which they are defined. Hence the role of mental content is indirect, but quite compatible with a theory of representation that defers to causal history. REFERENCES Biederman, I. 1987, Recognition by Components: A Theory of Image Understanding, Psychological Review 94, 115-147. Fodor, J.A. 1987, Psychosemantics, Cambridge, Ma, MIT Press. Fodor, J.A. 1990, A Theory of Content II: The Theory. In A Theory of Content and Other Essays, Chapter 4, Cambridge, Ma, MIT Press. Godfrey-Smith, P. 1989, Misinformation, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 19, 533-550. Jones, T., Mulaire, E. and Stich, S. 1991, Starving off Catastrophe: a Critical Notice of Jerry Fodor's Psychosemantics, Mind and Language, 6, 58-82. Sterelny, K. 1990, The Representational Theory of Mind, Oxford, Blackwell Wallis, C. (1992) Asymmetric Dependence and Mental Representation. PSYCOLOQUY 3(70) fodor-representation.1. 21-Mar-93 5:48:47-GMT,5798;000000000001 Received: from rutvm1.rutgers.edu by aramis.rutgers.edu (5.59/SMI4.0/RU1.5/3.08) id AA15488; Sun, 21 Mar 93 00:48:44 EST Message-Id: <9303210548.AA15488@aramis.rutgers.edu> Received: from RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (IBM VM SMTP R1.2.1MX) with BSMTP id 0391; Sun, 21 Mar 93 00:47:30 EST Received: from RUTVM1.BITNET (NJE origin LISTSERV@RUTVM1) by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (LMail V1.1d/1.7f) with BSMTP id 0949; Sun, 21 Mar 1993 00:47:29 -0500 Date: Sun, 21 Mar 1993 00:47:46 -0500 Reply-To: psyc@pucc.bitnet Sender: "PSYCOLOQUY: Refereed Electronic Journal of Peer Discussion" From: Stevan Harnad Subject: psycoloquy.93.4.20.reading.12.small (199 lines) Comments: To: psyc@pucc.bitnet To: Multiple recipients of list PSYC psycoloquy.93.4.20.reading.12.small Sunday 21 March 1993 ISSN 1055-0143 (4 paragraphs, 5 references, 193 lines) PSYCOLOQUY is sponsored by the American Psychological Association (APA) Copyright 1993 Jocelyn Penny Small VISUAL DISPLAY OF TEXT AFFECTS VISUAL DISPLAY OF RECALL: EVIDENCE FROM ANTIQUITY Commentary on Hartley on Small on Skoyles on Reading Jocelyn Penny Small U.S. Center Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Classicae Alexander Library Rutgers University New Brunswick, NJ 08903 JPSMALL@ZODIAC.RUTGERS.EDU 1.0 I very much appreciate Hartley's (1992) correction of my comment (Small 1992, 1.6) on the efficacy of dividing the display of text into coherent, visual chunks. He mentioned (5.0) a side-effect of such displays: in one test his subjects recalled text in the same format in which it had been originally displayed. He added that "more studies are needed to look at this aspect of how the presentation of the text affects how people might recall it." I am pleased to thank him by giving indirect corroboration from techniques of memorizing texts in Classical Antiquity and the Middle Ages. 2.0 Quintilian (11.11.2.32-33), writing in the first century A.D., recommends that: There is one thing which will be of assistance to everyone, namely, to learn a passage by heart from the same tablets on which he has committed it to writing. For he will have certain tracks to guide him in his pursuit of memory, and the mind's eye will be fixed not merely on the pages on which the words were written, but on individual lines, and at times he will speak as though he were reading aloud. Further, if the writing should be interrupted by some erasure, addition or alteration, there are certain symbols available, the sight of which will prevent us from wandering from the track. This device bears some resemblance to the mnemonic system which I mentioned above [the "architectural" system of loci], but if my experience is worth anything, is at once more expeditious and more effective. [1] This advice is an application of the idea that recall works best if you recreate the context in which you first experienced and, in this case, memorized something -- a phenomenon well known to psychologists (for example Baddeley 1990, 268-271; and Neisser 1988). 3.0 Quintilian (11.2.28-29) further suggests: If certain portions prove especially difficult to remember, it will be found advantageous to indicate them by certain marks, the remembrance of which will refresh and stimulate the memory. For there can be but few whose memory is so barren that they will fail to recognize the symbols with which they have marked different passages. In other words, if your text does not come ready-made with signs of division or markings, you should feel free to put them in. While today we sometimes frown on marking the printed page, ancient texts were supposed to be "annotated" by the owner. The classical habit of writing without any spaces or punctuation (scriptura continua), in fact, forced each reader to punctuate the text for him or herself either mentally or physically with some kind of marking. If someone else punctuates the text, in effect does all the work for you, you will not be able to remember that text as easily. Mary Carruthers (1990, 247) in her study of memory in the Middle Ages convincingly argues that in medieval manuscripts "the basic function of all page decoration [is] to make each page memorable." That is, the decoration, which changes between and within pages, makes each part of the text distinctive and hence easier to memorize. [2] 4.0 Thus, according to the evidence from antiquity, it is easier to recall text by remembering the way it appeared in the "original" than by memorizing it, as if it were an isolated string of words devoid of any physical arrangement. NOTES 1. The quotations from Quintilian are from the Institutio Oratoria. as translated by H. E. Butler in the Loeb Classical Library edition: Harvard University Press (Cambridge, MA and London 1922). 2. See especially: Chapter 7 "Memory and the Book," a fascinating account of how illuminations, text, and memory worked together (Carruthers 1990). REFERENCES Baddeley, Alan. (1990) Human Memory. Theory and Practice Allyn and Bacon: (Boston, etc.) Carruthers, Mary. (1990) The Book of Memory Cambridge University Press: (Cambridge). Hartley, James. (1992) The Visual Chunking of Text. PSYCOLOQUY 3(66) reading.11 Neisser, Ulric. (1988) Time Present and Time Past in M. M. Gruneberg, P. E. Morris, and R. N. Sykes, editors, Practical Aspects of Memory John Wiley & Sons: (Chichester, etc.) 545-560. Small, J. P. (1992) Historical Development of Writing and Reading. PSYCOLOQUY 3(61) reading.10 18-Mar-93 21:28:54-GMT,17867;000000000001 Received: from rutvm1.rutgers.edu by aramis.rutgers.edu (5.59/SMI4.0/RU1.5/3.08) id AA14432; Thu, 18 Mar 93 16:28:52 EST Message-Id: <9303182128.AA14432@aramis.rutgers.edu> Received: from RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (IBM VM SMTP R1.2.1MX) with BSMTP id 5952; Thu, 18 Mar 93 16:27:33 EST Received: from RUTVM1.BITNET (NJE origin LISTSERV@RUTVM1) by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (LMail V1.1d/1.7f) with BSMTP id 5649; Thu, 18 Mar 1993 16:27:32 -0500 Date: Thu, 18 Mar 1993 14:43:46 EST Reply-To: psyc@pucc.bitnet Sender: "PSYCOLOQUY: Refereed Electronic Journal of Peer Discussion" From: Stevan Harnad Subject: PSYCOLOQUY Newsletter Section (Part 1: 430 lines) Comments: To: psyc@pucc.bitnet To: Multiple recipients of list PSYC PSYCOLOQUY ISSN 1055-0143 Thu, 18 Mar 93 Newsletter Section (1) Query Summary: Plea for APA MSs (2) Employment: Tenure-Track, Experimental Psych, Univ of Nevada, Reno (3) Announcement: EBBS meeting, Sept 16-18, Madrid, Spain (4) Announcement: CFP: XXIII International Ethological Conference (5) Employment: Post-doc, Spoken Language, Buffalo Cognitive Science (6) Announcement: Proceedings on Cognition and Representation Available (7) Announcement: World Conference on Neural Networks '93 (July 11-15) (8) Employment: Lectureship in Cognitive Science, U of Sheffield (9) Employment: post-doc, HCI at NRL ---------------------------------------------------------------------- From: "Robert P. O'Shea" Subject: (1) Query Summary: Plea for APA MSs You may recall that recently I suggested in Psycoloquy (Tue, 2 Feb 93; Newsletter Section; (7) Query: Plea for APA MSs to incorporate figures and tables in text) that the APA Publication Manual be revised to allow ``the first-submitted version of a manuscript to resemble the final printed product, in particular with figures and figure captions, tables, and footnotes, appearing on the pages to which they refer''. I promised to post a summary of responses. Seventeen people replied, from a wide variety of areas within psychology, and from at least three different countries. All were encouraging; most were quite enthusiastic about the idea. ------------------------------ From: "R. Allen Gardner" Subject: (2) Employment: Tenure-Track, Experimental Psych, Univ of Nevada, Reno Faculty position Physiological Psychology and/or Perception We have just received approval to fill the following position for next Fall. Please call this to the attention of relevant colleagues in your group. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGIST: The Psychology Department at the University of Nevada, Reno, plans to fill a faculty position for Fall, 1993 at the Assistant Professor level. We are seeking an individual with a Ph.D. and strong credentials in both teaching and research who is qualified to teach graduate courses in Physiological Psychology and/or Perception. An initial application consisting of a cover letter, resume, and three letters of recommendation should be sent to: Chair, Search Committee Department of Psychology/ 296 University of Nevada, Reno Reno, Nevada 89557 The review of applicants will begin April 1, 1993, and will continue until the position is filled. Women and minorities are encouraged to apply. ------------------------------ From: terjesa@ulrik.uio.no (Terje Sagvolden) Subject: (3) Announcement: EBBS meeting, Sept 16-18, Madrid, Spain *********************************** 25th Annual Meeting of the European Brain and Behaviour Society 16-18 September Madrid -- Spain GENERAL INFORMATION The Congress language is English. Translation service will not be available. Registration and Meeting secretariat (see below). Registration Fees (Price in Pts.): Members of EBBS: 12.000 (Before 4/15/93); 14.000 (After 4/15/93) Non-members: 15.000 (Before 4/15/93); 17.000 (After 4/15/93) Students and PhD students: 5.000 (Before 4/15/93); 6.000 (After 4/15/93) (Certificate from supervisor or head of department necessary) Accompanying persons: 3.000 (Before 4/15/93); 4.000 (After 4/15/93) For a full program write: 6. MEETING SECRETARIAT Dr. Manuel Castro-Alamancos Instituto Cajal Avda. doctor Arce 37 E 28002 MADRID, Spain Telephone: +341 585 41 46 Telefax: +341 585 41 54 E-mail: macneuro@cc.csic.es 7. DEADLINES Early registration: 15 April 1993 Abstracts: 15 April 1993 ------------------------------ From: Beaugrand*Jacques Subject: (4) Announcement: CFP: XXIII International Ethological Conference CALL FOR ORAL PRESENTATIONS XXIII International Ethological Conference 1-9 September 1993, Torremolinos, Spain Hurry! it is still time to submit! SYMPOSIUM ON Mechanisms of Hierarchy Formation and Maintenance organized by Jacques Beaugrand and Ivan Chase. The focus of this symposium will be recent developments in mechanisms of hierarchy formation and maintenance. Talks should concentrate on species that form agonistic dominance orders based upon individual recognition but avoid those in which coalitions are frequent. Theoretical work, empirical studies, and simulations are invited on the following and related topics: the role on individual characteristics in determining rank, the impact of prior winning or losing experiences upon subsequent contests or reversals, mechanisms which insure transitivity within hierarchies, the role of social recognition, hierarchy formation as an example of self-organizing processes, and experimental design required to test various theories of hierarchy formation. Thirty minutes presentations are invited (live or pre-recorded on VCR). Five will be selected among those submitted. Presentations will be followed by a 30-40 minutes discussion. Unfortunately, no travel expenses are available to speakers. Please submit your proposal RAPIDLY through E-mail or Fax to one of the organizers: Jacques Beaugrand, e-mail: R20370 at UQAM.Bitnet; Fax: 514-987- 7953 (Montreal, Quebec, Canada). Ivan Chase, e-mail: ICHASE at SBCCVM.Bitnet; Fax: 516-632-7719 (Stony Brook, New York, USA). ------------------------------ From: rapaport@cs.buffalo.edu (William J. Rapaport) Subject: (5) Employment: Post-doc, Spoken Language, Buffalo Cognitive Science State University of New York at Buffalo CENTER FOR COGNITIVE SCIENCE Spoken Language Research Group Announcing a post-doctoral fellowship opportunity available through an N.I.D.C.D. training grant on the "Development of Spoken Language Capa- cities". The training grant provides support for individuals who have interests in the development of speech perception and production. The training program is interdisciplinary and involves the participation of faculty from the Departments of Psychology, Linguistics, Communicative Disord- ers & Sciences, and Pediatrics & Neurology. Trainees are expected to participate in interdisciplinary seminars and to conduct original experimental research related to these topics in the laboratories of participating faculty members. Inquiries and materials (3 letters of recommendation, vita, and relevant publications) should be directed to: Dr. Peter W. Jusczyk Department of Psychology Park Hall SUNY Buffalo Buffalo, NY 14260 (e-mail address: PSYPWJ@UBVMS.BITNET or psypwj@ubvms.cc.buffalo.edu). No person, in whatever relationship with the State University of New York at Buffalo, shall be subject to discrimination on the basis of age, creed, color, handicap, national origin, race, religion, sex, marital, or veteran status. SUNY is an Equal Opportunity/Affirmative Action Employer. All applicants must be either US citizens or permanent residents of the USA. Fullest consideration will be given to applications received by May 1, 1993. ------------------------------ From: rapaport@cs.Buffalo.EDU (William J. Rapaport) Subject: (6) Announcement: Proceedings on Cognition and Representation Availab le PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE ON COGNITION AND REPRESENTATION Held at the SUNY Buffalo Center for Cognitive Science, April 1992, the proceedings of this conference are now available as a technical report. The price is US$10.00. Payment may be made by check made payable to "Center for Cognitive Science", and orders should be sent to: Ms. Dawn Phillips Center for Cognitive Science 652 Baldy Hall SUNY Buffalo Buffalo, NY 14260 USA Email inquiries should be sent to dcp@cs.buffalo.edu. Phone inquiries should be made to 716-645-3794. TIM VAN GELDER "Distributed Represenation--An Outline" DAVID BANACH "Representing, Similarity, and the Storage of Information" ANN ROBYNS "Primary and Mature Conceptual Structures--Evidence from Child Language" JOHN KOUNIOS and PHILLIPS HOLCOMB "Inferring Semantic-Memory Structure from Behavioral and Electrophysiological Measures" VINOD GOEL "Specifying Classifying Representational Systems: A Critique and Proposal for Cognitive Science" STEVEN HORST "Notions of Representation and the Diverging Interests of Philosophy and Empirical Science" JOHN F. SOWA: "Logic Foundations for Representing Object-Oriented Systems" BARBARA L. SPEICHER "Disentangling Conceptual and Linguistic Knowledge" BARBARA ABBOTT and LARRY HAUSER "Natural Language and Thought" MICHAEL TARR "Behavioral and Computational Constraints in Human Shape Representation" WHITMAN RICHARDS "Is Perception for Real?" K. N. LEIBOVIC "Brain Mechanisms for Perceptual Representation" ------------------------------ From: dlukas@cns.bu.edu Subject: (7) Announcement: World Conference on Neural Networks '93 (July 11-15) WORLD CONGRESS ON NEURAL NETWORKS 1993 Annual Meeting of the International Neural Network Society July 11-15, 1993, Portland, Oregon WCNN'93 is the largest and most inter-disciplinary forum in the neural network field today. PLENARY SPEAKERS INCLUDE: Stephen Grossberg, 3-D Vision and Figure-Ground Pop-Out Bart Kosko, Neural Fuzzy Systems Carver Mead, Real-Time On-Chip Learning in Analog VLSI Networks Kumpati Narendra, Intelligent Control Using Neural Networks Wolf Singer, Coherence as an Organizing Principle of Cortical Function TUTORIALS INCLUDE: Gail Carpenter, Adaptive Resonance Theory Robert Desimone, Cognitive Neuroscience Walter Freeman, Neurobiology and Chaos Robert Hecht-Nielsen, Practical Applications of Neural Network Theory Michael Kuperstein, Neural Control and Robotics S.Y.Kung, Structural and Mathematical Approaches to Signal Processes V.S. Ramachandran, Biological Vision David Rumelhart, Cognitive Science Eric Schwartz, Neural Computation and VLSI Fred Watkins, Neural Fuzzy Systems Hal White, Supervised Learning GENERAL CHAIR: George G. Lendaris MAIN PROGRAM CHAIRS: Stephen Grossberg and Bart Kosko SME/INNS TRACK PROGRAM CHAIRS: Kenneth Marko and Bernard Widrow IFSA/INNS TRACK PROGRAM CHAIRS: Ronald Yager and Paul Werbos COOPERATING SOCIETIES CHAIR: Mark Kon FOR REGISTRATION AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PLEASE CONTACT: WCNN'93 Talley Management Group 875 Kings Highway, Suite 200 West Deptford, NJ 08096 Tel: (609) 845-1720 FAX: (609) 853-0411 e-mail: registration@wcnn93.ee.pdx.edu Please do not reply to this account. Please use the telephone number, fax number, U.S. Mail address, or email address listed above. ------------------------------ From: Tony_Prescott Subject: (8) Employment: Lectureship in Cognitive Science, U of Sheffield LECTURESHIP IN COGNITIVE SCIENCE University of Sheffield, UK. Applications are invited for the above post tenable from 1st October 1993 for three years in the first instance but with expectation of renewal. Preference will be given to candidates with a PhD in Cognitive Science, Artificial Intelligence, Cognitive Psychology, Computer Science, Robotics, or related disciplines. The Cognitive Science degree is an integrated course taught by the departments of Psychology and Computer Science. Research in Cognitive Science was highly evaluated in the recent UFC research evaluation exercise, special areas of interest being vision, speech, language, neural networks, and learning. The successful candidate will be expected to undertake research vigorously. Supervision of programming projects will be required, hence considerable experience with Lisp, Prolog, and/or C is essential. It is expected that the appointment will be made on the Lecturer A scale (13,400-18,576 pounds(uk) p.a.) according to age and experience but enquiries from more experienced staff able to bring research resources are welcomed. Informal enquiries to Professor John P Frisby 044-(0)742-826538 or e-mail jpf@aivru.sheffield.ac.uk. Further particulars from the Director of Personnel Services, The University, Sheffield S10 2TN, UK, to whom all applications including a cv and the names and addresses of three referees (6 copies of all documents) should be sent by 1 April 1993. Short-listed candidates will be invited to Sheffield for interview for which travel expenses (within the UK only) will be funded. Current permanent research staff in Cognitive Science at Sheffield include: Prof John Frisby (visual psychophysics), Prof John Mayhew (computer vision, robotics, neural networks) Prof Yorik Wilks (natural language understanding) Dr Phil Green (speech recognition) Dr John Porrill (computer vision) Dr Paul McKevitt (natural language understanding) Dr Peter Scott (computer assisted learning) Dr Rod Nicolson (human learning) Dr Paul Dean (neuroscience, neural networks) Mr Tony Prescott (neural networks, comparative cog sci) ------------------------------ From: schmidtn@itd.nrl.navy.mil (Astrid Schmidt-Nielsen) Subject: (9) Employment: post-doc, HCI at NRL Post-Doc Positions: Human Computer Interaction Research We are looking for a cognitive scientist or engineering psychologist with a strong computer scince background to work on a project titled "Human Machine Dialog." This project focuses on human-human dialogs as a model for human computer communication. An important aspect of the program is developing evaluation methods and training guidelines. Specific interest in individual differences is also encouraged. If interested, please call Dr. Astrid Schmidt-Nielsen (202) 767-2682 or send e-mail to schmidtn@itd.nrl.navy.mil for more information. The Human computer Interaction Laboratory at the Naval Research Laboratory provides an interdisciplinary research environment to address problems in interface software design. The approaches within the HCI Laboratory assume that interface software provides the bi-directional communication of information between humans and computers. Information can be in the form of data, symbolic knowledge, or control specifics. Multi-modal forms of communication are assumed. Research in the laboratory focuses on developing software principles and methodologies useful to software designers. Current work emphasizes dialogue as an organizing principle for the interactions. Presently, research spans efforts in interfaces for decision aids for avionics, novel devices and their I/O styles, speech processing, and development of evaluation and testing methodologies. The novel devices research includes aspects of telepresence and virtual environments. Software design within the research tasks provides the basis for our software engineering approach to developing interface specifications and requirements which are independent of the applications. The goal is to develop principles and methods for high-performance user-computer interaction and supporting software architectures. The Laboratory has Post-Doc positions for computer scientists, cognitive researchers and enigneering psychologists depending on availability of funding. Other Post-Doc enquiries should be addressed to: Dr. Helen M. Gigley Head, Human Computer Interaction Laboratory Naval Research Laboratory CODE 5530 Washington, D.C. 20375 phone: 202-767-0718 fax: 202-404-8441 email: gigley@itd.nrl.navy.mil Stipend $36,000-$40,000. U.S. citizenship is required. The Naval Research Laboratory is an equal opportunity employer. Women and minorities are encouraged to apply. ------------------------------ PSYCOLOQUY is sponsored by the Science Directorate and the Office of Publications and Communication of the American Psychological Association (202) 955-7653 Editors: (scientific discussion) (professional/clinical discussion) Stevan Harnad Cary Cherniss (Assoc Ed.) Psychology Department Graduate School of Applied Princeton University Professional Psychology Rutgers University Assistant Editor: Malcolm Bauer Psychology Department Princeton University End of PSYCOLOQUY Digest ****************************** 23-Mar-93 3:03:13-GMT,6882;000000000001 Received: from rutvm1.rutgers.edu by aramis.rutgers.edu (5.59/SMI4.0/RU1.5/3.08) id AA19088; Mon, 22 Mar 93 22:03:11 EST Message-Id: <9303230303.AA19088@aramis.rutgers.edu> Received: from RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (IBM VM SMTP R1.2.1MX) with BSMTP id 4079; Mon, 22 Mar 93 22:01:56 EST Received: from RUTVM1.BITNET (NJE origin LISTSERV@RUTVM1) by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (LMail V1.1d/1.7f) with BSMTP id 0751; Mon, 22 Mar 1993 22:01:56 -0500 Date: Mon, 22 Mar 1993 21:53:37 -0500 Reply-To: psyc@pucc.bitnet Sender: "PSYCOLOQUY: Refereed Electronic Journal of Peer Discussion" From: Stevan Harnad Subject: psycoloquy.93.4.24.frame-problem.8.grush (120 lines) Comments: To: psyc@pucc.bitnet To: Multiple recipients of list PSYC psycoloquy.93.4.24.frame-problem.8.grush Monday 22 March 1993 ISSN 1055-0143 (9 paragraphs, 4 references, 114 lines) PSYCOLOQUY is sponsored by the American Psychological Association (APA) Copyright 1993 Rick Grush VAN BRAKEL'S POSITION IS PERFECTLY COHERENT Commentary on Fetzer on van Brakel on Ford & Hayes on the Frame Problem Rick Grush Department of Philosophy University of California, San Diego La Jolla, CA 92037 rgrush@sdcc3.ucsd.edu 1. Fetzer (1993) claims that there are three reasons for disputing van Brakel's (1992) position. However, all three of the putative reasons are results of Fetzer's misunderstanding of van Brakel's position, or of simple misunderstanding. 2. As Fetzer points out, "Van Brakel claims that there are three dimensions to the frame problem: [A] Which things change, and which don't? [B] How can [A] be represented? and, [C] How can/do we reason about [A]?" Van Brakel denies that the frame problem is the problem of induction in disguise, but admits that aspect [A] of the frame problem is "related" to the problem of induction. Even if one agrees with Fetzer that [A], [B] and [C] are all intimately interrelated (which seems reasonable) it does not follow, as Fetzer claims, that van Brakel's position "is not logically consistent." It is clearly possible for X to be related to Y without it being the case that X is Y in disguise -- for example, if the relation in question is a part/whole relationship (which is clearly what van Brakel has in mind). 3. The second objection Fetzer aims at van Brakel seems, on my reading of Fetzer's text, to be a thicket of confusions. 3.1. Fetzer states that "in maintaining that the frame problem is a special case of the problem of induction, not only do I not deny that it has other dimensions (of representation and of implementation) but I actively affirm it." The only sense I can make of this statement is that it is a response to van Brakel's claim that "philosophers tend to concentrate on [A]." But unless "concentrate on [A]" is glossed as "maintain the irrelevance of all non-[A]," which is at best an uncharitable reading, Fetzer has no need to defend himself here, as there is no attack. In fact, given van Brakel's list of aspects of the frame problem (van Brakel, 1992, 1.4) and Fetzer's broad conception of induction, the dispute here seems to be one not about the nature of the frame problem, but about the extension of the phrase "problem of induction." 3.2. Fetzer continues: "Surely, if there is no answer to question [A] then there are no answers to [B] or [C], whose solutions presuppose a solution to [A]. Thus, in denying my position, van Brakel denies his own." This seems to be motivated by an ambiguity in the phrase "denies my position." If "denies Fetzer's position" means "denies that induction plays a role in [A]," then Fetzer is right to claim that denying his position would put van Brakel in a difficult spot. But van Brakel does not deny Fetzer's position in this sense. Rather, he denies Fetzer's position in the sense that he denies that "the problem of induction is ALL THERE IS to [A]," and this lands van Brakel in no difficulty, given his narrower conception of the problem of induction. 4. In Section 3 of Fetzer's commentary, he claims that van Brakel asserts "that it is impossible to give necessary and sufficient conditions for the occurrence of an event of the definition of a concept." 4.1. But van Brakel says no such thing. What he says is (van Brakel, 2.2) "it is, in general, not possible to specify the necessary and sufficient conditions for something." The force of "in general" is cashed out by van Brakel's admission that conventional definitions for the use of certain words, or physical laws WITH CETERIS PARIBUS CONDITIONS HOLDING may be amenable to such necessary and sufficient conditions. Curiously, Fetzer offers, as counterexamples to van Brakel's claim, the example of the definition of a bachelor and the lighting of a match (in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions), both of which are ALLOWED by van Brakel. 4.2 Ironically, it is Fetzer who seems to contradict himself within a single sentence. He states, concerning the striking of matches in appropriate conditions (Section 4): "The latter conditions [the striking of the match with oxygen present, etc.] appear to be individually necessary and jointly sufficient to bring about an occurrence of the kind described by the former [the match lights], although other causes are of course possible." Well, if OTHER causes are in fact possible, then the causes mentioned are not in fact necessary: Fetzer is in effect saying "X is necessary and sufficient for Y, though of course some non-X may be sufficient" which is to say "X is necessary for Y, and X is sufficient for Y, and X is not necessary for Y." A more charitable reading (barely sanctioned by the text) is that Fetzer is simply pointing out the necessity of taking cognizance of the appropriate ceteris paribus conditions. But if this is the right reading, then it is not clear where the disagreement between he and van Brakel is. 5. I think there is actually less disagreement between van Brakel and Fetzer than Fetzer makes out, at least on these issues. The heart of the misunderstanding, it seems to me, stems simply from disagreement over what is covered by the phrase "problem of induction," plus a few unfortunate misreadings. REFERENCES Fetzer, J.H. (1993) Commentary on van Brakel on Ford & Hayes on the Frame-Problem. PSYCHOLOQUY 4(14) frame-problem.4 Ford, K.M. and P.J. Hayes (1991) Reasoning Agents in a Dynamic World: The Frame Problem, Greenwich: JAI Press. Hayes, P.J. (1992) Summary of "Reasoning Agents in a Dynamic World: The Frame Problem" (Ford & Hayes 1991, Eds.) PSYCOLOQUY 3(59) frame-problem.1 van Brakel, J. (1992) The Complete Description of the Frame Problem. PSYCOLOQUY 3(60) frame-problem.2 23-Mar-93 3:04:01-GMT,8454;000000000001 Received: from rutvm1.rutgers.edu by aramis.rutgers.edu (5.59/SMI4.0/RU1.5/3.08) id AA19241; Mon, 22 Mar 93 22:03:59 EST Message-Id: <9303230303.AA19241@aramis.rutgers.edu> Received: from RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (IBM VM SMTP R1.2.1MX) with BSMTP id 4081; Mon, 22 Mar 93 22:02:45 EST Received: from RUTVM1.BITNET (NJE origin LISTSERV@RUTVM1) by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (LMail V1.1d/1.7f) with BSMTP id 0765; Mon, 22 Mar 1993 22:02:43 -0500 Date: Mon, 22 Mar 1993 21:42:59 -0500 Reply-To: psyc@pucc.bitnet Sender: "PSYCOLOQUY: Refereed Electronic Journal of Peer Discussion" From: Stevan Harnad Subject: psycoloquy.93.4.22.frame-problem.6.ford+hayes (155 lines) Comments: To: psyc@pucc.bitnet To: Multiple recipients of list PSYC psycoloquy.93.4.22.frame-problem.6.ford+hayes Monday 22 March 1993 ISSN 1055-0143 (10 paragraphs, 7 references, 149 lines) PSYCOLOQUY is sponsored by the American Psychological Association (APA) Copyright 1993 Pat Hayes & Ken Ford PROBLEMS WITH FRAMES Reply to Freeman on Ford & Hayes on the Frame Problem Pat Hayes Beckman Institute University of Illinois Urbana IL 61801 phayes@herodotus.cs.uiuc.edu Ken Ford Institute for Human & Machine Cognition University of West Florida Pensacola, FL 32514 kford@trivia.coginst.uwf.edu 1. In his review of Ford & Hayes (1991), Freeman (1992) makes it clear that he has not read the book itself, but is only responding to the summary of it that appeared in PSYCOLOQUY (Hayes 1992). It is probably as a result of this that he appears to miss the point in several respects. His review is in five parts; we will respond to each in turn, addressing the arguments and assertions that Freeman offers in each paragraph. 2. In paragraph 1.0, Freeman begins by noting that in the summary of our book, we evoke the image of a child playing with bricks. He writes that "this appeal to an example of biological intelligence does not seem to be pursued in the topics listed in the Table of Contents." The story about the child and the brick, however, was offered as an example not of "biological intelligence," but of ordinary, everyday intelligence, regardless of how it is implemented. Freeman seems to assume an a priori distinction between biological and other intelligences, which begs the questions at issue. 3. The rest of Section 1.0 of Freeman's review is given over to a long quote by John von Neumann (1958) that makes rather the opposite point from the one Freeman supposes. Ironically, von Neumann (1958, cited by Freeman) observed that from his perspective, the most striking aspect of the nervous system is that its functioning is prima facie digital. Von Neumann, with his usual insight, recognized that some kind of internal language must be used by the brain, and that conventional mathematics and logic may be a kind of constructed secondary language built much like a virtual machine (or high level representations) on top of a more primary lower-level language. He clearly appreciated that the higher levels of a system are rarely isomorphic or even similar to the structure its lower levels. 4. The unwarranted (and usually implicit) assumption that there ought to be similarity of structure among the various levels of organization of a computational system leads to great confusion. Any complex computational model will have many such levels of description, all equally valid. A full account of the machine's behavior will probably in practice require a description at several levels, but no simple reduction to a single level of rule-matching will suffice, and certainly the basic hardware level will not be suitable for understanding the complexity of the machine's behavior. There is no mystery here: such simple reductionism can be similarly rejected by considering any other sufficiently complex system or device. 5. The frame problem can be stated quite clearly with no reference to the notation used to formalise it. It arises from the ontological framework of world-states and actions which is often (in AI) taken to be the basis of meaning. Whether these are encoded as sentences of mathematical logic or as distributed patterns of neural activity -- even if we were to accept that these are distinct -- is irrelevant to the expressive difficulty it identifies. 6. In his paragraph 1.1, Freeman asserts that "framing" is a dynamic process, offering offers his rabbit experiments (Freeman, 1991) as evidence. Now, whatever Freeman means by "framing," it seems to have little to do with the frame problem that is the topic of discussion here. Freeman's notion of framing seems to have something to do with the brains of rabbits, and so presumably with those of humans. However, the AI frame problem arises in a context which assumes that the content of mental representations can be captured largely independently of how it is encoded in neurons. No doubt Freeman would rather not talk about representations at all, and that's his perogative, but then he is also not talking about the frame problem. 7. In his paragraph 1.2, Freeman writes: "[It] follows that centrally stored information about the environment is not invariant." Who would think that it was invariant? Why must it be centrally stored? Again, what does this have to do with the frame problem? The frame problem arises in reasoning about change, not in accounting for the structure of memory. 8. In paragraph 1.3, Freeman points us toward the mysteries of chaotic dynamics simulated by networks of nonlinear ordinary differential equations as a possible solution to what he perceives to be AI's difficulties, including the frame problem. These ideas are currently very fashionable, and often vaguely suggested as being something to do with how psychology might emerge from neurology, but those who are trying to give careful models of this connection do not seem to find them of much direct use. 9. Concerning Freeman's paragraph 1.4: In saying that when a child decides to pick up a brick it knows that it will then be in the air and "that's all," we did not mean to imply that that is all the child knows: rather, the child knows that the rest of the dynamic world will not be altered by the act of picking up. Children understand how their actions are limited in their effects, but this is hard for us to formalize. Perhaps this is because logic is not the appropriate language to encode the child's beliefs (a seductive thesis, given how hard this all seems), but then Freeman must indicate how the brain manages to think about bricks and tables at all, and why these methods are somehow inaccessible to logical formalization. The "new approaches" Freeman refers to are indeed interesting, but they must somehow be made to account for symbolic thinking (see, for example, Shastri & Ajjanagadde 1993), and the frame problem then arises. The problem is one of representation, and comes up regardless of the implementational technique used to realise such thinking. 10. By the way, Gibson's (1979) "ecological approach" is very much in line with the way AI thinks about perception. Both agree that it is important to look at the world from the point of view of the perceiver's conceptual framework. Gibson was always opposed to the idea of mental representations because he (wrongly) assumed that they implied a homuncular fallacy, but AI has adopted many of his ideas enthusiastically. REFERENCES Ford, K & Hayes, P (eds) (1991) Reasoning Agents in a Dynamic World: The Frame Problem. JAI Press. Freeman, W. J. (1992) Framing is a Dynamic Process. PSYCOLOQUY 3(62) frame-problem.3. Hayes, P. J. (1992) Summary of: K. Ford & P. Hayes (1991): Reasoning Agents in a Dynamic World: The Frame Problem. PSYCOLOQUY 3(59) frame-problem.1. Freeman, W. J. (1991) The Physiology of Perception. Scientific American 264: 78-85. Gibson, J.J. (1979) The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Shastri, L. and Ajjanagadde, V. (1993) From Simple Associations to Systematic Reasoning, Behavioral and Brain Sciences (to appear, with Commentary). Von Neumann, J. (1958) The Computer and the Brain. New Haven: Yale University Press. 23-Mar-93 3:05:17-GMT,11976;000000000001 Received: from rutvm1.rutgers.edu by aramis.rutgers.edu (5.59/SMI4.0/RU1.5/3.08) id AA19494; Mon, 22 Mar 93 22:05:15 EST Message-Id: <9303230305.AA19494@aramis.rutgers.edu> Received: from RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (IBM VM SMTP R1.2.1MX) with BSMTP id 4086; Mon, 22 Mar 93 22:04:00 EST Received: from RUTVM1.BITNET (NJE origin LISTSERV@RUTVM1) by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (LMail V1.1d/1.7f) with BSMTP id 0789; Mon, 22 Mar 1993 22:03:59 -0500 Date: Mon, 22 Mar 1993 21:47:15 -0500 Reply-To: psyc@pucc.bitnet Sender: "PSYCOLOQUY: Refereed Electronic Journal of Peer Discussion" From: Stevan Harnad Subject: psycoloquy.93.4.23.frame-problem.7.vanbrakel (209 lines) Comments: To: psyc@pucc.bitnet To: Multiple recipients of list PSYC psycoloquy.93.4.23.frame-problem.7.vanbrakel Monday March 22 1993 ISSN 1055-0143 (9 paragraphs, 12 references, 206 lines) PSYCOLOQUY is sponsored by the American Psychological Association (APA) Copyright 1993 J. van Brakel UNJUSTIFIED COHERENCE. Commentary on Fetzer on van Brakel on Ford & Hayes on the Frame Problem J. van Brakel Department of Philosophy University of Utrecht P.O. Box 80.126 3508 TC Utrecht (Netherlands) brakel@phil.ruu.nl 1. In their preface to Reasoning Agents in a Dynamic World: The Frame Problem, Ford & Hayes (1991) wrote: "Fetzer's paper gave rise to considerable controversy during the editorial process, and he asked for a public debate of some of the issues it raised." This led to Hayes's commentary on Fetzer's paper and a reply of Fetzer to Hayes (Fetzer 1991a, Hayes 1991, Fetzer 1991b). In my review of Ford & Hayes (1991; Hayes 1992) I wrote that I tend to side with Hayes in his exchange with Fetzer (van Brakel 1992). Fetzer (1993) characterises my position as logically inconsistent, semantically invalid, empirically wrong, and hence incoherent. I think his charges are based on very deep misunderstandings of my exposition of the Problem of Complete Description (PCD) and in my reply I will do my best to explain it better and further. 2. Fetzer (1993) starts his commentary with a misquotation. He says: "First, in 1.1, van Brakel asserts that there are three dimensions to the frame problem: [A] Which things change and which don't? [B] How can [A] be represented? and, [C] How can/do we reason about [A]?" I do not say this in 1.1 or anywhere else, but in 1.2 I do say that questions [A] - [C] "constitute the family of frame problems." Fetzer may think that quoting "constitute the family of frame problems" as "there are three dimensions to the frame problem" is an acceptable paraphrase, but it is not. The difference is precisely what the PCD (and the family of frame problems) is about. Fetzer assumes that anything, for example, the frame problem, can be given an unambiguous definition: It HAS three dimensions. The EXACT definition of dimension 1 is ..., etc. The PCD says this is not possible; to indicate this I use the family metaphor. 3. Fetzer continues to say that it is logically inconsistent, on my part, to say: [i] the "frame problem is not the problem of induction in disguise" AND [ii] [A] "is definitely related to the induction problem." He claims that holding both [i] and [ii] is inconsistent, because [B] and [C] are related to [A]; hence all three of [A] - [C] are related to the problem of induction; hence the frame problem is the problem of induction in disguise. If my vague use of "relate to" (or of "definitely") caused confusion, I apologise. But the overall structure of relations would seem to be very much the same according to both my account and Fetzer's. The problem of induction is more or less closely related to [A]; they are near-relatives. Although I didn't say that in my review, I am quite prepared to leave open the possibility that one may be the other in disguise (whatever that may mean). But the family of frame problems is bigger than just [A] or the problem of induction; hence the frame problem (or, more precisely, the family of frame problems) is not the problem of induction in disguise. One family member, or a single-parent family, is "related to" the extended family, but it is not the extended family in disguise. That is why I said in 1.2: "Part of the confusion about the frame problem is its family resemblance character." and in 1.5: "the conflict about the relation between the frame problem and the induction problem is more indicative of the nature of the frame problem than a substantial symptom in its own right." 4. Fetzer (1993) agrees that "it is logically impossible to provide a complete description of any single event," but he claims that this does not exclude giving "necessary and sufficient causal conditions for events of specific kinds," and he quotes the example of "lighting of a match." I was well aware of this sort of argument; amongst other things, it is spelled out at length in Fetzer (1991ab). I accordingly wrote in 2.2: "There are of course physical laws which are said to relate events [of a certain kind] in a necessary way. But laws (or other universal statements) cannot be applied to concrete events without the addition of unspecified ceteris paribus conditions." And I quoted Fetzer (in 3.4) as an example of one of those who think "one can break out of it [i.e. the PCD] by using heuristics or a panacea like relevance or salience." Fetzer does not dispute the arguments I give there, nor does he object to being quoted in that context. Hence I take it he agrees that appeal to "maximal specificity" (Fetzer 1991a) and the like "is useless as a contribution to solving the frame problem. The problem is just pushed ahead." 5. Fetzer (1991a) discusses "lighting of a match" as a specific case illustrating the requirement of maximal specificity, noting, correctly, that "the satisfaction of the requirement of maximal specificity means that the system thereby described is a `closed system' in relation to the occurrence of a corresponding outcome." In 3.6 I refer to this as an example of those who "recognise the PCD but assume that it does not exist for specific domains." I also point out that on such "closed system"-views it is assumed that "[i] the choice of primitive terms [to describe the properties of a particular closed system] is straightforward and [ii] descriptions can be carried out independently for each domain." Fetzer does not comment on what I write there, nor on my reference in 4.3 to his views on the priority of the physical over the commonsensical. Hence I have to assume he agrees when I say: "It is because these assumptions seem so 'plausible' or 'intuitively' correct that there doesn't seem to be a PCD. But these assumptions are incorrect (van Brakel 1991)." 6. Fetzer (1993) also writes that I am wrong to suggest that one cannot advance "necessary and sufficient definitional conditions for specific concepts"; he offers as proof "the definition of a `bachelor' as an `unmarried adult male'." I do not know why Fetzer thinks this is a criticism of my position. In 3.4 I wrote: "Of course, it is possible to propose conventional definitions specifying necessary and sufficient conditions for, say, the use of a word, but we cannot step outside these definitions and give definitions for all the words that are used in the definitions (or the metalanguage)." Fetzer does not dispute this statement, nor has he provided any reasons to assume that he is able to give definitions of ALL words used in definitions, such that his definitions are unconditionally accepted by all speakers of English (or all students of the University of Minnesota, for that matter). 7. Still, it may be useful to elaborate a bit on my ideas about definitions of concepts (van Brakel & Geurts 1988, van Brakel 1991). The difference between Fetzer and me is, I surmise, that he is talking about the logician's (or rational philosopher's) paradise and I'm talking about the real world. Fetzer would say that the pope is a bachelor and so, according to Fetzer, is a man who has been living with the same woman for 20 years, has brought up eight children (while his "woman" was out earning the money), never looked at another woman or went to a pub, and so on. I wouldn't say that. Fetzer says a bachelor is an unmarried adult male, but how are "unmarried," "adult," and "male" being defined? Does one marry for the church or for the law (what about Muslim law or eighteenth century Nuu-chah-nulth "law")? Can two males be married? What about a man who has been a bachelor all his life and after his death it is discovered that for humanitarian reasons he once married a refugee, whom he never saw? Were people making a mistake calling this man a typical bachelor? 8. Of course, my appeal to real language (which is what the frame problem has to deal with) is of no relevance to Fetzer. He will appeal to an artificial ideal language: such a "logically perfect language (Begriffsschrift) should satisfy the conditions, that every expression grammatically well constructed as a proper name out of signs already introduced shall in fact designate an object, and no new sign shall be introduced as a proper name without being secured a meaning [ = reference]" (Frege 1892). Instead, I would appeal to Davidson (1986, p. 446): "there is no such thing as a language, not if a language is anything like what many philosophers and linguists have supposed." Of course, I do not claim to have finalised the philosophical issues on this matter in my exposition of the Problem of Complete Description. But it is not sufficient simply to appeal to some worn-out positivistic ideas of the 1930s, as Fetzer does. As Quine writes (1990, p. 56): "I would not seek a scientific rehabilitation of something like the old notion of separate and distinct meanings; that notion is better seen as a stumbling block cleared away." 9. Fetzer's position exemplifies a case of unjustified coherence. He straight-jackets all words and concepts in decontextualised idiosyncratic definitions, allowing free-play with the signifiers of COHERENCE, VALIDITY, and CONSISTENCY. This is of little relevance for real-world problems, however, such as the frame problem. REFERENCES Davidson, D. (1986) A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs. In Truth and Interpretation (E. LePore, ed.). Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Pp. 433-446. Fetzer, J.H. (1991a) The Frame Problem: Artificial Intelligence Meets David Hume. In Ford & Hayes (1991) 55-70. Fetzer, J.H. (1991b) Artificial Intelligence Meets David Hume: A Response to Pat Hayes. In Ford & Hayes (1991) 77-86. Fetzer, J.H. (1993) Van Brakel's Position Appears to be Incoherent. PSYCOLOQUY 4 (14) frame-problem.4. Ford, K.M. and P.J. Hayes (eds.) (1991) Reasoning Agents in a Dynamic World: The Frame Problem. Greenwich: JAI Press. Frege, G. (1892) Ueber Sinn und Bedeutung. Zeitschrift fuer Philosophie und Philosophische Kritik 100: 25-50. Quoted from Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege (P. Geach and M. Black, eds.). Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Hayes, P.J. (1991) Commentary on "The Frame Problem: Artificial Intelligence Meets David Hume." In Ford & Hayes (1991) 71-76. Hayes, P.J. (1992) Summary of "Reasoning Agents in a Dynamic World: The Frame Problem" (Ford & Hayes 1991, Eds.). PSYCOLOQUY 3 (59) frame-problem.1. Quine, W.V. (1990) The Pursuit of Truth. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. van Brakel, J. (1991) Meaning, Prototypes and the Future of Cognitive Science. Minds and Machines 1: 233-257. van Brakel, J. (1992) The Complete Description of the Frame Problem, PSYCOLOQUY. 3 (60) frame-problem.2. van Brakel, J. and J.P.M. Geurts (1988) Pragmatic Identity of Meaning and Metaphor. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 2: 205-226 23-Mar-93 3:06:20-GMT,18278;000000000001 Received: from rutvm1.rutgers.edu by aramis.rutgers.edu (5.59/SMI4.0/RU1.5/3.08) id AA19605; Mon, 22 Mar 93 22:06:18 EST Message-Id: <9303230306.AA19605@aramis.rutgers.edu> Received: from RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (IBM VM SMTP R1.2.1MX) with BSMTP id 4088; Mon, 22 Mar 93 22:05:00 EST Received: from RUTVM1.BITNET (NJE origin LISTSERV@RUTVM1) by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (LMail V1.1d/1.7f) with BSMTP id 0803; Mon, 22 Mar 1993 22:04:59 -0500 Date: Mon, 22 Mar 1993 21:40:52 -0500 Reply-To: psyc@pucc.bitnet Sender: "PSYCOLOQUY: Refereed Electronic Journal of Peer Discussion" From: Stevan Harnad Subject: psycoloquy.93.4.21.frame-problem.5.ford+hayes (336 lines) Comments: To: psyc@pucc.bitnet To: Multiple recipients of list PSYC psycoloquy.93.4.21.frame-problem.5.ford+hayes Monday 22 March 1993 ISSN 1055-0143 (18 paragraphs, 18 references, 330 lines) PSYCOLOQUY is sponsored by the American Psychological Association (APA) Copyright 1993 Pat Hayes & Ken Ford EFFECTIVE DESCRIPTIONS NEED NOT BE COMPLETE Reply to Van Brakel on Ford & Hayes on the Frame Problem Pat Hayes Beckman Institute University of Illinois Urbana IL 61801 phayes@herodotus.cs.uiuc.edu Ken Ford Institute for Human & Machine Cognition University of West Florida Pensacola FL 32514 kford@trivia.coginst.uwf.edu 1.0 WHO NEEDS COMPLETE DESCRIPTIONS? 1.1 One can approach van Brakel's (1992) review of Ford & Hayes (1991; henceforth F&H) in two different ways: as a scholarly survey and critique of the frame problem (FP) in general (and our book in particular), or as a sketchy argument that traditional AI is inadequate to handle a new fundamental problem that he calls the "problem of complete description" (PCD). These require rather different kinds of response. 2.0 VAN BRAKEL ON THE FRAME PROBLEM 2.1 The FP was defined over twenty years ago (McCarthy and Hayes 1969). It has been described very clearly several times (Hayes 1987; Haugh: F&H, p. 106) so we will not describe it again here. The subsequent literature often confuses this problem with others, creating so much confusion that the original meaning of the term has often become lost, as Stein (F&H: p. 219) laments. Van Brakel confuses it with something new. 2.2 Van Brakel begins with a precise but faulty definition of the FP. Let us call the problem that van Brakel defines the VBFP (Van Brakel Frame Problem). The VBFP includes the problem of giving "necessary and sufficient conditions for an event to occur." The VBFP and the FP differ because the general enterprise of formalizing common sense knowledge, within which the FP arises, does not attempt to give such necessary and sufficient conditions for success. Such conditions probably cannot be found in general, as van Brakel notes (and as others have emphasized). Thus, the VBFP is subsumed under the PCD precisely where it differs from the FP. 2.3 Even if we had the PCD solved, the FP would still be a problem. Suppose we could give necessary and sufficient conditions for an action to be performed successfully. Then, presumably, given a sufficiently rich description of a world-state and an action, we could say with confidence when the action would succeed. In what does this success consist? Presumably, some changes to the state of the world are wrought by the action. However, in the common sense reasoning situations that we all encounter every day, most of our actions change the relevant aspects of the world only slightly, and most actions change most of it not at all. How does our representation of this successful action compactly reflect this apparent invariance that we find to be a pervasive fact about our everyday world? This is the FP, and we can have as much confidence as we like in the preconditions of the action without making much headway with it. (One might argue that in order to establish the confidence in the preconditions one would have to know the effects, so a solution to the PCD would entail a solution to the FP. But this would reduce the PCD to the FP.) 2.4 One could leave van Brakel's discussion of the FP here, but it deserves a bit more analysis, lest it add more confusion to an already confused discussion. In F&H (1991: p. ix), we distinguished the original meaning of the term FP from its use to refer to a complicated family of related but distinct problems. Unfortunately, van Brakel [1.2] introduces an even larger collection of such problems. We will do a brief survey here: The terms "temporal projection" and "inertia" refer to ideas put forward to solve the FP, not other problems. The planning, ramification, relevance and extended prediction problems are varieties of the general task of making relevant inferences from a set of axioms; they are not problems of representation. The qualification problem is this: almost any belief has exceptions, so how can a representational system escape the apparent rigidity of logic in insisting that any exception is a contradiction? (Much useful progress has been made on this one, by the way.) All of these are different from the original FP. (The terms "installation problem" and "holism problem" are new to us, and we don't believe they appear in the AI literature.) The danger in this kind of confusion can be seen in the next paragraph, where various reasons are cited for the difficulty of the FP. But at one point Hayes's chapter (F&H: p. 72) is referring to the FP, at another (p. 73) to the qualification problem; Nutter's chapter (F&H: p. 176] is referring to the inference problem, and Dennett (1987) to something else again -- what might be called the perception problem or the updating problem. 2.5 Van Brakel, like other philosophers who have ventured into this territory (Fodor 1987, Fetzer: F&H, p. 55), believes he can detect evidence of a single deep problem all over the place. This deeper problem is, he concedes, perhaps partially understood in an "implicit or `intuitive' way" by the AI technicians, but they cannot see it with the clear vision of a philosopher. In fact, they often adopt an "ostrich" approach to it, putting the real work off into the future and playing with minor matters. Fodor similarly talks of a "music of the spheres" which cannot be heard by those too close to it and requires a philosophical ear to detect. 2.6 We are rather sceptical about such an attitude when it is accompanied by such a thorough lack of technical understanding. Van Brakel misstates the FP, even acknowledging that the crucial mistake (his condition [A1] ) is not found in the technically competent literature; he then derives a false assertion, and goes on to claim to find evidence for this "lurking" everywhere, justifying this claim by a series of brief quotes. But this habit of snappy quotation takes phrases out of context in dangerously misleading ways. For example, the "implicit assumption that the agent doing the reasoning has complete knowledge of the relevant facts" (pointed out in their chapters in F&H by Haugh, Morgenstern, Tenenberg and Weld) is indeed a problem; but the problem is not that we cannot give such "complete knowledge" -- the PCD -- but rather that this assumption of complete knowledge is in fact wrong, and we don't know how to represent that. This is almost the inverse of the PCD. Again, the old idea of a "situation" is indeed one involving a complete state of the universe at a moment of time; but the situation calculus does not aspire to achieve a complete description of a situation; quite the contrary: McCarthy (1963) refers to "rich objects" which can never be fully described, and he utilizes this in the properties of his calculus. Situations do not suffer from a PCD; they rejoice in the impossibility of CD. 3.0 EFFECTIVE DESCRIPTIONS NEED NOT BE COMPLETE DESCRIPTIONS 3.1 Still, is the PCD another central problem for AI? Perhaps van Brakel has discovered a new problem that we have to solve. But he has not, for the PCD is irrelevant to AI. 3.2 It seems clear that in general, complete characterizations of things, in the sense of necessary and sufficient conditions for them to exist, or correct biconditional definitions of the concepts, cannot be given. CD is impossible. But achieving such complete descriptions is not (and never has been) a goal of most AI formalization; nor, it would seem, should it be (since it is impossible). We fail to see any problem here. If van Brakel regards this as a policy of denial, then we exult in denial; but he seems to be simultaneously asserting that CD is impossible and that AI must face up to the need to achieve it. You can't have it both ways: It is not reasonable to expect AI programs to aspire to omniscience and then complain that the omniscience problem is too hard. 3.3 Perhaps it should be emphasized that the strategy of building an axiomatic description of an environment does not imply that one must achieve or seek "complete" descriptions. Axiomatic formulations often (indeed, usually) admit several alternative interpretations. Nevertheless, useful inferences can often be drawn from them. There is no need to have definitions of any of the terms in the formalization. The sentences form a web of constraints on possible meanings of the terms, but they need not (and often, provably, cannot) uniquely pin down these meanings. The idea that they should do so, or must in order to achieve some kind of adequacy, is a legacy from the use of logical formalisms to establish the foundations of mathematics, a very different kind of enterprise. 3.4 It seems likely that most of human conceptual knowledge is of this character. Someone might know a great deal about, say, goldfish, or copper, or how to whittle a whistle, without being said to have complete knowledge of this, or to be able to give definitions of the words, or even knowing how such definitions might be constructed. A demonstration may help. Perhaps you, the reader, have never come across the term "bulbs of percussion." The Appendix [6.1] explains it. (It is amusing to make some guesses first.) After reading the Appendix you will have a fairly good idea of what this means and will be able to explain it to others. Your understanding will be linked to other concepts you already have, and it will in turn depend for its richness and depth on how rich and deep these are: Some of you will know more about that area than others do. But you won't have a complete description of it, whatever that would be. You probably won't be able to answer all possible questions about bulbs of percussion (how big are they? what color?), and you may not be able to recognize one if it were presented to you. Most of our knowledge is like this, it seems: partial, more or less sketchy, but all connected together, and adequate to support the inferential and pragmatic tasks that confront us from day to day. That is what AI is trying to capture in its representational games. 3.5 So it seems that "complete descriptions" are not used by human thinkers, cannot be given in general, and have no particular connection to the goals of AI. No problem. 4.0 MEANINGS 4.1 We could forget the FP, however, and read van Brakel more sympathetically (and therefore less carefully). There is a larger issue in his critique, and it is one that other philosophers have raised. It has also been called the problem of meaning (Searle 1983) or "grounding": How can we capture the meanings of concepts in representations? Can a collection of, say, sentences in a logic, ever be said to somehow encode or correspond to real, living beliefs, beliefs with intentional meaning, beliefs which are about something? 4.2 We believe that this is what is really worrying van Brakel, and why he regards the PCD as so important. Although he does not state it quite explicitly, his argument goes something like this. [a] Any formalization in the tradition of logicism must use symbols. [b] The meaning of these symbols must somehow be specified completely. [c] But this cannot be done without using other symbols, since... [d] ...definitions of terms themselves use symbols. [e] Therefore, logistic (linguistic) representations must be inadequate. The mistake, as we have observed, is [b]. But the general worry is valid: how can we ever attach "formal" symbols to the actual world? This is what Harnad (1990) calls the "symbol grounding problem." 4.3 Van Brakel's implied solution is to move away from knowledge representation. He waves us in the direction of a more physicalist approach to AI, citing Clancey (1991), Dreyfus & Dreyfus (1990) and Brooks (1991) with approval. Why is this the right approach? Here is his argument in its entirety: "During human evolution, "nature" has hit on a practical solution to the frame problem. We have to find the PHYSICAL description of how humans do it." Van Brakel seems to assume that any account of how cognition evolved can only be given in physical terms. This is quite unjustified, however. In fact, all the obvious evidence suggests that the differences between humans and other mammals at almost all physical levels of description, from chemistry up to detailed neuroanatomy, are relatively minor. Right now, the best places to look for insights into the content of mental structure seem to be cognitive and developmental psychology. Neuroscience is advancing rapidly and in exciting ways, but any such "physical" insight can only relate to a theory of mental structure via some mapping between mental structure and architecture, and these all involve some notion of representation (Shastri 1993). Brooks's "mobots" model primitive insects and have no mental life whatever. (Van Brakel points out "But these mobots really exist in their world." True: in fact, anything that exists, really exists in its world. So what?) 5.0 HOLISM 5.1 Like other critics, notably John Searle (1980), van Brakel assumes a highly oversimplified model of AI representations, typically based on Schank's scripts (Schank & Abelson 1977). This seems to lead him to several unjustified assumptions, including that logistical representations cannot represent time-varying information, unconscious or "moral" beliefs, and so forth. Van Brakel's only argument is the bald assertion that the kind of "relational" knowledge of, for example, chairs, which a child obtains from acquaintance with them "has little to do with the descriptive knowledge in a "chair-script." We challenge those who make such "arguments" to explain carefully why any kind of knowledge should be excluded from the range of symbolic representations. 5.2 Finally, to return to nitpicking, there are many other confusions in von Brakel's discussion. He talks of using the "world as its own model." This phrase is used in parts of AI as a slogan for the observation that an intelligent agent can often rely on its environment to provide it with certain information in its own future, which it therefore does not need to remember or encode internally. It would be more accurate to call this idea "the world as a notebook." The question of the extent to which this is a useful strategy is interesting, but used in this way as a methodological slogan it is misplaced, because the position it opposes is a fantasy. Nobody has suggested that an intelligent agent, machine or otherwise, must carry the burden of total observation of the environment. That would be to fall into the clutches of the PCD. 6.0 APPENDIX 6.1 In the Stone Age, craftsmen made flint tools by skillfully striking one stone on another. The first hard blow, designed to split a new stone in a certain way, typically produced a series of concentric shock marks radiating out from the point of impact on the smooth surface of the split flint. Archeologists call this pattern of marks, still visible on many stones, the "bulb of percussion." (Thanks to Jim Doran, University of Essex, for this example.) REFERENCES Boden, M.A. (ed.) (1990) The Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Brooks, R.A. (1991) Intelligence without representation. Artificial Intelligence 47: 139-159. Clancey, W.J. (1991) The frame of reference problem in the design of intelligent machines. In Architectures for Intelligence: The Twenty-Second Carnegie Symposium on Cognition (K. vanLehn, ed.). Hillsdale NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, pp. 357-424. Dennett, D (1987) The Intentional Stance. MIT Press Dreyfus, H.L. and S.E. Dreyfus (1990) Making a mind versus modelling the brain: Artificial intelligence back at a branch-point. in Boden (1990) 309-333. Fodor, J (1987) Modules, Frames, Frigeons, Sleeping Dogs and the Music of the Spheres. In: Pylyshyn 1987. Ford, K & Hayes, P (eds) (1991) Reasoning Agents in a Dynamic World: The Frame Problem. JAI Press. Harnad, S. (1990) The Symbol Grounding Problem. Physica D 42: 335-346. Hayes, P (1987) What the Frame Problem Is and Isn't. In Pylyshyn 1987. Hayes, P. J. (1992) Summary of: K. Ford & P. Hayes (1991): Reasoning Agents in a Dynamic World: The Frame Problem. PSYCOLOQUY 3(59) frame-problem.1. McCarthy, J (1963) Situations, Actions and Causal Laws. Stanford Artificial Intelligence Project, Memo 2. McCarthy, J and Hayes, P (1969) Some philosophical problems from the standpoint of Artificial Intelligence. In B. Meltzer & D. Michie (eds) Machine Intelligence 4. Elsevier. Pylyshyn, Z. (ed) (1987) The Robot's Dilemma. Ablex. Schank, R. C. & Abelson, R. P. (1977) Scripts, Plans, Goals, and Understanding: An Inquiry into Human Knowledge Structures. Erlbaum. Searle J. R. (1983) Intentionality, an essay in the philosophy of mind. Cambridge University Press. Searle, J. R. (1980) Minds, brains and programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3: 417-457. Shastri, L. and Ajjanagadde, V. (1993) From Simple Associations to Systematic Reasoning. Behavioral and Brain Sciences (to appear, with commentaries). Van Brakel, J. (1992) The complete description of the frame problem. PSYCOLOQUY 3(60) frame-problem.2. 23-Mar-93 3:07:49-GMT,26909;000000000001 Received: from rutvm1.rutgers.edu by aramis.rutgers.edu (5.59/SMI4.0/RU1.5/3.08) id AA19877; Mon, 22 Mar 93 22:07:47 EST Message-Id: <9303230307.AA19877@aramis.rutgers.edu> Received: from RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (IBM VM SMTP R1.2.1MX) with BSMTP id 4089; Mon, 22 Mar 93 22:06:31 EST Received: from RUTVM1.BITNET (NJE origin LISTSERV@RUTVM1) by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (LMail V1.1d/1.7f) with BSMTP id 0817; Mon, 22 Mar 1993 22:06:30 -0500 Date: Mon, 22 Mar 1993 21:57:55 -0500 Reply-To: psyc@pucc.bitnet Sender: "PSYCOLOQUY: Refereed Electronic Journal of Peer Discussion" From: Stevan Harnad Subject: psycoloquy.93.4.25.frame-problem.9.morris (466 lines) Comments: To: psyc@pucc.bitnet To: Multiple recipients of list PSYC psycoloquy.93.4.25.frame-problem.8.morris Monday 22 March 1993 ISSN 1055-0143 (29 paragraphs, 7 references, 460 lines) PSYCOLOQUY is sponsored by the American Psychological Association (APA) Copyright 1993 Robert A. Morris THE CHANGING SCENE Book Review of Ford & Hayes on the Frame Problem Robert A. Morris Computer Science Department Florida Institute of Technology Melbourne, FL 32901 morris@cs.fit.edu 1.0 INTRODUCTION 1.1 The Frame Problem concerns the representation of knowledge in a changing world. In so-called declarative computational representations of knowledge, the world is depicted as a set of assertions. Knowledge about the effects of actions, in particular, is often depicted in assertions of the form: If P is true, then Q is true as the result of performing action A. There are two related problems with this representation: the first is in listing all the conditions (P) which must be true for A to produce its "intended" effect. The other problem is to specify (in Q) all the truths which follow from A being performed, including not only a specification of things that change, but also things that do not. The former problem is called the qualification problem; the latter, the frame problem. Finally, there is a related ramification problem, which is the problem of formalizing all the things that do change as the result of an action. In the following, unless more specificity is required, I shall use the term frame problem in a generic sense, which includes all three problems just identified. 1.2 The Ford & Hayes (1991, henceforth F&H) volume contains expanded and revised versions of papers presented at the First International Workshop on Human and Machine Cognition in 1989. The objective of the workshop was to bring together researchers in AI, cognitive science, psychology, and philosophy for the purpose of presenting different perspectives on a common problem or theme, to achieve "a focused exchange of ideas" (p. ix). Despite the interdisciplinary intent, the majority of papers present a more or less conventional AI perspective. That is, they attempt to solve what is sometimes called the technical frame problem, in contradistinction to the broader formulation sometimes preferred by philosophers. The papers from this workshop that had a broader philosophical approach appear in a separate volume (Ford and Pylyshyn, 1992). A review of the workshop itself appears in (Dietrich, 1991). 1.3 The book is useful to researchers in cognitive science, AI and philosophy who wish to possess a single resource for technical discussions on the frame question. It differs from other edited volumes in having original contributions and also in stressing an interdisciplinary approach. Those likely to benefit the most from this collection will have some background in logic and formal semantics, familiar with what the frame problem is, appreciative its significance, but perhaps not yet familiar with the current approaches to solving it. Alternatively, for those who need to obtain the relevant background knowledge in semantics and logic, some of the more self-contained papers provide a useful introduction; otherwise, the accompanying bibliographies are useful. In addition, the interdisciplinary nature of the collection gives the reader a valuable reference source for authors in logic and cognitive science who are not as well known in AI. This I found especially useful. 2.0 APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM 2.1 In dealing with the frame problem, most of the contributors to the book take as the starting point of their analysis the current state of AI research. To understand this current state, it is useful to summarize some recent history. 2.2 The original technical solution to the frame problem was proposed within the framework of nonmonotonic reasoning (McCarthy, 1986). There are a number of formalizations of nonmonotonic reasoning, including circumscription, default logic, and the closed world assumption. In general, nonmonotonic reasoning systems attempt to model reasonable but deductively unsound inferencing. These models allow for the expression of default knowledge, such as "birds typically fly," in terms of rules to the effect that unless refutable from what is known, the system can infer from knowledge that X is a bird, that X flies (i.e. is typical). This system is "nonmonotonic" because further information to the effect that X is not typical (e.g., it is a penguin) will force the removal of the default conclusion. Circumscription sanctions this inference through a formal process of "minimizing" the set of abnormal things. Minimizing formalizes the intuition that the only things the system should identify as abnormal are the things it can prove to be such. The relevance of the nonmonotonic perspective for the frame problem is the observation that any general assertion of the effects or preconditions of actions (or other events) will also be defeasible, given additional knowledge. 2.3 The use of nonmonotonic techniques can lead, unfortunately, to the so-called "Yale Shooting Problem" (YSP) (Hanks, McDermott, 1987). The YSP involves a loaded gun, a victim, and a waiting period prior to the firing of the gun. Minimizing abnormality in this case does not yield the singular intended solution that the victim dies; equally minimal is the world in which the gun becomes unloaded. This result is unintuitive because, barring new knowledge, common sense would maintain that loaded guns remain loaded. 2.4 The YSP led immediately to attempts to revise the formalizations of default reasoning which "work but don't seem natural" (McCarthy, 1993). The current state of research on the frame problem in AI can be characterized roughly as attempts to formulate criteria for justifying formal proposals for solving YSP and similar problems. This supplies the necessary background for understanding the focus of the workshop. 2.5 Articles in the collection can be divided roughly into two categories: first, "expanding old directions," in which authors use the framework of nonmonotonic reasoning to devise new (and, one hopes, less ad hoc) frameworks for solving the frame problem. The other category can be called "proposing new directions," in which an alternative representation and reasoning framework is identified. This partitioning is rough, and some authors are hard to classify; but I will use this distinction in the remainder of my summary. 3.0 EXPANDING OLD DIRECTIONS 3.1 Scott Goodwin and Andre Trudel (F&H, p. 87) see the key to solving the frame problem in an adequate characterization of persistence. Their approach to formalization differs from the traditional one in opting for the framework of so-called continuous temporal logics (i.e., logics which represent time explicitly), rather than that of the situation calculus. Their system operates within a first-order hypothetical reasoning framework, with knowledge consisting of facts and hypotheses, as well as meta-knowledge sufficient to make assertions about justifications of knowledge (including notions like plausibility and unacceptability, p. 93). Default assumptions are represented differently from the usual form of "true until proven false"; rather, an empirically verifiable statistical approach is presented (p. 94). Temporal persistence underlies a kind of default knowledge: it states that "for most intervals, the truth value of a relation is the same at every point in the interval" (p.100). The minimal models of the YSP are, on this approach, treated "skeptically," i.e., neither is acceptable without further information. To achieve the desired solution, the assumption of "temporal independence" (the past is independent of the future) is required (p.101). 3.2 Leora Morgenstern (F&H, p. 133) presents new variations on the frame problem, ones in which there are multiple agents and "vicarious plans" (pp. 140-41). The examples point to a solution in which agents are able to reason without full knowledge of events that have occurred. This motivates an approach which adds a logic of belief to a temporal nonmonotonic framework; the result, she calls Epistemic Motivated Action Theory (EMAT). The central notion of motivation is similar to that of justification, in that it supplies the warrant for the reasoning agent either to maintain or "clip" models. The belief representation allows for a relativization of theories to agents and times, thus supporting the means for expressing concepts like ignorance and belief revision. 3.3 The chapter by Jay Weber (F&H, p. 259) raises a fundamental criticism of persistence-based solutions to the YSP and related problems and suggests a different explanation of, and approach to, the frame problem. His suggestion is that temporal minimization is "too insensitive to contextual information" (p. 260), and that the frame problem should be viewed as one of supplying enough domain-dependent information to infer the occurrence of particular events. He offers three solutions to the frame problem, each of which illustrates how adding domain-dependent knowledge avoids frame "problems," including the so-called knowledge omniscience assumptions. 3.4 Brian Haugh (F&H, p. 105) also cites YSP as illustrative of how solutions involving nonmonotonic formalisms violate common sense by "incorporating implicit assumptions about (a theory's) knowledge of its domain" (p. 108). His solution also introduces an explicit representation of belief. The key is the need to minimize changes ("disturbances") in factual knowledge without any justification. Justified changes are "roughly, those changes that are somehow justified by the facts, events, and laws of an explicitly stated theory"(p. 121). His chapter goes on to sketch a foundation for a representation of explicit knowledge, justification of knowledge, and causation. 3.5 Frank Brown (F&H, p. 1) returns to a situation calculus framework formulated in second-order modal quantification logic, with an intensional semantics and a proof technique involving reflective reasoning. The logic includes a formulation of frame laws for actions as quantifications over propositions in which modal operators are relativized to initial situations and those resulting from the action. Reflective reasoning involves solving an equation of the form K = A, where K may appear in A, presumably within a default law. To solve this equation, A is reduced to a disjunction of formulas in which K no longer occurs but which is logically equivalent to the original equation. This formulation allows for a solution to the frame problem by propagating properties across successive situations in which an action is performed through default laws (p. 13f). The intensional semantics is utilized for soundness and completeness results as well as to prove equivalence with other nonmonotonic systems. 4.0 NEW DIIRECTIONS 4.1 Lynn Andrea Stein (p.219) objects to approaches that pose the frame problem as a problem in reasoning about time and suggests that the problem of determining what changes as the result of an action is a problem of relevance. Support for this idea comes by contrasting the frame problem with the so-called counterfactual validity problem. This is the problem of interpreting counterfactual statements like "if kangaroos didn't have tails, they would fall over." This is a particularly difficult problem, and one whose formal semantics seems to require something like possible worlds. However, such a semantics seems to lead to something analogous to the YSP for counterfactuals, since there may be multiple worlds which are consistent with the change implied by making the antecedent of the counterfactual true, but which differ in their common sense appeal. The chapter concludes with a recommendation for incorporating a record of changes made in the world to serve as justifications for inferences made during frame-like situations. 4.2 David Etherington, Sarit Kraus, and Donald Perlis (F&H, p. 43) summarize accounts that expose anomalous behavior in nonmonotonic reasoning systems. An example involving the persistence of a healthy state of an automobile relates these anomalies to the frame problem. Their solution involves recognizing a "scope of interest or concern." The idea, which is illustrated nicely with an example about an engineer (p. 47), is that "scoped minimization" is not constrained by the presence of assertions that there are counterexamples to default generalizations; this allows for the drawing of the intuitive default conclusions. On this reading, "scope" becomes a predicate true of domain objects; if it ranges "widely" over elements of the domain, few default conclusions are drawn. To solve the problem of vehicle servicing, one merely puts the time containing the trip home within the scope of the predicate "scope." This sanctions the desired inference. 4.3 Similarly, J. Terry Nutter (F&H, p. 171) focuses on the problem of context of reasoning, but in a broader setting. Her argument draws upon a rich set of examples which show how pervasive the frame problem is, and adopts the notion of salience as a paradigm for representing context and focus of attention. She suggests that for solving potentially complex reasoning problems such as those posed by the frame problem what is needed is not something that prunes a complex search space but rather something that limits what is accessible (salient) to the reasoner. This intriguing paradigm of context limitation involves nondestructive operations on the knowledge itself, producing simplified transformations of assertions, which thereby controls the complexity. Since these operations are nondestructive, they can be modified to handle changes in context as the result of adding new knowledge. 4.4 Donald Perlis (F&H, p. 189) and Daniel S. Weld (F&H, p. 275) offer contributions in a similar vein but using different frameworks. Perlis suggests that the key for a solution to the frame problem may reside in an explicit representation of the intensionality (the aboutness) of concepts. This leads from the uncertainty of the world from the standpoint of an axiomatic account of its behavior, to default reasoning with vague concepts, to the problem of "getting the right defeasible conclusion" (p.191) in the light of problems such as YSP. The latter may require a mechanism which recognizes something as conceptual, and hence can distinguish between reality and "mere appearance." This leads into a brief history of western philosophy and a suggestion that a systems be developed with the appearance/reality distinction. Weld, by contrast, uses the framework of system dynamics to argue that solutions to the qualification problem will result from developing computational systems which recognize that multiple models exist, each offering merely an approximation of the reality being modeled. 4.5 Erik Sandewall's chapter (F&H, p. 201) contains an interesting historical analysis which ties together the frame problem of McCarthy and Hayes with Minsky's (1974) notion of frames. Briefly, the term "frame" was used by Minsky to describe a particular knowledge structure representing things like objects with properties. McCarthy/Hayes, on the other hand use it to describe "histories", i.e., bundles of spacetime. Sandewall introduces a structure called "dynamic frames" as a generalization or synthesis of the two notions. The frame problem, on this approach, is unified with the problem of reasoning about the dynamics of dynamic frames. He distinguishes between two kinds of change, smooth (intraframe) and structural (interframe). The logic of smooth change involves chronological minimization and concepts like persistence. The logic of structural change, by contrast, is to be found by applying principles found in qualitative reasoning systems. 4.6 Josh Tennenberg offers a useful classification of frame problem solutions in terms of the conservative/permissive dichotomy. Permissive views, which include all of the proposals summarized in the previous section, assume the completeness of knowledge, thereby sanctioning inferences about change. Tennenberg echoes some of the remarks of Nutter in rejecting such accounts as overly simple and inadequate on many counts. The conservative approach, by contrast, sanctions inferences about change through the use of explanation-closure axioms of the form: "P changes between t and t+1 only when actions A1 ... An occur at t"(p.240). This approach avoids the limitations of the permissive approach, but at a price which makes it equally inadequate. The problem, of course, is coming up with the requisite axioms regarding change; as Tennenberg notes, this is the same as or close to the qualification problem itself. His solution uses probabilistic reasoning based on statistical assertions. Associating probabilities allows for the abandonment of completeness assumptions and yet allows for the propagation of knowledge. Unlike in traditional approaches, knowledge is also allowed to become obsolete, thus admitting revision of predictions about the future. 4.7 Finally, the collection includes a debate between James Fetzer (F&H, pp. 55, 77), and Patrick Hayes (F&H, p. 71). Fetzer offers an analysis of the frame problem which leads to a solution in terms of the proper formulation of natural laws. He reformulates the frame problem as the classical problem of induction as formulated by Hume. Like the problem of induction, the frame problem, in Fetzer's view, is one of justifying inferences about the future, both about what changes and what stays the same. It is therefore a problem of the justification of claims to knowledge. According to Fetzer, appeals to principles like persistence will work only if they follow from carefully formulated theories of natural law. Furthermore, so-called "common sense" fails to provide the source for such a theory, since common sense is too haphazard to offer a proper foundation for knowledge representation. 4.8 Instead, Fetzer offers a set of schemata for the formulation of natural laws. The schemata provide the warrant for predictive inferences about the future. Laws that instantiate the schema must be "maximally specific" in the characterization of their antecedent conditions; hence, "the system thereby described is a "closed system (p.60); in other words, the inferences they sanction are deductively valid. Such schemata are utilized by Fetzer in the formulation of laws sanctioning inferences about what changes as the result of an action, what stays the same, and about inferential situations in which the knowledge of the requisite law is lacking. Although the laws sanction deductively valid inferences, knowledge of these laws is itself empirically based, and hence fallible. He adopts a Popperian methodology for the validation of these laws. Finally, there is a suggestion that the schemata provide a foundation for a implementable knowledge representation language for AI. 4.9 In his response, Hayes proceeds to attack Fetzer on every count. The frame problem is not reducible to the problem of induction (it is a representation problem, not a problem in justification of knowledge), common sense does provide the key to its solution (humans can perform the proper inferences without knowledge of maximally specific causal laws), and Fetzer's schemata offer no help in finding a solution (in being maximally specific, they exemplify rather than solve the qualification problem, and they are useless as a representation language for AI). 4.10 Hayes's frontal attack leaves little hope of reaching any graceful resolution to the debate, and Fetzer's "final word" offers little more than a restatement of his original thesis. This debate seems indicative of a tension between some philosophers and AI researchers. This tension has led McCarthy (1993) to complain that "Some of the most confused people about formalized nonmonotonic reasoning and the problems for which AI people use it have been philosophers" (p. 25). This point is evidenced, I believe, by the remarks of a recent contributor to this journal, whose comments I will now briefly address. 5.0 A COMMENTARY ON VAN BRAKEL 5.1 I wish to address specific remarks made by van Brakel (1992). I ignore the broader question of whether van Brakel has even formulated the frame problem correctly, which is also questionable. 5.2 Van Brakel's discussion begins with identifying what he terms three AI "responses" to the frame problem (3.2), viz: R1 the ostrich approach; R2 the panacea approach and R3 the approach that recognizes that there is a problem, but "assumes it does not exist for specific domains". R1, the "ostrich" approach, van Brakel ambiguously defines as (M1)"denying the problem exists", and (M2)"relegating the problem to the future work category (3.2). In no clear sense are these two definitions equivalent. By adopting M2 I clearly identify it as a problem (otherwise, there would be nothing to relegate). The effect here seems to be to muddy the waters. 5.3 Van Brakel attributes the ostrich approach to Morgenstern, Etherington, Kraus, Perlis, and Haugh. But to attribute M1 to them is absurd (why would they attend a workshop on the problem unless they believe it exists)? The passages van Brakel cites from their chapters suggest that he is accusing them of M2. But what, exactly, is the criticism here? As my review has suggested, some of these authors are suggesting that a new direction be taken in solving the frame problem. It seems to be legitimate for contributors to a workshop to argue for a new direction without offering a complete technical solution, based on this new direction -- especially given the complexity of the problem itself. 5.4 R2 is attributed to Nutter, Perlis, Weber. This is the approach in which the solution to a problem is "delayed" by appealing to a question begging concept, i.e., a concept whose representation is at least as difficult a problem as the original one to be solved. Examples from the book of question-begging properties which are supposed to supply a key to solving the framing dilemma are "salient," "appropriate" and "relevant." There are two issues being conflated here: viz., 1. How does a knowledge engineer partition a set of predicates into the appropriate categories for developing knowledge bases that are not subject to the frame problem, and 2. How does one automate this process? The second problem is clearly more difficult than the first, and the solution to the second presupposes that the first has been solved. Problem 2 may be unsolvable in general, due to the complexity of the frame problem (but see the results in Brown's chapter ). Nutter seems to be addressing point (2), but the other authors seem to be addressing point (1). And although to a limited extent one might agree with van Brakel's point (some authors seemed to be pushing the problem back a bit), I do not find the point to carry a lot of force. The reason is that, as a design aid for nonmonotonic reasoning system builders, it is useful to have a theory which explains what makes certain relations abnormal (or projectable, etc). This is a kinder and more accurate characterization of what the authors van Brakel criticizes are doing. It is simply too casual to dismiss what they are doing in the manner van Brakel adopts. As I indicated in my review, the AI research community is currently driven by the need to find solutions to the problem that are "grounded" in common sense, not just ones that "work." This explains the appeal to "grounding" concepts like relevance, context, and the like. Unlike van Brakel, I found these attempts, on the whole, to contribute to advancing the research. 5.5 Finally, commenting on R3 (3.6), van Brakel does not have any specific authors from the book in mind, but proceeds to criticize AI solutions in general as tending towards being the ad hoc and question-begging. He speaks of the "practical AI researchers" (whoever they are) who don't find anything wrong with the frame problem. I find these blind side attacks on AI completely lacking in substance. The very workshop that van Brakel is reviewing belies the claim that the AI community is insensitive to the depth of the problem. Even a cursory glance at the history of the problem (as I have tried to provide here; a more comprehensive reference is Ginsberg, 1987) shows that AI researchers have been engaged in a healthy, self-critical debate about the value of proposed technical solutions. One is forced to conclude that the so-called "practical AI researcher" is clearly a straw man for confused and/or threatened philosophers. 6.0 CONCLUSION 6.1 This book, along with its companion (Ford and Pylyshun, 1992) are useful reference guides to recent advances in AI and cognitive science towards a satisfactory solution to the frame problem. Being an original collection, many of the contributions further the advance of research in this area. In addition, many of the articles point the way for the reader interested in exploring broader foundational issues. REFERENCES Dietrich, E. (1991) The First International Workshop on Human and Machine Cognition, Pensacola, Florida. Topic: The Frame Problem. AI Magazine, 11(5) 60-64. Ford, K.M. and P.J. Hayes (1991) Reasoning Agents in a Dynamic World: The Frame Problem, Greenwich: JAI Press. Ford, K. and Pylyshyn, Z., eds. (1992) The Robot's Dilemma Revisited: The Frame Problem in Artificial Intelligence, in press. Ginsberg, M. (ed.) (1987) Readings in Non-Monotonic Reasoning. Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, Inc. McCarthy, J. (1993) History of Circumscription. Artificial Intelligence 59, 23-26. Minsky, M. (1974) A framework for Representing knowledge. MIT Lab Memo # 306. Van Brakel, J. (1992) The complete description of the frame problem. PSYCOLOQUY 3(60) frame-problem.2. 25-Mar-93 19:17:54-GMT,5695;000000000001 Received: from rutvm1.rutgers.edu by aramis.rutgers.edu (5.59/SMI4.0/RU1.5/3.08) id AA13118; Thu, 25 Mar 93 14:17:53 EST Message-Id: <9303251917.AA13118@aramis.rutgers.edu> Received: from RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (IBM VM SMTP R1.2.1MX) with BSMTP id 1088; Thu, 25 Mar 93 14:16:37 EST Received: from RUTVM1.BITNET (NJE origin LISTSERV@RUTVM1) by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (LMail V1.1d/1.7f) with BSMTP id 5859; Thu, 25 Mar 1993 14:16:36 -0500 Date: Thu, 25 Mar 1993 14:13:59 EST Reply-To: "PSYCOLOQUY: Refereed Electronic Journal of Peer Discussion" Sender: "PSYCOLOQUY: Refereed Electronic Journal of Peer Discussion" From: Stevan Harnad Subject: MOTOR INTENTION, IMAGERY AND REPRESENTATION: BBS Call for Commentators Comments: To: PSYCOLOQUY To: Multiple recipients of list PSYC Below is the abstract of a forthcoming target article by MARC JEANNEROD, on MOTOR INTENTION, IMAGERY AND REPRESENTATION, that has been accepted for publication in Behavioral and Brain Sciences (BBS), an international, interdisciplinary journal providing Open Peer Commentary on important and controversial current research in the biobehavioral and cognitive sciences. Commentators must be current BBS Associates or nominated by a current BBS Associate. To be considered as a commentator for this article, to suggest other appropriate commentators, or for information about how to become a BBS Associate, please send email to: harnad@clarity.princeton.edu or harnad@pucc.bitnet or write to: BBS, 20 Nassau Street, #240, Princeton NJ 08542 [tel: 609-921-7771] To help us put together a balanced list of commentators, please give some indication of the aspects of the topic on which you would bring your areas of expertise to bear if you were selected as a commentator. An electronic draft of the full text is available for inspection by anonymous ftp according to the instructions that follow after the abstract. ____________________________________________________________________ THE REPRESENTING BRAIN: NEURAL CORRELATES OF MOTOR INTENTION AND IMAGERY Marc Jeannerod Vision et Motricite INSERM Unite 94 16 avenue du Doyen Lepine 69500 Bron France KEYWORDS: affordances, goals, intention, motor imagery, motor schemata, neural codes, object manipulation, planning, posterior parietal cortex, premotor cortex, representation. ABSTRACT: This target article concerns how motor actions are neurally represented and coded. Action planning and motor preparation can be studied using motor imagery. A close functional equivalence between motor imagery and motor preparation is suggested by the positive effects of imagining movements on motor learning, the similarity between the neural structures involved, and the similar physiological correlates observed in both imagining and preparing. The content of motor representations can be inferred from motor images at a macroscopic level: from global aspects of the action (the duration and amount of effort involved) and from the motor rules and constraints which predict the spatial path and kinematics of movements. A microscopic neural account of the represenation of object-oriented action is described. Object attributes are processed in different neural pathways depending on the kind of task the subject is performing. During object-oriented action, a pragmatic representation is activated in which object affordances are transformed into specific motor schemata independently of other tasks such as object recognition. Animal as well as clinical data implicate posterior parietal and premotor cortical areas in schema instantiation. A mechanism is proposed that is able to encode the desired goal of the action and is applicable to different levels of representational organization. -------------------------------------------------------------- To help you decide whether you would be an appropriate commentator for this article, an electronic draft is retrievable by anonymous ftp from princeton.edu according to the instructions below (the filename is bbs.jeannerod). Please do not prepare a commentary on this draft. Just let us know, after having inspected it, what relevant expertise you feel you would bring to bear on what aspect of the article. ------------------------------------------------------------- To retrieve a file by ftp from a Unix/Internet site, type either: ftp princeton.edu or ftp 128.112.128.1 When you are asked for your login, type: anonymous Enter password as per instructions (make sure to include the specified @), and then change directories with: cd /pub/harnad/BBS To show the available files, type: ls Next, retrieve the file you want with (for example): get bbs.jeannerod When you have the file(s) you want, type: quit In case of doubt or difficulty, consult your system manager. A more elaborate version of these instructions for the U.K. is available on request (thanks to Brian Josephson)> ---------- Where the above procedures are not available (e.g. from Bitnet or other networks), there are two fileservers: ftpmail@decwrl.dec.com and bitftp@pucc.bitnet that will do the transfer for you. To one or the other of them, send the following one line message: help for instructions (which will be similar to the above, but will be in the form of a series of lines in an email message that ftpmail or bitftp will then execute for you). ------------------------------------------------------------- 25-Mar-93 19:29:41-GMT,6119;000000000001 Received: from rutvm1.rutgers.edu by aramis.rutgers.edu (5.59/SMI4.0/RU1.5/3.08) id AA13416; Thu, 25 Mar 93 14:29:40 EST Message-Id: <9303251929.AA13416@aramis.rutgers.edu> Received: from RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (IBM VM SMTP R1.2.1MX) with BSMTP id 1117; Thu, 25 Mar 93 14:28:24 EST Received: from RUTVM1.BITNET (NJE origin LISTSERV@RUTVM1) by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (LMail V1.1d/1.7f) with BSMTP id 6072; Thu, 25 Mar 1993 14:28:23 -0500 Date: Thu, 25 Mar 1993 14:23:39 EST Reply-To: "PSYCOLOQUY: Refereed Electronic Journal of Peer Discussion" Sender: "PSYCOLOQUY: Refereed Electronic Journal of Peer Discussion" From: Stevan Harnad Subject: VISUAL STABILITY ACROSS SACCADIC EYE MOVEMENTS: BBS Call for Comm. Comments: To: PSYCOLOQUY To: Multiple recipients of list PSYC Below is the abstract of a forthcoming target article by BRUCE BRIDGEMAN et al on VISUAL STABILITY ACROSS SACCADIC EYE MOVEMENTS that has been accepted for publication in Behavioral and Brain Sciences (BBS), an international, interdisciplinary journal providing Open Peer Commentary on important and controversial current research in the biobehavioral and cognitive sciences. Commentators must be current BBS Associates or nominated by a current BBS Associate. To be considered as a commentator for this article, to suggest other appropriate commentators, or for information about how to become a BBS Associate, please send email to: harnad@clarity.princeton.edu or harnad@pucc.bitnet or write to: BBS, 20 Nassau Street, #240, Princeton NJ 08542 [tel: 609-921-7771] To help us put together a balanced list of commentators, please give some indication of the aspects of the topic on which you would bring your areas of expertise to bear if you were selected as a commentator. An electronic draft of the full text is available for inspection by anonymous ftp according to the instructions that follow after the abstract. ____________________________________________________________________ A THEORY OF VISUAL STABILITY ACROSS SACCADIC EYE MOVEMENTS Bruce Bridgeman Program in Experimental Psychology University of California Santa Cruz, CA 95064 A.H.C. van der Heijden Department of Psychology Leiden University Wassenaarsweg 52 2333 AK Leiden, The Netherlands Boris M Velichkovsky Department for Psychology and Knowledge Engineering Moscow State University Moscow 103009, Russia KEYWORDS: space constancy, proprioception, efference copy, space perception, saccade, eye movement, modularity, visual stability. ABSTRACT: We identify two aspects of the problem of how there is perceptual stability despite an observer's eye movements. The first, visual direction constancy, is the (egocentric) stability of apparent positions of objects in the visual world relative to the perceiver. The second, visual position constancy, is the (exocentric) stability of positions of objects relative to each other. We analyze the constancy of visual direction despite saccadic eye movements. Three information sources have been proposed to enable the visual system to achieve stability: the structure of the visual field, proprioceptive inflow, and a copy of neural efference or outflow to the extraocular muscles. None of these sources by itself provides adequate information to achieve visual direction constancy; present evidence indicates that all three are used. Our final question concerns the information processing operations that result in a stable world. The three traditional solutions involve elimination, translation, and evaluation. All are rejected. From a review of the physiological and psychological evidence we conclude that no subtraction, compensation or evaluation need take place. The problem for which these solutions were developed turns out to be a false one. We propose a "calibration" solution: correct spatiotopic positions are calculated anew for each fixation. Inflow, outflow, and retinal sources are used in this calculation: saccadic suppression of displacement bridges the errors between these sources and the actual extent of movement. -------------------------------------------------------------- To help you decide whether you would be an appropriate commentator for this article, an electronic draft is retrievable by anonymous ftp from princeton.edu according to the instructions below (the filename is bbs.bridgeman). Please do not prepare a commentary on this draft. Just let us know, after having inspected it, what relevant expertise you feel you would bring to bear on what aspect of the article. ------------------------------------------------------------- To retrieve a file by ftp from a Unix/Internet site, type either: ftp princeton.edu or ftp 128.112.128.1 When you are asked for your login, type: anonymous Enter password as per instructions (make sure to include the specified @), and then change directories with: cd /pub/harnad/BBS To show the available files, type: ls Next, retrieve the file you want with (for example): get bbs.bridgeman When you have the file(s) you want, type: quit In case of doubt or difficulty, consult your system manager. A more elaborate version of these instructions for the U.K. is available on request (thanks to Brian Josephson). ---------- Where the above procedures are not available (e.g. from Bitnet or other networks), there are two fileservers: ftpmail@decwrl.dec.com and bitftp@pucc.bitnet that will do the transfer for you. To one or the other of them, send the following one line message: help for instructions (which will be similar to the above, but will be in the form of a series of lines in an email message that ftpmail or bitftp will then execute for you). ------------------------------------------------------------- 24-Mar-93 18:41:27-GMT,18689;000000000001 Received: from rutvm1.rutgers.edu by aramis.rutgers.edu (5.59/SMI4.0/RU1.5/3.08) id AA06079; Wed, 24 Mar 93 13:41:25 EST Message-Id: <9303241841.AA06079@aramis.rutgers.edu> Received: from RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (IBM VM SMTP R1.2.1MX) with BSMTP id 8318; Wed, 24 Mar 93 13:40:10 EST Received: from RUTVM1.BITNET (NJE origin LISTSERV@RUTVM1) by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (LMail V1.1d/1.7f) with BSMTP id 6238; Wed, 24 Mar 1993 13:40:09 -0500 Date: Wed, 24 Mar 1993 12:53:50 EST Reply-To: psyc@pucc.bitnet Sender: "PSYCOLOQUY: Refereed Electronic Journal of Peer Discussion" From: Stevan Harnad Subject: PSYCOLOQUY Newsletter Section (416 lines) Comments: To: psyc@pucc.bitnet To: Multiple recipients of list PSYC PSYCOLOQUY ISSN 1055-0143 Wed, 24 Mar 93 Newsletter Section (1) Query: Family Centers (2) Employment: Lecturer/Lab Director, General Psychology, UNC (3) Announcement: AISB'93 Final Call (4) Announcement: Control Systems Group Network (5) Employment: Tenure-track, Psychology Concordia University, Montreal (6) Announcement: CFP: Neural Information Processing Systems Conference (7) Employment: Post-docs, HCI at CMU (8) Announcement: Conference on Mental Lives of Animals, Georgia State U. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- From: solly dreman Subject: (1) Query: Family Centers I would like to obtain a list of family centers which engage in research and/or intervention in the States and abroad. I would be interested in such things as areas being researched, populations studied or treated, as well as the staff and disciplines they represent. Thank you. Solly Dreman E - M A I L Behavioral Sciences Dept. =========== Ben-Gurion University Internet: DREMAN@BGUMAIL.BGU.AC.IL Beer-Sheva 84105 ISRAEL Phone: 972-57-472-067 Fax: 972-57-232-766 ------------------------------ From: PAULA GOOLKASIAN Subject: (2) Employment: Lecturer/Lab Director, General Psychology, UNC LECTURER/LAB DIRECTOR for undergraduate, General Psychology Laboratories in the Department of Psychology at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte. Responsibilities include primary instruction of General Psychology lab classes and supervision of graduate teaching assistants. Must have Master's degree in Psychology. This is a nine month, continuing position, with possibilities for Summer teaching, beginning in August 1993. To be considered, send vita, transcript of graduate work, and three letters of recommendation to Paul W. Foos, Chairperson, Department of Psychology, University of North Carolina at Charlotte, Charlotte, NC 28223. Review of applications will begin May 15, 1993 and continue until the position is filled. UNCC is an Equal Opportunity/Affirmative Action Employer. Paula Goolkasian (FPY00PAG AT UNCCVM) University of North Carolina, Charlotte ------------------------------ From: aisb93-prog@cs.bham.ac.uk Subject: (3) Announcement: AISB'93 Final Call FINAL CALL FOR REGISTRATION A I S B' 9 3 The University of Birmingham March 29th -- April 2nd 1993 The Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science conference AISB'93 will take place this year at the University of Birmingham from March 29th till April 2nd, with the general theme 'Prospects for Artificial Intelligence'. We are pleased to announce that in addition to the previously announced prize offered by Integral Solutions Ltd. for the best presented paper, there is also a prize donated by Wiley for the technically best paper, consisting of the new edition of the Encyclopaedia of AI. The Conference Dinner will be in Birmingham's Repertory Theatre overlooking Centenary Square. * For a programme and registration form please email the auto-reply service aisb93-info@cs.bham.ac.uk * Other enquiries: AISB'93, School of Computer Science, The University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham, B15 2TT, U.K. Phone: +44-(0)21-414-3711 Fax: +44-(0)21-414-4281 Email aisb93-prog@cs.bham.ac.uk ------------------------------ From: g-cziko@uiuc.edu (CZIKO Gary) Subject: (4) Announcement: Control Systems Group Network ANNOUNCING THE CONTROL SYSTEMS GROUP NETWORK (CSGnet) It is generally thought that feedback control is well-understood and thoroughly integrated into the modern behavioral sciences. But there are some indications that it is not in fact quite as well-understood as one might expect.* CSGnet is an electronic forum for the investigation and application of closed-loop system models to all areas of psychology and the social sciences following the general lead of the work of William T. Powers and his associates. CSGnet links together over 120 individuals in 17 countries and its participants include experimental and clinical psychologists, counsellors, educators, linguists, sociologists, control-system engineers, cognitive scientists, and roboticists, among others. CSGnet is an unmoderated LISTSERV group as well as a NetNews (Usenet) group. The LISTSERV address for CSGnet is or and the Usenet group is . More information about CSGnet can be obtained from Gary Cziko . *For example, with the revival of interest in 'Central Pattern Generators' (CPGs) in the 1970s, one possibility that does not seem to have occurred to people is that a CPG might function by delivering time-varying set-points to feedback mechanisms, thereby reducing the need to pre-compute parameters for motor-programs. In fact, even today, it is not clear that this rather simple possibility is clearly formulated in the standard literature, and adequately investigated in cases where it has some degree of prima facie plausibility. ------------------------------ From: Peter Shizgal Subject: (5) Employment: Tenure-track, Psychology Concordia University, Montreal Concordia University Department of Psychology Applications are invited for at least one tenure track opening and several limited term appointments available to the department beginning on August 1 1993, pending budgetary approval. A number of openings are anticipated over the next several years. The immediate areas of search are psychopathology, including lifespan psychopathology, animal learning and memory, and human neuropsychology. Applicants in any of the above broadly defined areas with an active ongoing research program are encouraged to apply. Appointments will be at the Assistant Professor level. The department is also interested in sponsoring candidates for NSERC (Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada) Women's Faculty Awards and holders of other agency fellowships. The Department has 43 tenure track faculty positions and offers both an M.A. and Ph.D. degree in addition to B.Sc. and B.A. programs. The graduate program provides a clinical training stream that is fully accredited by CPA and APA. The principal areas of research in the department are psychobiology, cognition and perception, child and life span development and clinical psychology. Included among the Department's many active research programs are two major research centres: the Centre for Research in Human Development and the Center for Studies in Behavioural Neurobiology. Applications are being considered at this time and new applications will be accepted until the positions are filled. Please send a letter of application, a curriculum vitae, a statement of teaching interests and qualifications, and three letters of reference to: Norman Segalowitz, Chairperson, Department of Psychology, Concordia University, 1455 de Maisonneuve Blvd. West, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, H3G 1M8. Inquiries may also be sent by e-mail to segalow@vax2.concordia.ca. In accordance with Canadian immigration requirements, this advertisement is directed in the first instance to Canadian citizens and permanent residents. Concordia University is committed to Employment Equity and encourages applications from women, aboriginal peoples, visible minorities and disabled persons. ------------------------------ From: cowan@SYNAPSE.UCHICAGO.EDU(Jack Cowan) Subject: (6) Announcement: CFP: Neural Information Processing Systems Conference FIRST CALL FOR PAPERS Neural Information Processing Systems -Natural and Synthetic- Monday, November 29 - Thursday, December 2, 1993 Denver, Colorado This is the seventh meeting of an inter-disciplinary conference which brings together neuroscientists, engineers, computer scientists, cognitive scientists, physicists, and mathematicians interested in all aspects of neural processing and computation. There will be an afternoon of tutorial presentations (Nov 29) preceding the regular session and two days of focused workshops will follow at a nearby ski area (Dec 3-4). Major categories and for paper submissions are the following: NEUROSCIENCE THEORY IMPLEMENTATION & SIMULATION ALGORITHMS & ARCHITECTURES COGNITIVE SCIENCE & AI VISUAL PROCESSING SPEECH & SIGNAL PROCESSING NAVIGATION, & PLANNING APPLICATIONS Technical Program: Plenary, contributed and poster sessions will be held. There will be no parallel sessions. The full text of presented papers will be published. Submission Procedures: Original research contributions are solicited, and will be carefully refereed. Authors must submit six copies of both a 1000-word (or less) summary and six copies of a separate single-page 50-100 word abstract clearly stating their results postmarked by May 22, 1993 (express mail is not necessary). Accepted abstracts will be published in the conference program. Summaries are for program committee use only. At the bottom of each abstract page and on the first summary page indicate preference for oral or poster presentation and specify one of the above nine broad categories and, if appropriate, sub-categories (For example: Poster, Applications, Expert Systems; Oral, Implementation-Analog VLSI). Include addresses of all authors at the front of the summary and the abstract and indicate to which author correspondence should be addressed. Submissions will not be considered that lack category information, separate abstract sheets, the required six copies, author addresses, or are late. Mail Submissions To: Gerry Tesauro The Salk Institute, CNL 10010 North Torrey Pines Rd. La Jolla, CA 92037 Mail For Registration Material To: NIPS*93 Registration NIPS Foundation PO Box 60035 Pasadena, CA 91116-6035 All submitting authors will be sent registration material automatically. Program committee decisions will be sent to the correspondence author only. DEADLINE FOR SUMMARIES & ABSTRACTS IS MAY 22, 1993 (POSTMARKED) ------------------------------ From: Bonnie_John@centro.soar.cs.cmu.edu Subject: (7) Employment: Post-docs, HCI at CMU I have the following two post-doc positions available to work with me here at Carnegie Mellon University. A completed PhD in CS, Cognitive Psychology, or related degree is the minimum requirement. Salary is based on degree and experience. Please respond via e-mail to bej@cs.cmu.edu or via USMail to Bonnie E. John School of Computer Science Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh PA 15213 Thanks, Bonnie PS. The successful applicant will be part of the Soar research community here at CMU (about 25 researchers) and elsewhere (about 100 researchers worldwide). ********************************* Immediate Interaction Post-doc position available to study Human-Computer Interaction in highly interactive domains. Cognitive modeling of user behavior in HCI research has historically centered on user-paced, routine cognitive skills (e.g. text-editing), but much of what we use computers for today does not fit in this category. We write papers with WYSIWYG editors getting our tables to look "just right", interactively manipulate data in spreadsheets, draw diagrams with graphic editors that snap to "interesting" areas of the diagram, and browse through information spaces. Progress in computer technology has imposed a much tighter loop between the user's actions and the computer's reactions, involving perception and comprehension of the computer's actions much more than in the days of line editors. This post-doc will use, and expand, the Soar unified theory of cognition to model "immediate interaction" tasks. Skills in cognitive modeling *essential*. Knowledge of Soar extremely helpful. Position available immediately. ********************************* Usability of Knowledge-based Programming Environments Post-doc position available to study how Human-Computer Interaction analysis techniques can inform the design of knowledge-based programming environments. In particular, the Soar cognitive modeling architecture is more difficult to learn and use than we would like it to be. This post-doc would apply several HCI analysis techniques to the current Soar programming environment in order to design and implement a new programming environment. The new environment would be empirically tested to establish that it is indeed easier to learn and use than the old environment. The new environment would be thoroughly examined to understand which benefits resulted from which analysis techniques, thereby evaluating the techniques themselves. Skill in using one or more HCI evaluation technique (e.g. GOMS, TAG, cognitive walkthroughs, claims analysis, etc.) *essential*. Skills in cognitive modeling *essential*. Knowledge of Soar extremely helpful. Position available pending funding, expected no later than Sept 1993. ********************************* ------------------------------ From: phlpwb@gsusgi2.gsu.edu (William Bechtel) Subject: (8) Announcement: Conference on Mental Lives of Animals, Georgia State U. NOTE: While there is no registration required for this conference, I would appreciate it if those who are coming would let me know in advance. I can give you some information on housing and other details. Bill Bechtel The Mental Lives of Animals A Conference Sponsored by The Department of Philosophy and The Language Research Center of Georgia State University Atlanta, Georgia April 29 - May 1, 1993 The Conference is open to the public without charge. It is made possible by support from the College of Arts and Sciences, the Department of Philosophy, and the Language Research Center. Location: Room 939, General Classroom Building, corner of Decatur Street and Peachtree Center Avenue. For further information, call (404) 651-2277. THE MENTAL LIVES OF ANIMALS Georgia State University Thursday, April 29 8:30 PM Chair: Douglas Winblad (Vassar College) E. Sue Savage-Rumbaugh (Biology & Language Research Center, Georgia State) Film: Language and Animal Mind Friday, April 30 9:00 AM Chair: Marc Bekoff (University of Colorado) Daniel C. Dennett (Philosophy & Cognitive Studies, Tufts University) "Animal Sensation and Animal Consciousness 10:30 AM Chair: Simone Gozzano (Tufts University & University of Genoa) Terrence W. Deacon (Neurobiology, McLean Hospital & Harvard University) "What's So Special About Human Brains?" 1:30 PM Chair: George Collier (Rutgers University) John R. Searle (Philosophy, University of California-Berkeley) "Animal Minds: Some Philosophical Issues" 3:00 PM Chair: Tolbert Thomas (College of William & Mary) Herbert L. Roitblat (Psychology, University of Hawaii) "What Animals Think" 8:30 PM Chair: Terry Maple (Zoo Atlanta & Georgia Institute of Technology) John V. Canfield (Philosophy, University of Toronto) "Wittgenstein of the Apes: Conceptual Foundations for the Study of Primate Communication" Saturday, May 1 9:00 AM Chair: Chris Gauker (University of Cincinnati) Carolyn Rovee-Collier (Psychology, Rutgers University) "Infant Memory and Retrieval" 10:30 AM Chair: Michael Tomasello (Emory University) David Pears (Philosophy, University of Oxford, UCLA) "Have They Anything to Say?" 1:30 PM Chair: Robert C. Richardson (University of Cincinnati) Andrew Whiten (Psychology, University of St. Andrews) "Mind Reading: The Approach of Child, Chimpanzee, and Comparative Psychologist" 3:00 PM Chair: Karyl B. Swartz (CUNY, Lehman College) Stephen Stich (Philosophy, Rutgers University) "Do Animals Think? - A Problem Deconstructed" William Bechtel Department of Philosophy Georgia State University Atlanta, GA 30303-3083 (404) 651-2277 Fax: (404) 651-1563 ------------------------------ PSYCOLOQUY is sponsored by the Science Directorate and the Office of Publications and Communication of the American Psychological Association (202) 955-7653 Editors: (scientific discussion) (professional/clinical discussion) Stevan Harnad Cary Cherniss (Assoc Ed.) Psychology Department Graduate School of Applied Princeton University Professional Psychology Rutgers University Assistant Editor: Malcolm Bauer Psychology Department Princeton University End of PSYCOLOQUY Digest ****************************** 24-Mar-93 18:42:08-GMT,14933;000000000001 Received: from rutvm1.rutgers.edu by aramis.rutgers.edu (5.59/SMI4.0/RU1.5/3.08) id AA06106; Wed, 24 Mar 93 13:42:06 EST Message-Id: <9303241842.AA06106@aramis.rutgers.edu> Received: from RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (IBM VM SMTP R1.2.1MX) with BSMTP id 8321; Wed, 24 Mar 93 13:40:52 EST Received: from RUTVM1.BITNET (NJE origin LISTSERV@RUTVM1) by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (LMail V1.1d/1.7f) with BSMTP id 6256; Wed, 24 Mar 1993 13:40:51 -0500 Date: Wed, 24 Mar 1993 12:55:58 EST Reply-To: psyc@pucc.bitnet Sender: "PSYCOLOQUY: Refereed Electronic Journal of Peer Discussion" From: Stevan Harnad Subject: PSYCOLOQUY Newsletter Section (325 lines) Comments: To: psyc@pucc.bitnet To: Multiple recipients of list PSYC PSYCOLOQUY ISSN 1055-0143 Wed, 24 Mar 93 Newsletter Section (1) Announcement: DALTON 94 - Colour Vision Conference (2) Employment: Sci Education Researcher, Univ of Fort Hare, South Africa (3) Employment: Postdoctoral Fellowships at Durham (4) Employment: Psych Chair, Inst. of Psychology, University of Innsbr (5) Announcement: Research on Human Language Technology: Program (6) Announcement: IJCNN'93-NAGOYA Call For Papers ---------------------------------------------------------------------- From: DALTON CONFERENCE 1994 Subject: (1) Announcement: DALTON 94 - Colour Vision Conference THE JOHN DALTON COLOUR VISION CONFERENCE 1994 ************************** HOLD THE DATE *************************** * * * Announcing a major INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE to celebrate * * 200 years of colour vision research - to be held in * * Manchester (UK), September 5th - 9th, 1994. * * * * Since attendance may be limited please send a message to * * DALTON@UMIST.ac.uk to register your interest. * * Please include your full mailing address and telephone number. * * * * For further information contact the DALTON '94 conference office * * DALTON 94, UMIST, PO Box 88, Manchester, M60 1 QD, UK. * * * * Tel/Fax: (uk), 061 200 4433 or (international), +44 61 200 4433 * * E-MAIL: DALTON@UMIST.ac.uk * ******************************************************************** ------------------------------ From: bhv@cs.ufh.ac.za (Prof B H Venter) Subject: (2) Employment: Sci Education Researcher, Univ of Fort Hare, South Afri ca The University of Fort Hare is a historically black, rural university founded in 1916 and counting many prominent African scholars and statesmen among its alumni. Due to the immense social problems caused by Apartheid, the students entering the university have become highly disadvantaged. Students entering the Faculty of Science have particularly severe difficulties with the current educational process. In order to address this problem in a meaningful and effective way, the Faculty is looking for a researcher to help with characterizing the problems students experience, as well as helping with the identification and evaluation of possible remedies. Applicants are expected to have a university education and a background in dealing with the problems of science education. A working knowledge of computers and statistics, as well as an interest in computer aided learning will be an advantage. The post is offered on a three year contract basis and is financed by the Independent Development Trust. To apply, send a CV to Prof B H Venter Vice-Dean of Science University of Fort Hare Private Bag X1314 Alice South Africa or e-mail to bhv@cs.ufh.ac.za or fax to (0404)31669 ------------------------------ From: Dennis Carmody Subject: (3) Employment: Postdoctoral Fellowships at Durham UNIVERSITY OF DURHAM : POSTDOCTORAL FELLOWSHIPS Applications are invited for two Addison Wheeler Fellowships tenable from October 1993 for a period of up to five years. The Fellowships are for candidates working in the Life Sciences and were established from a bequest to encourage "efforts for increased knowledge of Man and his physical make-up so as to enable him to make better use of his life here on earth". Candidates should be under 28 years of age. The salary will be on the UK academic Grade 1A scale. Further details and an application form may be obtained from the Director of Personnel Services, Old Shire Hall, Durham, DH1 1HP, England quoting reference A181. Telephone (44)-91-374-3158. Fax (44)-91-374-4747. Closing date for applications 16 April 1993. The Psychology Department of Durham University has well equipped laboratories and an active group working in vision, visual neuropsychology, visual attention and eye movements. Candidates in these or in other areas are encouraged to apply. _______________________________________________ | John Findlay, | | Dept of Psychology, University of Durham, | | South Road, DURHAM, DH1 3LE, England. | | Telephone : +44 91-374-2603. | | Fax : +44 91-374-7474 | | Email : J.M.Findlay@uk.ac.durham | |_____________________________________________| ------------------------------ From: "Innsbruck University" Subject: (4) Employment: Psych Chair, Inst. of Psychology, University of Innsbr We have just received approval to fill the following position of a Psychology Chair in Applied Psychology for Spring or Fall 1994: PROFESSUR FUER PSYCHOLOGIE AN DER LEOPOLD-FRANZENS-UNIVERSITAET INNSBRUCK Am Institut fuer Psychologie der Naturwissenschaftlichen Fakultaet der Leopold-Franzens-Universitaet Innsbruck ist die Planstelle eines/ einer Ordentlichen Universitaetsprofessors / Universitaetsprofessorin fuer Psychologie wieder zu besetzen. Der Schwerpunkt der Forschungsarbeit des Bewerbers / der Bewerberin sollte in einem der folgenden Anwendungsgebiete der Psychologie liegen: Arbeits- und Organisationspsychologie, Verkehrs- und Umweltpsychologie, Gerontopsychologie oder Rehabilitations- psychologie. Es wird vorausgesetzt, dass sich der Bewerber/ die Bewerberin an der Durchfuehrung und Organisation der Lehre zu den Faechern der Studienrichtung Psychologie, vor allem in der Angewandten Psychologie und in der Psychologischen Diagnostik, angemessen beteiligt. Bewerber / Bewerberinnen mit Habilitation oder einer gleichzuhaltenden wissenschaftlichen Qualifikation sowie paedagogischer Eignung werden gebeten, die ueblichen Unterlagen, einschliesslich Sonderdrucken von 5 der wichtigsten Veroeffentlichungen, bis spaetestens * 24. Mai 1993 * an das Dekanat der Naturwissenschaftlichen Fakultaet der Universitaet Innsbruck, Innrain 52 A-6020 Innsbruck Oesterreich - Austria zu senden. Die Leopold-Franzens-Universitaet Innsbruck strebt eine Erhoehung des Frauenanteils am wissenschaftlichen Personal an und fordert deshalb qualifizierte Frauen nachdruecklich auf, sich zu bewerben. O.Univ.-Prof. Dr. Michael Kuhn Dekan +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Institut fuer Psychologie Leopold-Franzens-Universitaet | | Innrain 52 (Bruno-Sander-Haus) A-6020 Innsbruck / Austria | | Phone: (+43) (0512) 5073150 Internet: Psychologie@uibk.ac.at | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ ------------------------------ From: pchapin@nsf.gov Subject: (5) Announcement: Research on Human Language Technology: Program The NSF and DARPA have announced a significant new initiative for funding research on human language technology. Excerpts of the text and information on how to retreive the complete program announcement follows. Paul Chapin, NSF ********************************** RESEARCH ON HUMAN LANGUAGE TECHNOLOGY _______________ Joint Initiative Announcement _______________ Deadline for Receiving Proposals: May 17, 1993 NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION COMPUTER AND INFORMATION SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING Division of Information, Robotics and Intelligent Systems AND DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY SOFTWARE AND INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY OFFICE ANNOUNCEMENT No. NSF-93-19 INTRODUCTION Beginning in 1993, the Information, Robotics and Intelligent Systems Division of the Computer, Information Science and Engineering Directorate of NSF and the Software and Intelligent Systems Technology Office of DARPA will support jointly innovative, multi-disciplinary, research projects in the general area of human language technology. The motivation for this initiative is the favorable research environment provided by continuing advances in computer technology. This was recognized and encouraged in the 1992 report of the NSF-sponsored Workshop on Spoken Language Understanding. Computing systems now available and affordable for research are proving adequate to support major advances in natural language understanding, speech recognition, machine translation, and other human language technologies. It is now becoming possible to create realistic computer models of human language mechanisms. We also take account of the synergistic advantage of the combined common research interests of NSF and DARPA in artificial intelligence and human language technology. Therefore, the time is ripe for accelerating efforts in these areas of artificial intelligence. Recent DARPA and NSF publications related to this initiative, including information on existing corpora developed under NSF or DARPA sponsorship, will be provided upon request by contacting the NSF Interactive Systems Program Assistant at (202)-357-9554. The Telephonic Device for the Deaf number is (202) 357-7492. Facilitation Awards for Scientists and Engineers with Disabilities provides funding for special assistance or equipment to enable persons with disabilities (investigators and other staff, including student research assistants) to work on an NSF project. See the program announcement, or contact the program coordinator in the Director for Education and Human Resources. ELECTRONIC DISSEMINATION: Information can be obtained rapidly through STIS (Science and Technology Information System), NSF's on-line publishing system, described in NSF 91-10, "STIS flyer". To get a paper copy of the flyer, call the NSF Publications Section at (202) 357-7861. For an electronic copy, send an e- mail message to stisfly@nsf.gov (Internet) or stisfly@nsf (BITNET). ORDERING BY ELECTRONIC MAIL OR BY FAX: If you are a user of electronic mail and have access to either BITNET or Internet, you may order publications electronically. BITNET users should address requests to pubs@nsf and Internet users to pubs@nsf.gov . In your request include the NSF publication number and title, number of copies, your name and a complete mailing address. Printed publications may be ordered by FAX (703/644-4278). Publications should be received within 3 weeks after receipt of request. ------------------------------ From: usui@tut.ac.jp Subject: (6) Announcement: IJCNN'93-NAGOYA Call For Papers ======================================================================== CALL FOR PAPERS (Second Version) IJCNN'93-NAGOYA, JAPAN INTERNATIONAL JOINT CONFERENCE ON NEURAL NETWORKS NAGOYA CONGRESS CENTER, JAPAN OCTOBER 25-29,1993 IJCNN'93-NAGOYA co-sponsored by the Japanese Neural Network Society (JNNS), the IEEE Neural Networks Council (NNC), the International Neural Network Society (INNS), the European Neural Network Society (ENNS), the Society of Instrument and Control Engineers (SICE, Japan), the Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers (IEICE, Japan), the Nagoya Industrial Science Research Institute, the Aichi Prefectural Government and the Nagoya Municipal Government cordially invite interested authors to submit papers in the field of neural networks for presentation at the Conference. Nagoya is a historical city famous for Nagoya Castle and is located in the central major industrial area of Japan. There is frequent direct air service from most countries. Nagoya is 2 hours away from Tokyo or 1 hour from Osaka by bullet train. KEYNOTE SPEAKERS INCLUDE: David E. Rumelhart, Methods for Improving Generalization in Connectionist Networks Shun-ichi Amari, Brain and Computer - A Perspective Papers may be submitted for consideration as oral or poster presentations in the following areas: Neurobiological Systems Self-organization Cognitive Science Learning & Memory Image Processing & Vision Robotics & Control Speech, Hearing & Language Hybrid Systems (Fuzzy, Genetic, Expert Systems, AI) Sensorimotor Systems Implementation (Electronic, Optical, Bio-chips) Neural Network Architectures Other Applications(Medical and Social Systems, Network Dynamics Art, Economy, etc. Optimization Please specify the area of the application) For registration and additional information please contact: IJCNN'93-NAGOYA Secretariat: Travel Plaza International Chubu, Inc. Shirakawa Dai-san Bldg., 4-8-10 Meieki, Nakamura-ku, Nagoya, 450 Japan Phone: +81-52-561-9880/8655 Fax: +81-52-561-1241 Please do not reply to this account. Please use the telephone number, fax number or Mail address listed above. ------------------------------ PSYCOLOQUY is sponsored by the Science Directorate and the Office of Publications and Communication of the American Psychological Association (202) 955-7653 Editors: (scientific discussion) (professional/clinical discussion) Stevan Harnad Cary Cherniss (Assoc Ed.) Psychology Department Graduate School of Applied Princeton University Professional Psychology Rutgers University Assistant Editor: Malcolm Bauer Psychology Department Princeton University End of PSYCOLOQUY Digest ****************************** 24-Mar-93 23:16:49-GMT,5619;000000000001 Received: from rutvm1.rutgers.edu by aramis.rutgers.edu (5.59/SMI4.0/RU1.5/3.08) id AA28556; Wed, 24 Mar 93 18:16:47 EST Message-Id: <9303242316.AA28556@aramis.rutgers.edu> Received: from RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (IBM VM SMTP R1.2.1MX) with BSMTP id 9103; Wed, 24 Mar 93 18:15:33 EST Received: from RUTVM1.BITNET (NJE origin LISTSERV@RUTVM1) by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (LMail V1.1d/1.7f) with BSMTP id 2155; Wed, 24 Mar 1993 18:15:32 -0500 Date: Wed, 24 Mar 1993 18:13:41 EST Reply-To: "PSYCOLOQUY: Refereed Electronic Journal of Peer Discussion" Sender: "PSYCOLOQUY: Refereed Electronic Journal of Peer Discussion" From: Stevan Harnad Subject: MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF REINFORCEMENT: BBS Call for Commentators Comments: To: PSYCOLOQUY To: Multiple recipients of list PSYC Below is the abstract of a forthcoming target article by PETER KILLEEN on MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF REINFORCEMENT, that has been accepted for publication in Behavioral and Brain Sciences (BBS), an international, interdisciplinary journal providing Open Peer Commentary on important and controversial current research in the biobehavioral and cognitive sciences. Commentators must be current BBS Associates or nominated by a current BBS Associate. To be considered as a commentator for this article, to suggest other appropriate commentators, or for information about how to become a BBS Associate, please send email to: harnad@clarity.princeton.edu or harnad@pucc.bitnet or write to: BBS, 20 Nassau Street, #240, Princeton NJ 08542 [tel: 609-921-7771] To help us put together a balanced list of commentators, please give some indication of the aspects of the topic on which you would bring your areas of expertise to bear if you were selected as a commentator. An electronic draft of the full text is available for inspection by anonymous ftp according to the instructions that follow after the abstract. ____________________________________________________________________ MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF REINFORCEMENT Peter R. Killeen Department of Psychology University of Arizona Tempe, AZ 85281-1104 KEYWORDS: reinforcement, memory, coupling, contingency, contiguity, tuning curves, activation, schedules, trajectories, response rate, mathematical models. ABSTRACT: Effective conditioning requires a correlation between the experimenter's definition of a response and an organism's, but an animal's perception of its own behavior differs from ours. Various definitions of the response are explored experimentally using the slopes of learning curves to infer which comes closest to the organism's definition. The resulting exponentially weighted moving average provides a model of memory which grounds a quantitative theory of reinforcement in which incentives excite behavior and focus the excitement on the responses present in memory at the same time. The correlation between the organism's memory and the behavior measured by the experimenter is given by coupling coefficients derived for various schedules of reinforcement. For simple schedules these coefficients can be concatenated to predict the effects of complex schedules and can be inserted into a generic model of arousal and temporal constraint to predict response rates under any scheduling arrangement. According to the theory, the decay of memory is response-indexed rather than time-indexed. Incentives displace memory for the responses that occur before them and may truncate the representation of the response that brings them about. This contiguity-weighted correlation model bridges opposing views of the reinforcement process and can be extended in a straightforward way to the classical conditioning of stimuli. Placing the short-term memory of behavior in so central a role provides a behavioral account of a key cognitive process. -------------------------------------------------------------- To help you decide whether you would be an appropriate commentator for this article, an electronic draft is retrievable by anonymous ftp from princeton.edu according to the instructions below (the filename is bbs.killeen). Please do not prepare a commentary on this draft. Just let us know, after having inspected it, what relevant expertise you feel you would bring to bear on what aspect of the article. ------------------------------------------------------------- To retrieve a file by ftp from a Unix/Internet site, type either: ftp princeton.edu or ftp 128.112.128.1 When you are asked for your login, type: anonymous Enter password as per instructions (make sure to include the specified @), and then change directories with: cd /pub/harnad/BBS To show the available files, type: ls Next, retrieve the file you want with (for example): get bbs.killeen When you have the file(s) you want, type: quit In case of doubt or difficulty, consult your system manager. ---------- Where the above procedures are not available (e.g. from Bitnet or other networks), there are two fileservers: ftpmail@decwrl.dec.com and bitftp@pucc.bitnet that will do the transfer for you. To one or the other of them, send the following one line message: help for instructions (which will be similar to the above, but will be in the form of a series of lines in an email message that ftpmail or bitftp will then execute for you). ------------------------------------------------------------- 25-Mar-93 16:14:14-GMT,9374;000000000001 Received: from rutvm1.rutgers.edu by aramis.rutgers.edu (5.59/SMI4.0/RU1.5/3.08) id AA01298; Thu, 25 Mar 93 11:14:12 EST Message-Id: <9303251614.AA01298@aramis.rutgers.edu> Received: from RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (IBM VM SMTP R1.2.1MX) with BSMTP id 0634; Thu, 25 Mar 93 11:12:58 EST Received: from RUTVM1.BITNET (NJE origin LISTSERV@RUTVM1) by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (LMail V1.1d/1.7f) with BSMTP id 1460; Thu, 25 Mar 1993 11:12:57 -0500 Date: Thu, 25 Mar 1993 11:12:44 -0500 Reply-To: psyc@pucc.bitnet Sender: "PSYCOLOQUY: Refereed Electronic Journal of Peer Discussion" From: Stevan Harnad Subject: psycoloquy.93.4.26.categorization.2.hardcastle (159 lines) Comments: To: psyc@pucc.bitnet To: Multiple recipients of list PSYC psycoloquy.93.4.26.categorization.2.hardcastle Thurday 25 March 1993 ISSN 1055-0143 (9 paragraphs, 2 references, 153 lines) PSYCOLOQUY is sponsored by the American Psychological Association (APA) Copyright 1993 Valerie Gray Hardcastle WHAT COUNTS AS PLAUSIBLE? Book Review of Murre on Categorization Valerie Gray Hardcastle Department of Philosophy Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University Blacksburg, VA 24061-0126 valerie@vtvm2.cc.vt.edu 1.0 INTRODUCTION 1.1 Jacob Murre's (1992) book Learning and Categorization in Modular Neural Networks bills itself as being of interest to psychologists, cognitive scientists, neuroscientists, and to those interested in neural networks in general. For the most part, that assessment is right on the mark. Murre introduces and discusses in detail a biologically and psychologically plausible neural network. This is no small undertaking, and his results are impressive. However, despite the advertisement, his model has some distance to go before one could rightly claim that it is truly connected to either biology or psychology. Here I list a few of these shortcomings (some of them should be quite familiar); I then close by indicating what -- despite these shortcomings -- I find quite interesting and exciting about the CALM ("categorization and learning in neural networks") family. 2.0 BIOLOGICAL PLAUSIBILTY 2.1 Of course, Murre does not claim to have captured all the aspects of cortex involving information processing. Like most modelers interested in biological realism, he focusses on a few salient facts about our brain. In this case, he highlights the modularity of the minicolumns in neocortex and the organization of excitatory and inhibitory connections. He builds these two constraints into a network and notices that such a biologically inspired network can learn sequences of patterns unsupervised. There the biological connection ends, however. In fact, I find the actual connections among the various nodes in each module -- especially among the connections from the E-nodes to the R-nodes and from the V- and R-nodes to the the A-nodes -- to be only faintly inspired by any neuroscientific data, if at all. 2.2 This lack of biological realism should be easily forgiven once it is realized that Murre has no intention of modeling known neurophysiological phenomena. Instead, he wants to use his network to explore high level psychological curiosities, such as letter recognition, the difference between implicit and explicit processing, and pattern recognition in general. Thus, we are left to wonder why Murre would bother connecting his model to the few biological facts that he does, given that (surely) the minicolumn and local excitatory and inhibitory connections operate at a level of organization much lower than the information processing phenomena he discusses. The price of the chasm between the level of organization of the neurophysiological details he uses and the level of organization of the psychological phenomena is that his biological inspiration is no longer interesting as a design feature. Let me emphasize, though, that I do not wish to ignore the power of the model Murre has developed, nor do I wish to slight the implications it might have for rethinking psychological theories. What I do wish to claim is that the power and the implications have nothing to do with biology -- nor should they. 3.0 PSYCHOLOGICAL PLAUSIBILITY 3.1 On the other hand, I take the claim for psychological plausibility to be more serious and far-reaching. Here, Murre's errors are more subtle, yet no less significant. Allow me to take his model of implicit and explicit processing as an example. He designed ELAN such that it would receive three types of inputs -- a context, a word beginning, and a word ending-- and then give one output -- a complete word. The task for the net after training is to output the correct completed word given either a word beginning and a context (explicit memory test) or just a word beginning (implicit memory test). Already the connection to language processing is dubious. For example, it is fairly well accepted that we process and store words in meaningful chunks that do not necessarily correspond to syllables or to word beginnings/word endings. The task of learning a two-part pattern in different contexts and then completing the pattern given the first half is a substantially different paradigm from the word completion task used in explicit and implicit memory tests, which traditionally ignores subitized parts when dividing letter strings. 3.2 Yet Murre seems to have overlooked something more damaging. He is interested in the differential processing between high frequency and low frequency WORDS. The data he reports, which reflect mainstream psychological opinion as far as I know, indicate that subjects who have been previously exposed to a list of both high and low frequency words show a greater effect in a word completion test for implicit memory for the low frequency words. However (and this is crucial), they still do show significant priming effects for the high frequency words. Murre reports that "[t]he average increase in completion performance compared with base rate for the low-frequency words... was significantly greater than that for the high-frequency words" (p. 78). What he fails to report, however (perhaps because he did not notice), was that his neural net "subjects" did not show ANY significant priming effect for the high frequency words. (The average base rate of completion for high frequency words was 5.67 and the experimental word completion performance was 6.75. According to a quick t-test, this difference is insignificant (t(11) = -2.6).) His network fails to model the psychological phenomena accurately. 3.3 What this failure tells us is that the word completion task is too easy for Murre's "subjects" in that they do not need to rely on context to determine the correct answer. Perhaps this is an artifact of the artificial word-beginning/word-ending division he has imposed. Perhaps if he were to change the way the inputs were given to the nets so that they are trained on complete words and a context and then tested on partial patterns (with and without a context input), the results would be more accurate. At least the inputs would then be psychologically more plausible. 4.0 THE POWER OF CALM 4.1 Despite the overstated claims of biological and psychological plausibility, however, Murre's proposed models are nonetheless impressive. For example (and bugs aside), he does illustrate a way in which our memory systems might be constructed such that implicit and explicit memory processes might operate over the SAME mnemonic system. These sorts of existence proofs for various psychological or biological hypotheses I take to be the greatest contribution that neural network modeling can make for those interested in how we actually cogitate. 4.2 Moreover, Murre's CALM family of models manages to learn these sorts of patterns without direct supervision. Removing the dependence of neural nets on such highly artificial and obviously implausible learning algorithms as back-propagation and yet still managing to obtain sophisticated results is a feat for which Murre should be applauded. Though the ties to biology may be questionable, he has at least hit upon a modeling scheme that allows for true biological connections to be forged. 4.3 In sum, I recommend this book for those who wish to be up-to-date on the latest in connectionist technique. Murre gives much detail about the construction of the CALM modules, convincingly demonstrates their power through a wide range of applications, and gestures towards more impressive results yet to come. (However, for those new to the field, reading an introductory text on exactly what parallel distributed processing is and how it works is advised before plunging into the details of CALM.) But, if you are looking for a model of how cortex might actually work or of how we might actually think, then your expectations are too high. Murre's CALM is but a step in either of those directions. REFERENCES Murre, J.M.J. (1992) Learning and Categorization in Modular Neural Networks. UK: Harvester/Wheatsheaf; US: Erlbaum Murre, J.M.J. (1992) Precis of: Learning and Categorization in Modular Neural Networks. PSYCOLOQUY 3(68) categorization.1 25-Mar-93 16:15:07-GMT,4714;000000000001 Received: from rutvm1.rutgers.edu by aramis.rutgers.edu (5.59/SMI4.0/RU1.5/3.08) id AA01330; Thu, 25 Mar 93 11:15:06 EST Message-Id: <9303251615.AA01330@aramis.rutgers.edu> Received: from RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (IBM VM SMTP R1.2.1MX) with BSMTP id 0636; Thu, 25 Mar 93 11:13:51 EST Received: from RUTVM1.BITNET (NJE origin LISTSERV@RUTVM1) by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (LMail V1.1d/1.7f) with BSMTP id 1474; Thu, 25 Mar 1993 11:13:50 -0500 Date: Thu, 25 Mar 1993 11:13:29 -0500 Reply-To: psyc@pucc.bitnet Sender: "PSYCOLOQUY: Refereed Electronic Journal of Peer Discussion" From: Stevan Harnad Subject: psycoloquy.93.4.27.categorization.3.gregson (86 lines) Comments: To: psyc@pucc.bitnet To: Multiple recipients of list PSYC psycoloquy.93.4.27.categorization.3.gregson Thursday 25 March 1993 ISSN 1055-0143 (5 paragraphs, 2 references, 80 lines) PSYCOLOQUY is sponsored by the American Psychological Association (APA) Copyright 1993 Robert A Gregson NETWORKS THAT RESPECT PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY Book Review of Murre on Categorization Robert A. M. Gregson Department of Psychology, Australian National University, Canberra, A C T 0200 Australia rag655@cscgpo.anu.edu.au 1. It is refreshing to meet a neural networks text which is theoretical psychology first and artificial intelligence second. Murre (1992) takes the healthy stance that psychological plausibility takes precedence over mathematical tractability, but he does not fully exclude the latter. 2. This book, for the beginner with a little computing and mathematical competence, and an awareness of issues in cognitive psychology, is a better place to start then the obsolescent parallel distributed processing model which has been over-quoted. Hierarchical, layered, fully connected structures are not what the brain has, and backpropagation is not what it does, nor what it could be doing if it learns sequentially. 3. Murre builds from CALM modules of connected excitatory and inhibitory units, which have internal fixed structure; the intramodule connections are unmodifiable but the intermodule connections between excitatory units are modifiable. There are neurophysiological reasons why this structure is plausible, and it can exhibit both supervised and unsupervised learning, and interestingly can learn EXOR as well as form topological maps. 4. There are some affinities with ideas of Kohonen (1988), but CALM networks appear to be faster yet not improbabaly fast. Learning theorists will be interested in the stability of CALM networks in a learning mode and in the implementation of the distinction between explicit and implicit memory processes. One notes that parameter values have to be delicately adjusted to avoid what Murre calls reverberatory internal loops between modules; this point recalls Haken's (1987) insight that the brain must function just on the stable side of chaotic dynamics. The rather uncritical acceptance (p. 129) of Shepard's (1974) and Nosofksky's (1992) use of hypothetical metric spaces in psychology is unfortunate and not necessary to the general argument, indeed the biological features of these "spaces," Murre notes, are unsatisfactorily undefined. 5. For this reviewer, who has ready access to massive parallel computing, the technical appendices on programming were the part to read first. Neural network texts are necessarily ephemeral; ideas, hardware and software have an apparent half-life of about three years. This book in paperback is good value for the money, and worth serious study, particularly the sections on psychological and biological plausibility. Software to run on personal computers is said to be available. REFERENCES Haken, H. (1987) (Ed.) Advanced Synergetics. Berlin: Springer-Verlag. Kohonen, T. (1988) Representation of sensory information in self-organizing feature maps, and the relation of these maps to distributed memory networks. In: Cotterill, R. M. J. (Ed.) Computer Simulation in Brain Science. Cambridge: C.U.P., pp. 12-25. Murre, J.M.J. (1992) Learning and Categorization in Modular Neural Networks. UK: Harvester/Wheatsheaf; US: Erlbaum Murre, J.M.J. (1992) Precis of: Learning and Categorization in Modular Neural Networks. PSYCOLOQUY 3(68) categorization.1 Nosofksky, R. M. (1992) Similarity Scaling and Cognitive Process Models. Annual Review of Psychology, 43, 25-54. Shepard, R. N. (1974) Representations of Structure in Similarity Data: Problems and Prospects. Psychometrika, 39, 373-421. 25-Mar-93 16:20:36-GMT,9924;000000000001 Received: from rutvm1.rutgers.edu by aramis.rutgers.edu (5.59/SMI4.0/RU1.5/3.08) id AA01459; Thu, 25 Mar 93 11:20:34 EST Message-Id: <9303251620.AA01459@aramis.rutgers.edu> Received: from RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (IBM VM SMTP R1.2.1MX) with BSMTP id 0650; Thu, 25 Mar 93 11:19:19 EST Received: from RUTVM1.BITNET (NJE origin LISTSERV@RUTVM1) by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (LMail V1.1d/1.7f) with BSMTP id 1550; Thu, 25 Mar 1993 11:19:18 -0500 Date: Thu, 25 Mar 1993 11:19:06 -0500 Reply-To: psyc@pucc.bitnet Sender: "PSYCOLOQUY: Refereed Electronic Journal of Peer Discussion" From: Stevan Harnad Subject: psycoloquy.93.4.28.categorization.4.krakauer (170 lines) Comments: To: psyc@pucc.bitnet To: Multiple recipients of list PSYC psycoloquy.93.4.28.categorization.4.krakauer Thursday 25 March 1993 ISSN 1055-0143 (5 paragraphs, 10 references, 164 lines) PSYCOLOQUY is sponsored by the American Psychological Association (APA) Copyright 1993 David C. Krakauer & Alasdair I. Houston EVOLUTION, LEARNING & CATEGORIZATION Book Review of Murre on Categorization David C. Krakauer & Alasdair I. Houston NERC Unit of Behavioural Ecology, Department of Zoology, University of Oxford, South Parks Road, Oxford OX1 3PS, UK krakauer@vax.ox.ac.uk houston@vax.oxford.ac.uk "Learning, that Cobweb of the Brain" (Samuel Butler, 1612-1680) 1. In "Learning and Categorisation in Modular Neural Networks" Murre (1992) has presented a connectionist model based on a competitive learning rule that takes as its exemplar the neocortical minicolumns. Whilst the basis of the model is a schematization of anatomical observations, the model remains symbolic -- a conceptual level model of cognition intended to address psychological phenomena. Thus we are immediately challenged by a possible confluence of two levels, the neural substrate and the psychological data. By avoiding the claim that the architecture of the model is a veridical representation of cortical microcircuits and simultaneously stressing the primacy of the behaviour, Murre diffuses what might have been a source of confusion. The minicolumn structure pre-eminently provides an approach to modularity, where modularity is understood as a limitation on connectivity. By approaching psychological phenomena from the bottom (the level of connectionism), Murre suggests that he has constructed a "strong" generative model as opposed to a "weak" model where descriptions remain purely phenomenological. As Maki and Abunawass (1991) have argued, a model can be more neurally inspired than neurobiologically faithful. 2. One ambiguity we should like to be more explicit about is that of the relationship between the "learning rules" used to establish the connection weights in a network and the learning rules discussed by psychologists to describe the behaviour of animals. Whilst it remains possible that the higher order features of associative learning are themselves grounded in associative rules at a network level (Sutton and Barto, 1981), this is in no sense certain or necessary. While the Hebb rule can be interpreted as a simple form of classical conditioning, psychological classical conditioning needn't be a linear projection of the Hebb rule to the behavioural level. A latent danger in Murre's approach is in turning a "strong" model into a "weak" one by understating the dichotomy between these two uses of learning. 3. Murre has gratifyingly included a chapter on genetic algorithms (GAs). He describes the analogies between nets and GAs as optimisation strategies and characterises where their respective strengths lie (e.g., coarse versus fine search). We see utility in an approach that combines elements of connectionism with GAs, because it provides a suggestion of how evolutionary function and proximate mechanism might be integrated. Murre has identified how a network can transform a "weak" hypothesis into a "strong" one, but he does not fully credit GAs with a similar power. GAs not only provide a means of solving a problem, but through their analogy to biological evolution they give a measure of where selective pressures are brought to bear (Sumida et al. 1990). A function might fail to converge to the optimum solution because parameters do not contribute to a fitness function. High variability in a given trait might reflect a weak selective influence. If we are unable to evolve a net to perform a given task we are led to ask how we can modify our constraints so as to expose the net to a greater selection pressure. It is with this in mind that Hinton and Nowlan (1987) introduce "learning" (Murre pp. 106). For a given fitness function, the constraint of learning a proportion of the network's weights through a series of guesses (where fitness is inversely related to the number of guesses) provides continuity of solution. In other words, the network becomes subject to a graded selection pressure which allows an incremental approach to the solution. While this approach expedites a solution, it is questionable whether we are entitled to call it learning. Hinton and Nowland's model eventually evolves to a solution involving maximum constraint where learning is effectively excluded. We shall discuss this conception of learning and the desirability of restricting what we could call the network's "phenotypic plasticity." 4. According to Dickinson (1989), a learning mechanism is one that is able to detect and store information about casual relationships. On this definition, the environment should confer fitness in direct proportion to the assessment of causality by any network in which we would like to evolve the capacity to learn. Evolution should act to set up the machinery which will subsequently allow an association to be formed, and these associations should be formed within the lifetime of a single individual. The networks discussed by Murre use learning as a tactic to arrive at a solution which ultimately obviates the need to learn. These presuppose an unchanging environment, whereas learning might more appropriately be described as a mechanism to minimise the detrimental fitness consequences of variability. We may benefit here by introducing more formally the idea of phenotypic plasticity: "when the environment is heterogeneous, a single genotype can develop different phenotypes in different environments" (Stearns, 1992). Where we argue for the ability of a network to assess causality to provide a selection gradient, we might have said "heritability of plasticity should measure the additive genetic variation in plasticity" (Stearns, 1992). Learning will not always be advantageous and might well impose a cost in terms of wasted time (viz. Hinton and Nowlan XXXX). To quote Lynch and Gabriel (1987), "when the within generation component of environmental variation is much less than the between generation component, spatial heterogeneity can actually select for a high degree of specialisation." Hence any discussion of learning and its relation to evolution must distinguish between its role in allowing for a selection gradient and the contextual issue (subject to environmental variability) concerning the desirability of plasticity. 5. Finally, we would like to suggest that a CALM-like ("categorization and learning in neural networks") module could form the basis of a model of spatial memory with a view to understanding cache recovery in food storing birds. The problem faced by the bird is that of relocating scattered caches of food. Some parids are able to store hundreds of food items in a single day (Sherry et al., 1982). There is strong evidence that each spatial location is retained indepedently in memory. The properties of this memory are: recall of large numbers of items; long retention intervals; and rapid elaboration of new memories. The problems with the conventional fully connected networks discussed by Murre (pp 4-14), involving catastrophic interference and a lack of autonomous programming, make them unlikely models for this type of memory, where thousands of potential patterns might be stored and where latent learning is important. The possibility of evolving a sparse or modular network which employs competitive learning would also enable us to address the issue of adaptive specialisation when learning involves a unique task. REFERENCES Dickinson, A. (1980). Contemporary animal learning theory. New York: Cambridge University Press. Hinton, G. E. and Nowlan, S. J. (1987) How learning can guide evolution. Complex Systems 1: 495-502. Lynch, M. J. & Gabriel, W. (1987) Environmental tolerance. Am. Nat. 129, 283-303. Maki, W. S. & Abunawass, A. M. (1991). A connectionist approach to conditional discriminations: Learning short term memory and attention. In, Commons, M. L., Grossberg, S. & Staddon, J. E. R. (eds.) Neural Network Models of Conditioning and Action. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, New Jersey. Murre, J.M.J. (1992) Learning and Categorization in Modular Neural Networks. UK: Harvester/Wheatsheaf; US: Erlbaum Murre, J.M.J. (1992) Precis of: Learning and Categorization in Modular Neural Networks. PSYCOLOQUY 3(68) categorization.1 Sherry, D. F., Krebs, J. R. & Cowie, R. J. (1981) Memory for the location of stored food in marsh tits. Animal Behaviour, 29, 1260-1266. Stearns, S. C. (1992) The Evolution of Life Histories. Oxford. Sumida, B. H. , Houston, A. I., McNamara, J. M., Hamilton, W.D. (1990) Genetic Algorithms and evolution. J. theor.Biol, 147, 59-84. Sutton, R. S. & Barto A. G. (1989). Towards a modern theory of adaptive networks: Expectation and prediction. Psychological Review, 88, 135-170. 25-Mar-93 16:22:46-GMT,9849;000000000001 Received: from rutvm1.rutgers.edu by aramis.rutgers.edu (5.59/SMI4.0/RU1.5/3.08) id AA01544; Thu, 25 Mar 93 11:22:44 EST Message-Id: <9303251622.AA01544@aramis.rutgers.edu> Received: from RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (IBM VM SMTP R1.2.1MX) with BSMTP id 0657; Thu, 25 Mar 93 11:21:30 EST Received: from RUTVM1.BITNET (NJE origin LISTSERV@RUTVM1) by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (LMail V1.1d/1.7f) with BSMTP id 1587; Thu, 25 Mar 1993 11:21:29 -0500 Date: Thu, 25 Mar 1993 11:21:20 -0500 Reply-To: psyc@pucc.bitnet Sender: "PSYCOLOQUY: Refereed Electronic Journal of Peer Discussion" From: Stevan Harnad Subject: psycoloquy.93.4.29.categorization.5.sloman (169 lines) Comments: To: psyc@pucc.bitnet To: Multiple recipients of list PSYC psycoloquy.93.4.29.categorization.5.sloman Thursday 25 March 1993 ISSN 1055-0143 (7 paragraphs, 11 references, 163 lines) PSYCOLOQUY is sponsored by the American Psychological Association (APA) Copyright 1993 Steven Sloman MODULARITY OF MIND: A QUESTION UNASKED Book Review of Murre on Categorization Steven Sloman Department of Cognitive and Linguistic Sciences Brown University, Box 1978 Providence, RI 02912 sloman@columbo.cog.brown.edu 1.0 Connectionist models can help us to understand the mind in a variety of ways. Their contribution can be substantive, in providing the means to formulate new scientific theories that explain data that were previously unexplained, in bringing coherence to disparate domains, in providing a unifying theoretical structure, or in providing a more precise account of data than other theories do. Their contribution can also be more subtle. They can provide a new metaphor for thinking about an issue or, relatedly, a new language for theorizing on a topic. Their value in this regard depends on the extent to which they provide an original set of simple, general tools that can be productively combined to generate new theories. Connectionist models are valuable even when their contribution is as vague as that of facilitating communication among different disciplines. Murre (1992) describes a model that purportedly does all these things; I find no evidence that it does any of them. 2.0 The problem addressed by the title of the book is critical for understanding the architecture of both mind and brain. Why is the brain apparently so modular, and what kind of computational power does that give to processes like learning and categorization? The high point of the book comes in the last chapter when, for two pages, Murre addresses that problem in its general form. There we learn that modularity is important because it makes a model extendible; a new module can be attached without affecting the functioning of the rest of the system. But of course from the point of view of those who believe that processing is wholly interactive, that is just the problem. Every experimental cognitive psychologist has had the frustrating impression at one point or other that everything depends on everything else. Murre shows us some of what you buy by assuming modular structures, such as certain forms of stability, but connectionism is exciting precisely because it gives us a way of describing a system without having to specify functional parts. As others have described in exquisite detail (e.g., Fodor 1983), the extent of modular structure in mental activity is an open theoretical and empirical question. 2.1 This should not bother Murre, because his model is agnostic concerning the structure of our modular architecture. What Murre describes is a particular kind of competitive learning network. This network (or module) can be freely combined with other modules to build a larger network. But when he actually models something, all the effort is put into how these modules are interconnected. Indeed, all the learning occurs in the interconnections. In terms of the theoretical work they perform, the modules, with rare exceptions, play the same role as single units do in standard networks. The modularity structure of his models just adds complexity to his theorizing, making his models seem baroque and confusing -- at least, Murre never presents evidence showing that his model fares better in a direct comparison, in terms of either efficiency or scientific validity, than other simpler models. So as a means of facilitating thinking, theorizing, and communication, these ideas seem to be of little help. The idea of a competitive learning network itself has many virtues, which have been discussed at length by a multitude of theorists, starting with Rosenblatt (1962). 3.0 The one strong claim that Murre's model does make is that categorization plays a fundamental role in memory. His one argument for the primacy of categorization is that the process of chunking an input into a superordinate category reduces the problem of catastrophic interference. Indeed it does. Of course, it also reduces the advantageous property of automatic generalization given by distributed representations. Moreover, categorization throws away information. Whenever we have fewer superordinate categories than we do inputs (as we must, by the definition of "superordinate"), individuating aspects of inputs become irrelevant if the input is categorized along with other inputs. The extent to which we abstract out commonalities and the extent to which we retain the attributes of individual exemplars is a matter of fierce debate in the literature on categorization, comprehension, and memory. In fact, some of the strongest evidence that we maintain detailed information about superficial features comes from the literature on implicit memory (e.g., Kolers 1975). 4.0 Murre seems to be confused about what counts as an explanation in science. For example, most scientists agree that a model gains support by being consistent with a variety of data. It gains more support if those data verify a counterintuitive prediction of the model. Murre's model gains little support because it does not make any predictions at all. Both Gluck and Bower (1988) and Kruschke (1992) describe models that do fairly well on both these counts, but Murre dismisses these because the "authors cannot account for most architectural aspects of their model in terms of their psychological function or relation to biological structures" (p. 129). 4.1 Apparently Murre can account for such aspects of his model. To find out, consider the work on memory modeling described in the book. Murre takes as evidence for his model that it implements a theory of explicit and implicit memory tasks developed by Graf and Mandler (1984). They suggested that implicit memory performance is a product of associative learning -- the strengthening of pre-existing associations -- and that explicit memory performance is due to elaborative learning -- the formation of new associations. Although this is an interesting distinction, it has been known for a decade that it is incomplete as a model of the explicit/implicit distinction (see, for example, Schacter 1987). One of several weaknesses is that it fails to explain why implicit memory facilitation sometimes lasts much longer than the aspect of memory measured by explicit tasks. One example can be found in Sloman et al. (1988), who found facilitation on an implicit fragment completion test after 16 months. Murre's failure to consider such evidence is representative of his general approach. He picks and chooses those bits of evidence at any level of analysis and from any domain that happen to be generally consistent with his framework. The few simulations he describes that show some qualitative consistency (and some unmentioned inconsistency) with experimental data in the study of memory is just not sufficient. So much detailed work modeling memory data has now gone on (e.g., Murdock 1974) that it is incumbent on theorists to be qualitatively thorough or quantitatively precise or both when comparing their theories to data. 5.0 Murre's book reads like a hodge-podge of facts and figures about connectionist models and his particular combination of techniques. He and his colleagues have clearly been busy, but the book is a report of work-in-progress that is lacking in completeness and polish. REFERENCES Fodor, J. A. (1983). Modularity of mind. Cambridge: MIT Press. Gluck, M. A. & Bower, G. H. (1988). Evaluating an adaptive network model of human learning. Journal of Memory and Language, 27, 166-195. Graf, P. & Mandler, G. (1984). Activation makes words more accessible, but not necessarily more retrievable. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 23, 553-568. Kolers, P. A. (1975). Memorial consequences of automatized encoding. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 1, 689-701. Kruschke, J. K. (1992). ALCOVE: An exemplar based connectionist model of category learning. Psychological Review, 99, 22-44. Murre, J.M.J. (1992) Learning and Categorization in Modular Neural Networks. UK: Harvester/Wheatsheaf; US: Erlbaum Murre, J.M.J. (1992) Precis of: Learning and Categorization in Modular Neural Networks. PSYCOLOQUY 3(68) categorization.1 Murdock, B. B., Jr. (1974). Human memory: Theory and data. Potomac: Erlbaum. Rosenblatt, F. (1962). Principles of neurodynamics. New York: Spartan. Schacter, D. L. (1987). Implicit memory: History and current status. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 13, 501-518. Sloman, S. A., Hayman, C. A. G., Ohta, N., Law, J., & Tulving, E. (1988). Forgetting in fragment completion. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 14, 223-239. 10-Apr-93 23:47:00-GMT,9487;000000000001 Received: from rutvm1.rutgers.edu by aramis.rutgers.edu (5.59/SMI4.0/RU1.5/3.08) id AA17046; Sat, 10 Apr 93 19:46:59 EDT Message-Id: <9304102346.AA17046@aramis.rutgers.edu> Received: from RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (IBM VM SMTP R1.2.1MX) with BSMTP id 5202; Sat, 10 Apr 93 19:45:44 EDT Received: from RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (NJE origin LISTSERV@RUTVM1) by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (LMail V1.1d/1.7f) with BSMTP id 1371; Sat, 10 Apr 1993 19:45:44 -0400 Date: Sat, 10 Apr 1993 19:45:25 -0400 Reply-To: psyc@pucc.bitnet Sender: "PSYCOLOQUY: Refereed Electronic Journal of Peer Discussion" From: Stevan Harnad Subject: psycoloquy.93.4.30.reading-inference.12.garnham (169 lines) Comments: To: psyc@pucc.bitnet To: Multiple recipients of list PSYC psycoloquy.93.4.30.reading-inference.12.garnham Saturday 12 April 1993 ISSN 1055-0143 (6 paragraphs, 12 references, 162 lines) PSYCOLOQUY is sponsored by the American Psychological Association (APA) Copyright 1993 Alan Garnham SPACE: THE FINAL FRONTIER? Reply to Haberlandt on Garnham on Reading-Inference Alan Garnham Laboratory of Experimental Psychology University of Sussex Brighton BN1 9QG, UK +44-273-678337 alang@epunix.sussex.ac.uk 1. Haberlandt (1993: 3) is (perhaps unintentionally) ambiguous about whether he attributes to me "a clear preference for the spatial domain" or merely the view that, myself perhaps excluded, "mental model theorists have a clear preference for the spatial domain." In their comment on Glenberg and Mathew's (1992) target article, Zwaan & Graesser (1993: 3.1) are more definite in claiming that I, as well as Glenberg & Mathew, "appear to work under the assumption that spatial models are either the most important or the only type of situation model people construct while reading a narrative text." In fact, nothing could be further from the truth. What I wrote (1992: 6.1 - 6.3) about empirical research on inferences in the spatial domain is that it makes a particular pedagogical point. It happens to be extremely easy to distinguish between a representation of the linguistic form of a text about a spatial layout and a representation of the situation it describes. Hence, both a priori arguments and empirical evidence for the use of mental models are easy to find in the spatial domain. 2. For a particular reader of a particular text (perhaps with a particular goal), spatial inferences may be more or less important. The subject matter of the text is, obviously, a crucial determinant of the role that spatial inferences play in understanding it. I have long endorsed (see e.g. Garnham, 1985: 177) Miller and Johnson-Laird's (1976) suggestion that, in text comprehension, it is necessary to establish the logical, temporal, causal, intentional and moral connections between the events, states and processes described in different parts of the text, as well as the spatial ones. In the mental model of a particular text, relations of several of these kinds are likely to be encoded. It would be a rare text (and a rare reader, with a rare goal) that required a mental model that encoded only spatial relations -- one that warranted the appellation "spatial model." Furthermore --and here I agree with Zwaan and Graesser (1993: 3) -- there are reasons for thinking that spatial models might be comparatively difficult to construct. There are, however, counterarguments. The spatial domain is a particularly favored source of metaphors (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), suggesting that people find processing spatial information, and in particular spatial relations, relatively easy. 3. I am also surprised by Haberlandt's claim that "it is not clear how mental models would capture... causal links" (1993: 3). Mental models contain information about particular events, and they may directly encode relations between them. Of course, if one believes that mental models are "life-like," and nothing else, there may be a problem with causal relations. As Hume pointed out long ago, we do not experience causation directly (though cf. Michotte's work [e.g., 1954]), but only the conjunction of events in the world. If a mental model simply represented a sequence of events (a ball hitting a window; the window breaking), there would be no representation of the causal relation in the model. Even if causation is explicitly signaled ("the window broke because the ball hit it"), it is not clear how it would be represented in a "life-like" model. 4. There are two possibilities, and I don't know which is right. Indeed, it is possible that each is realized under different circumstances. The first is that causality is represented by links between the representations of events. We know that mental models have to have various adjuncts to their representations of situations in the world. For example, they need to be supplemented with information about the people to whom they are addressed -- the particular person one is talking or writing to, or the general audience of a public lecture or a written text (see Johnson-Laird & Garnham, 1980). One problem with this kind of adjunct in the case of causation is apparent from the discussion of Noordman and Vonk's (1992) data (see e.g. Garnham & Oakhill, 1992). Simply encoding that events, states and processes are somehow or other causally linked does not result in an adequate representation of the causal connection between them. 5. The second possibility is that causal relations are not encoded directly into mental models. Rather, when a model is constructed, the reader or listener should establish that the encoded events are related, causally or otherwise, in a way that makes sense in terms of that person's knowledge about how the world (or the world that the text is about) works. Thus, as in my omission theory of case filling inferences (Garnham, 1982), information about causal relations can be left out of a mental model if it can be filled in later using knowledge stored in long-term memory. However, although this view is plausible for simple causal relations between two events, its extension to complex causal chains would require a different type of checking process. Information about causal chains presumably cannot be stored as a set of templates but must be held in the form of a "grammar" of causation. So deciding whether a complex causal chain is consistent with background knowledge would require a process akin to parsing. 6. I would like to close with a reminder that the mental-models theory is supposed to be a theory of how ALL texts are understood, not just texts about space and, indeed, not just texts about concrete situations. Sometimes there are similarities between the structure of a text and the structure of the situation it describes, for example, between a linear sequence of causally related events and a text that describes them in the order in which they occurred. Sometimes there are no such similarities, for example, in texts about spatial layouts. But even when there are similarities between the structure of a text and the structure in the world that it describes, there are crucial differences between mental models and representations of text structure. Texts are made up of words that are syntactically and semantically related to one another. A representation of their structure would include elements standing for words and other linguistic entities and elements standing for the syntactic and semantic relations. A mental model is a representation of a situation and contains elements that represent people, things, events, states, processes, times and places, and real world relations between them. REFERENCES Garnham, A. (1982). Testing psychological theories about inference making. Memory and Cognition, 10, 341-349. Garnham, A. (1985). Psycholinguistics: Central topics. London: Methuen. Garnham, A. (1992). Minimalism versus constructionism: A false dichotomy in theories of inference in reading. PSYCOLOQUY 3(63) reading-inference-1.1 Garnham, A. & Oakhill, J.V. (1992). Discourse representation and text processing from a "mental models" perspective. Language and Cognitive Processes, 7, 193-204. Glenberg, A.M. & Mathew, S. (1992). When minimalism is not enough: Mental models in reading comprehension. PSYCOLOQUY 3(64) reading-inference-2.1. Haberlandt, K. (1993). Understanding mental models and inferences. PSYCOLOQUY 4(5) reading-inference.6 Johnson-Laird, P.N. & Garnham, A. (1980) Descriptions and discourse models. Linguistics and Philosophy, 7, 391- Lakoff, G. & Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors we live by. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Michotte, A. E. (1954) La Perception de la Causalite. Studia Psychologica: Publications Universitaires de Louvain. Miller, G.A. & Johnson-Laird, P.N. (1976). Language and perception. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Noordman, L.G.M. & Vonk, W. (1992). Reader's knowledge and the control of inferences in reasoning. Language and Cognition, 7, 373-391. Zwaan, R.A. & Graesser, A.C. (1993). Reading goals and situation models. PSYCOLOQUY 4(3) reading-inference.4. AUTHOR NOTE: My work on mental models has been supported by ESRC grant C 0023 2439 "Mental models and the interpretation of anaphora. Thanks to Jane Oakhill for comments on an earlier draft. 11-Apr-93 18:58:14-GMT,19413;000000000001 Received: from rutvm1.rutgers.edu by aramis.rutgers.edu (5.59/SMI4.0/RU1.5/3.08) id AA18542; Sun, 11 Apr 93 14:58:12 EDT Message-Id: <9304111858.AA18542@aramis.rutgers.edu> Received: from RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (IBM VM SMTP R1.2.1MX) with BSMTP id 5753; Sun, 11 Apr 93 14:56:58 EDT Received: from RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (NJE origin LISTSERV@RUTVM1) by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (LMail V1.1d/1.7f) with BSMTP id 4368; Sun, 11 Apr 1993 14:56:58 -0400 Date: Sun, 11 Apr 1993 14:56:42 -0400 Reply-To: psyc@pucc.bitnet Sender: "PSYCOLOQUY: Refereed Electronic Journal of Peer Discussion" From: Stevan Harnad Subject: psycoloquy.93.4.31.reading-inference.13.glenberg 354 lines) Comments: To: psyc@pucc.bitnet To: Multiple recipients of list PSYC psycoloquy.93.4.31.reading-inference.13.glenberg Sunday 11 April 1993 ISSN 1055-0143 (17 paragraphs, 22 references, 347 lines) PSYCOLOQUY is sponsored by the American Psychological Association (APA) Copyright 1993 Arthur Glenberg COMPREHENSION WHILE MISSING THE POINT: MORE ON MINIMALISM AND MODELS Reply to Carreiras, Fernandez & Carriedo. Haberlandt and Zwaan & Graesser on Glenberg & Mathew on Reading-Inference Arthur Glenberg Department of Psychology University of Wisconsin Madison, WI 53706 glenberg@macc.wisc.edu 1.0 INTRODUCTION 1.1 In this Reply I will address four issues raised in the commentaries on Glenberg & Mathew (1992). First, Fernandez & Carriedo (1993) suggest that Glenberg & Mathew (1992) were "unfair" in one of their empirical criticisms of the McKoon & Ratcliff (1992) salience account. I acknowledge that that was the case. Familiarity with Glenberg & Mathew will facilitate understanding the section (2.0) dealing with this issue, but the remainder of this reply is self-contained. Second, Haberlandt (1993) and Zwaan & Graesser (1993) call for a consideration of nonspatial mental models. Here I sketch some ideas based on analyses of Lakoff (1987) that seem to bridge the gap between spatial and nonspatial mental models. Third, I will use these ideas to elaborate on a distinction between inferences proper and information available from the representation that does not seem to have a direct counterpart in the text. Fourth, I will extend Carreiras's (1993) discussion of the "survivor effect." As documented by Barton & Sanford (in press), this effect demonstrates that local INcoherence can be ignored if there is global coherence. The ideas I sketch, along with an analysis provided by Barton & Sanford, provide a way of thinking about how this can occur while respecting some of the intuitions that lay behind the notion of minimalism. 2.0 AN UNFAIR CRITICISM 2.1 Glenberg & Mathew (1992) discuss several criticisms of the McKoon Ratcliff (1992) salience account of Glenberg, Meyer & Lindem (1987). One such criticism (section 4.4 of Glenberg & Mathew) is that the salience account cannot explain the absence of an effect of the associated/dissociated variable when the recognition probe occurs immediately after the critical sentence that instantiates the associated/dissociated variable. Fernandez & Carriedo (1993, Section 4.3) point out that the null effect can be explained easily as due to verbatim memory for the probed item presented in the critical sentence. In fact, a similar verbatim memory account is used by Glenberg & Mathew to explain the null effect from the mental model perspective! Clearly, Fernandez & Carriedo are right: the null effect cannot be used to discriminate between the salience and mental-model approaches. 3.0 NON-SPATIAL INFORMATION AND MENTAL MODELS 3.1 Haberlandt (1993, section 3) points out that research and thinking about mental models stresses the spatial domain. Zwaan & Graesser (1993, section 3) discuss the need to incorporate nonspatial information into models derived from text. I address several aspects related to these points in the next few paragraphs. 3.2 Space is special. We have to survive in a dangerous, three- dimensional spatial environment. Given our species' size (and thus vulnerability to gravity, predation, injury), if we had no ability to represent and reason about space, that survival would be unlikely. However, we can represent space, and in fact it seems that our perceptual system recognizes the importance of space in that many subsystems (e.g., vision, audition, proprioception) provide information useful in forming those representations (see Freksa, 1991, for further development of this theme). In other words, real survival of individuals and species depends on being able to represent and reason about the natural environment. It would seem a good bet, then, that our conceptual system has sophisticated mechanisms for encoding space. Keep this idea in mind. 3.3 A background assumption in many theories of cognition is that representations of environmental information are, for the most part, formed of the same stuff as representations of linguistically derived information, namely, propositions formed out of abstract symbols that seem to be similar to words. No doubt this reliance on verbal-like propositions stems from several sources, such as a concern for language, the preponderance of experimental techniques derived from the verbal learning tradition, and the elegance and power of propositional systems. There is beginning to be an accumulation of evidence, however, that propositional representations are not the stuff of cognitive representations (Barsalou, in press; Lakoff, 1987; Sanford & Moxey, 1993). 3.4 Let's now view the background assumption (that perceptual and linguistic information share a common representational format) from a different perspective, namely, that space is special, and thus that the representation of the natural environment is the primary job of the conceptual system. From this perspective the assumption that perceptual and linguistic information share a common representational format implies that linguistic information is encoded by means of representations designed primarily to deal with space. Thus, from this perspective, language comprehension is intrinsically spatial. 3.5 How can this be? Clearly, not all language is about space, so how can a system evolved to deal with space represent nonspatial information such as time and causality? One solution is suggested by Glenberg & Langston (1992) and Glenberg, Kruley & Langston (in press). They propose that language understanders can learn to map nonspatial dimensions onto spatial ones and that this mapping affords spatial reasoning. This spatial reasoning may often take the form of "noticing," using the analog of spatial contiguity in the mental model to infer new relations (see Glenberg & Langston, 1992; Glenberg et al., in press). There is empirical evidence that this form of mapping can be done. Nonetheless, this form of mapping also appears to be quite effortful and to depend on special strategies or conditions (e.g., when pictures are available to suggest the appropriate mapping). 3.6 A second, more sophisticated, solution is described by Lakoff (1987) and Johnson (1987). They suggest that common, repeated, human experiences result in the formation of basic conceptual structures that are universal. These structures (which bear a family resemblance to the Piagetian notion of sensory-motor schemata) are termed kinesthetic image schemas (K-schemas here). As examples, we have a source-path-goal K-schema to represent movement in space from a source, along a path, and to a goal. We have a container K-schema to represent the idea of containment. In addition to incorporating spatial information developed through interaction with the environment, K-schemas are highly structured (nothing like pictures) and provide a type of logic. Thus, the container schema includes structural information such as inside, outside, and boundary, as well as logical notions such as EITHER inside OR outside, and transitivity of embedded containers. According to Lakoff and Johnson, these sorts of K-schemas can be used to represent a great variety of objects and ideas. Thus, the container schema is used in thinking about human bodies, cups, cars, lakes, and universes. 3.7 Furthermore, Lakoff and Johnson develop the Spatialization of Form hypothesis, according to which abstract ideas and complex arrays of loosely structured experiences (e.g., experiences of love) can be mapped onto more concrete K-schemas when there is a correlation between the structure of the K-schema and the structure of the abstract idea or experience. Thus, whereas Glenberg & Langston (1992) and Glenberg et al. (in press) propose a mapping of single dimensions, Lakoff and Johnson propose a mapping of correlated structures. For example, we come to view the abstract notion of "mind" as a container for ideas, and we say things such as, "Keep this idea IN mind" (end of section 3.1). Similarly, we can conceptualize abstract theories as buildings (a type of container) with foundations (assumptions) that can be viewed from different perspectives (beginning of section 3.4). Furthermore, even prototypically abstract relations such as "cause" appear (!) to be representable using structures very similar to K-schemas (see Talmy, 1988). In short, it is not inconceivable that what we have defined as abstract can be conceptualized as concrete and spatially structured. In fact, it is quite conceivable that this should occur, given that space is special. 3.8 Why is the sort of mapping that Glenberg & Langston (1992) describe strategic and effortful, whereas the sort of mapping that Lakoff and Johnson describe is natural and easy? I suspect that the difference has to do with structure and familiarity. In the Glenberg & Langston situation, subjects must map arbitrary temporal relations onto arbitrary spatial relations. At the very least, there are well-known constraints on immediate memory capacity that make this difficult. In the Lakoff and Johnson situation, the relations are nonarbitrary; spatialization of form occurs when there is a (perceived) correlation between the structure of the abstract domain and the structure of the concrete domain. Thus, at the very least, the ability to handle chunks of information as single units will make the Lakoff and Johnson situation easier. 4.0 INFERENCES AND INFORMATION 4.1 Glenberg & Mathew (1992, section 3.2) tried to develop a distinction between (a) inferences and (b) information that accompanies a representation. The notions that we struggled with are similar to ideas expressed in Garnham (1992, Section 6; 1993, Section 3). I am sorry that distinction was not central to any of the commentaries, because I think it is an important (though difficult) issue. I will try again. When we think about inferences, the prototypical case is in going beyond what is given by applying some sort of logic-like process to the data (assumptions or premises) at hand. Thus, in the domain of reading comprehension, we think of the text as containing some basic ideas and the application of inference processes gets us beyond the basic ideas to inferences. This is wrong in at least two ways. 4.2 First, texts do not have any ideas in them. Ideas can only be in heads. Furthermore, getting even the most basic ideas out of a text requires that the text be interpreted, and this interpretation is always relative to some background (Fauconnier, 1985; Sanford & Garrod, 1981). When an author violates those background assumptions, we are brought up short (see, for example, O'Brien & Albrecht, 1992). Of course, once ideas are formed, logic-like processes can be used to derive various inferences, and in some circumstances this clearly occurs. 4.3 Second, because even the simplest language segment requires some sort of interpretation relative to background knowledge, the process of forming the interpretation will induce information that does not correspond to any of the words in the text. Thus, when we read a text about Sally starting her car in the garage, we don't have to infer that Sally is also in the garage. By virtue of conceptualizing the car and the garage as containers, the transitive "inference" comes along with the conceptualization; it does not have to be derived from the conceptualizations. 5.0 GLOBAL (?) MINIMALISM AND THE SURVIVOR EFFECT 5.1 This sort of thinking provides a new perspective on minimalism -- or, perhaps, a new type of minimalism. The basic question becomes: what sort of understanding is achieved when the reader does not engage in inferential processes (as described in 4.1) but simply constructs an interpretation constrained by background assumptions? This type of minimalism helps us understand phenomena like the "survivor effect" (Barton & Sanford, in press) and the "illusion of knowing" (Glenberg, Wilkinson & Epstein, 1982). 5.2 In Barton & Sanford (in press), subjects were asked to write solutions to a version of the following problem (adapted from Barton & Sanford): (1) A tourist flight crashes in the Pyrenees and wreckage is strewn equally in France and Spain. Where should the survivors be buried? Only 66% of the subjects noted that survivors are not the sorts of things that should be buried. Even more striking, when the term "survivors" was replaced by the phrase "surviving dead," only 23% of the subjects noted any anomaly! 5.3 What is going on here? Clearly subjects were "understanding" the text; they were willing to write solutions to the problem and the solutions were, in some sense, coherent. Nonetheless, the subjects did not appear to notice what is a clear anomaly. Even the locally incoherent (and nonsensical) "surviving dead" did not sound any alarms, and appeared to suppress detection of the anomaly. The account that Barton & Sanford offer is that subjects were understanding by developing a global, situational interpretation of the text. To the extent that the coherence at the global level can be maintained (e.g., "dead" is consistent with the global plane-crash situation), local problems are ignored and perhaps not even computed. Consistent with this account, when the global situation was changed (to a bicycle crash instead of a plane crash), detection of the anomaly increased from about 35% to about 80%. Thus we have a situation in which readers are forming a global interpretation but they do not appear to be engaging any formal, global inferencing. In fact, given the failure to notice the problem with "surviving dead," it seems unlikely that the readers are forming text-based propositions as the premises of inference processing. 6.0 CONCLUSION 6.1 There are at least two ways in which space can be important in language comprehension. First there is brute force: given the right incentives, we can form mental models of space, we can map arbitrary nonspatial dimensions into spatial ones, and we can derive spatial inferences. Second, according to Lakoff's Spatialization of Form hypothesis, abstract ideas can be understood by conceptualizing them using structured K-schemas derived from interactions with spatial objects. This sort of conceptualization results in a structured interpretation, and this interpretation may encode information that does not correspond to particular words in the text. On the other hand, this information is not formally inferred. Given that the goal of language comprehension is the construction of coherent, situational interpretations (i.e., mental models), we can begin to understand how one can comprehend (globally) and still miss the (local) point. REFERENCES Barsalou, L. B. (in press). Flexibility, structure, and linguistic vagary in concepts: Manifestations of a compositional system of perceptual symbols. In A. C. Collins, S. E. Gathercole, M. A. Conway & P. E. M. Morris (Eds.), Theories of Memory. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Barton, S. B. and Sanford, A. J. (in press). A case-study of anomaly detection: shallow semantic processing and cohesion establishment. Memory & Cognition. Carreiras, M. (1993). Minimalist misconceptions of mental models. PSYCOLOQUY 4(6) reading-inference.7. Fauconnier, G. (1985). Mental spaces: Aspects of meaning construction in natural language. London: MIT Press. Fernandez, A. & Carriedo, N. (1993). Reading Comprehension: In defense of a mental model approach. PSYCOLOQUY 4(7) reading-inference.8. Freksa, C. (1991). Qualitative spatial reasoning. In D. M. Mark & A. U. Frank (Eds.) Cognitive and Linguistic Aspects of Geographic pace. pp. 361- 372. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Garnham, A. (1992). Minimalism versus constructionism: A false dichotomy in theories of inference during reading. PSYCOLOQUY 3(63) reading-inference-1. Garnham, A. (1993). An impartial view of inference making. PSYCOLOQUY 4(17) reading-inference.17. Glenberg, A. M., Kruley, P. & Langston, W. E. (in press). Analogical processes in comprehension: Simulation of a mental model. In M. A. Gernsbacher (Ed.), Handbook of Psycholinguistics. Glenberg, A. M. & Langston, W. E. (1992). Comprehension of illustrated text: Pictures help to build mental models. Journal of Memory and Language, 31, 129-151. Glenberg, A. M. & Mathew, S. (1992) When minimalism is not enough: Mental models in reading. PSYCOLOQUY 3(64) reading-inference-2.1. Glenberg, A. M., Meyer, M. & Lindem, K. (1987). Mental models contribute to foregrounding during text comprehension. Journal of Memory and Language, 26, 69-83. Glenberg, A. M., Wilkinson, A. C., and Epstein, W. (1982). The illusion of knowing: Failure in the self-assessment of comprehension. Memory & Cognition, 10, 597-602. Haberlandt, K. (1993). Understanding mental models and inferences. PSYCOLOQUY 4(5) reading-inference.6. Johnson, M. (1987). The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Lakoff, G. (1987). Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. McKoon, G. & Ratcliff, R. (1992). Inference during reading. Psychological Review, 99, 440-466. O'Brien, E. J. & Albrecht, J. E. (1992). Comprehension strategies in the development of a mental model. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 18, 777-784. Sanford, A. J. & Garrod, S. C. (1981). Understanding Written Language. Chichester: Wiley. Sanford, A. J. & Moxey, L. M. (in press). Aspects of coherence in written language: A psychological perspective. In T. Givon and M. A. Gernsbacher (Eds.), Coherence in Spontaneous text. Philadelphia, PA: John Benjamins. Talmy, L. (1988). Force dynamics in language and cognition. Cognitive Science, 12, 49-100. Zwaan, R. A. & Graesser, A. C. (1993). Reading goals and situation models. PSYCOLOQUY 4(3) reading-inference.4. Note: I thank the Zentrum fur interdisziplinare Forschung (ZiF) of the University of Bielefeld for support while preparing this article, Tony Sanford for many fruitful and enjoyable discussions about these issues, and Morti Gernsbacher for her insightful comments on an earlier draft. Art Glenberg ZiF, University of Bielefeld, Wellenberg 1, Apt. 10/18 D-4800 Bielefeld 1, Germany 11-Apr-93 19:57:37-GMT,13799;000000000001 Received: from rutvm1.rutgers.edu by aramis.rutgers.edu (5.59/SMI4.0/RU1.5/3.08) id AA21571; Sun, 11 Apr 93 15:57:35 EDT Message-Id: <9304111957.AA21571@aramis.rutgers.edu> Received: from RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (IBM VM SMTP R1.2.1MX) with BSMTP id 5793; Sun, 11 Apr 93 15:56:21 EDT Received: from RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (NJE origin LISTSERV@RUTVM1) by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (LMail V1.1d/1.7f) with BSMTP id 4551; Sun, 11 Apr 1993 15:56:20 -0400 Date: Sun, 11 Apr 1993 15:56:04 -0400 Reply-To: psyc@pucc.bitnet Sender: "PSYCOLOQUY: Refereed Electronic Journal of Peer Discussion" From: Stevan Harnad Subject: psycoloquy.93.4.32.frontal-cortex.3.henderson (237 lines) Comments: To: psyc@pucc.bitnet To: Multiple recipients of list PSYC psycoloquy.93.4.32.frontal-cortex.3.henderson Sunday 11 April 1993 ISSN 1055-0143 (12 paragraphs, 6 references, 1 Table 230 lines) PSYCOLOQUY is sponsored by the American Psychological Association (APA) Copyright 1993 L. Henderson & W. Dittrich DECOMPOSING THE CORPUS OF NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS Commentary on Abbruzzese et al. on Frontal-Cortex L. Henderson & W. Dittrich University of Hertfordshire School of Health & Human Sciences, Psychology Hatfield AL10 9B, England Psyqwhd@vms3.herts.ac.uk W.H.Dittrich@cen.exeter.ac.uk 1.0 INTRODUCTION 1.1 In what follows, we present a critique from a cognitive science standpoint of the form of inference to be found in the target article by Abbruzzese, M., Ferri, S., Bellodi, L., and Scarone, S. (1993). For the most part these authors adhere to the conventions of traditional neuropsychological argument. In Table 1 we display their principal findings: TABLE 1: Neuropsychological test outcome in Abbruzzese et al's study, in terms of whether each of the patient groups performed significantly worse ("*") than the normal group on the four tests: Verbal Fluency, Weigl Sorting, Wisconsin Card Sort: Perseveration Index, and the Object Alternation: Perserveration Index. Note also that only the VFT and OAT:P reliably distinguished between performances of the two psychiatric groups. VFT WST WCST:P OAT:P --------------------------------- paranoid schizophrenic * * * = obsessive-compulsive = = = * Since schizophrenic patients have been reported to perform poorly on almost every available cognitive test, only their normal attainment on the OAT perseveration index holds potential interest. We dispute Abbruzzese et al.'s interpretative assumptions regarding these data as follows: Concerning the conclusions of Abbruzzese et al., we hold that data of the sort presented are in principle incapable of sustaining direct inferences about pathoanatomy. Neither can they afford a neuropsychological "profile" of frontal functioning, since we have no persuasive theory of the critical attributes of these tasks. 2.0 ON THE EXPLANATION OF BRAIN-BEHAVIOR RELATIONS IN COGNITION 2.1 We take it that the ultimate explanatory objective in the study of brain-behavior relationships is to relate elementary cognitive operations (understood in relation to a detailed model of normal cognitive functioning) to neuroanatomy. In the ideal case, for neuropsychological data to be brought to bear on the resolution of such issues, the necessary preliminaries would include: (i) analysis of the behavioral tasks used into the specific cognitive processes required for performance, as well as any strategic control processes governing the activities of the various specialized processors. (ii) A means of determining what neuropathology was present or a means of inferring the nature of the dysfunction, formulated with reference to a theory of normal functioning and supplemented by a specification of any putative compensatory rearrangements. (iii) In addressing the correspondences between cognitive model and neuroanatomy, we believe that describing the pattern of connectivity amongst the neural elements is likely to be more important than their absolute location in the skull. 2.2. NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS: These require from the subject a complex composite of cognitive operations, usually involving specialized processors whose function is governed by relatively nonspecific, strategic control processes. If the "neuro-psychological" tests are to attach to the expectantly dangling "neuro-" anything of psychological substance, one must confront these complexities and provide a systematic explanation instead of attempting to overleap such difficulties in the hope that the test may conduct us directly to its anatomical home. Where the frontal lobes (FLs) are the focus of enquiry these difficulties may be especially severe, if as many have supposed, the FLs largely subserve rather general monitoring, planning and coordinating functions. The FLs have been implicated in many disorders and it seems likely that they play a role in most cognitive skills. Yet neuropsychological tests are sometimes remarkably insensitive to extensive FL damage (Eslinger & Damasio, 1985). 2.3 BRAIN DAMAGE AS A MANIPULATION OF THE SYSTEM: For the privilege of addressing the rich cognitive skills with which humans are endowed and the manner of their breakdown, the neuropsychologist has to pay a considerable price in terms of uncertainty about the nature and extent of the lesions resulting from accident or the unpredictable progress of the disease processes. By way of compensation, although brain damage cannot be systematically manipulated as an experimental variable, a powerful quasimanipulation can be achieved by selecting cases whose outcome has been the loss of a circumscribed process or skill; in contrast, laboratory manipulations applied to normal individuals merely result in performance that is slightly slower or less accurate. 2.4 For studies of disorders such as schizophrenia, the price is especially high, because neither aetiology nor pathoanatomy are known. Moreover, the variation across patients in surface clinical features and in any evidence of underlying pathology is so great as to suggest that treating schizophrenia as unitary at the diagnostic, pathoanatomical or cognitive-defect levels is futile. Although postulating subtypes has since the time of Kraepelin seemed a possible means of salvaging a disease concept, the traditional categories of schizophrenia such as "paranoid" have shown little validity, having neither cohesion at the level of clinical features nor coherence at an interpretative level. At least three mutually compatible explanations of this diffuseness of abnormalities suggest themselves: (i) heterogeneity within the schizophrenic population, (ii) plurality and diversity of abnormal features within the individual and (iii) the nonspecific nature of the schizophrenic cognitive defects. 2.5 METHODOLOGY AND HETEROGENEITY: The assumption that schizophrenia is aetiologically, neuropathologically or functionally unitary is difficult to maintain in face of its extreme heterogeneity. The problems with generalizing about a heterogeneous group can be reduced by adopting a symptomatological rather than nosological approach to the selection of patients and explicanda. In Frith's (1992) carefully pondered version of this approach, nosological categories are only used to control comparisons. For example, the appropriate method for investigating any role of DLPC hypoactivity (PET) in abnormal saccadic distractibility would consist in comparing schizophrenia groups who did and did not exhibit this abnormality. In contrast, the single case-study approach currently favoured in cognitive neuropsychology simply begs the question of how to achieve generalizability, in circumstances of extreme heterogeneity (e.g., Caramazza, 1988). 2.6 Just as the heterogeneity across patients within the same nosological category makes doubtful the notion of a unitary disease (Andreasen & Olsen, 1982), the diversity of abnormalities found in the typical patient obliges us to reconsider the intuition that a particular mental illness must be susceptible to a parsimonious account at a functional level. We need to estimate the amount of explanatory parsimony that might be achievable by postulating particular cognitive defects, each subsuming several surface features. This requires, in turn, assessment of the tendency of signs and symptoms to co-occur (cohesion) and the susceptibility of each cluster to a single-mechanism account (coherence). It is possible that performance is impaired on a broad range of tests, however, because the cognitive processes that are defective are not those relying on specific processors but rather the pervasive, nonspecific processes that coordinate and monitor the activity of other processors. 3.0 ON THE INTERPRETATION OF ABBRUZZESE ET AL.'S SPECIFIC RESULTS 3.1 Abbruzzese et al.'s main objective is to obtain a more differentiated view of frontal lobe function. To this end, the selection of schizophrenia for positive symptoms (paranoid schizophrenia) seems ill-advised, for the features that have been shown to be associated with frontal dysfunction are negative features such as apathy or features with ambiguous polarity such as distractibility (see Frith, 1992) 3.2 Abbruzzese et al. attempt to use schizophrenic vs obsessive- compulsive group differences in test scores to infer a double dissociation between lesion sites. However, to establish such a dissociation, several preconditions would have to satisfied. The demonstration would be suspect if either group showed equal abnormality in tests that purport to be sensitive to dysfunction in other brain regions. Moreover, it would also need to be established that patients with lesions restricted to nonfrontal regions perform normally on these tests. Contrary evidence abounds. The WCST is sensitive to temporal lobe dysfunction. Performance of VFT induces activity in widely distributed brain regions (PET studies) and is sensitive to a particularly broad range of disorders. The lack of any such control measures in Abbruzzese et al. reveals a general failure to design for falsifiability rather than corroboration. 3.3 Conferring the status of an anatomically decisive result on the WCST/OAT contrast is arbitrary. The performance of the schizophrenic patients was significantly worse than that of the controls on three of the tests and worse than the obsessive-compulsive patients only on the WST. Moreover, the fact that the two tests, set in opposition, both purport to yield measures of perseveration is a reminder of the cognitive opacity of such tests. The perseveration indices are as opaque as the undifferentiated error scores and it is necessary to consider the nature of the tasks and the types of error they allow to interpret particular patterns of stereotyped response (see Freedman, 1990). The frequency with which stereotyped responses occur and the form they take varies between different schizophrenic subgroups, between tasks, and between different ways of presenting a given tasks (Frith, 1992). 3.4. Whereas a true double dissociation would reflect a categorical distinction between processing operations recruited by either test, the obtained pattern of results is at least as likely to reflect variation in one of the pervasive nonspecific requirements of such tests. For example, perfect OAT performance can be obtained with a working memory load extending back a single trial. We suspect this is why it is impaired in schizophrenia. The WCST requires information accrual over a longer background period. At the extreme stands the VFT, which is saturated with working memory and strategic control factors, required for keeping track of output, avoiding response repetition, and locating fresh clusters whilst unpacking those already located. 4.0 CONCLUSION 4.1 This commentary has had two primary concerns: We have attempted to address the difficulties and possibilities of using cognitive tests to measure the underlying biological basis for mental disorders. In particular, we have argued that to understand and interpret test results in psychiatry appropriate models of cognitive brain operations on a process-analytic level rather than on a psychometric level are essential. We have also discussed particular results of Abbruzzese et al.'s study, pointing out alternative interpretations of their perseveration results and some preconditions for demonstrating a true double dissociation. Rather than proceeding from the assumption of a unitary disease entity, we prefer to view "schizophrenia" as heterogeneous in its neuropathological and cognitive processing substrates, reflected in Bleuler's term "the schizophrenias." REFERENCES Abbruzzese, M., Ferri, S., Bellodi, L., and Scarone, S. (1993) Frontal lobe dysfunction in mental illness. PSYCOLOQUY 4(9) frontal-cortex.1. Andreasen, N.C. and Olsen, S. (1982) Negative vs. positive schizophrenia. Archives of General Psychiatry 39, 789-794. Caramazza, A. (ed.) (1988) Methodological problems in cognitive neuropsychology (Special Issue) Cognitive Neuropsychology 5, 517-623 Eslinger, P.J. and Damasio, A.R. (1985) Severe disturbance of higher cognition after bilateral frontal lobe ablation: patient E.V.R. Neurology, Cleveland 35, 1731-1741. Freedman, M. (1990) Object alternation and orbitofrontal system dysfunction in Alzheimer's and Parkinson's disease. Brain and Cognition 14, 134-143 Frith, C.D. (1992) The Cognitive Neuropsychology of Schizophrenia. Hove: Erlbaum. 12-Apr-93 20:27:14-GMT,23258;000000000001 Received: from rutvm1.rutgers.edu by aramis.rutgers.edu (5.59/SMI4.0/RU1.5/3.08) id AA20756; Mon, 12 Apr 93 16:27:12 EDT Message-Id: <9304122027.AA20756@aramis.rutgers.edu> Received: from RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (IBM VM SMTP R1.2.1MX) with BSMTP id 7965; Mon, 12 Apr 93 16:25:55 EDT Received: from RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (NJE origin LISTSERV@RUTVM1) by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (LMail V1.1d/1.7f) with BSMTP id 6437; Mon, 12 Apr 1993 16:25:55 -0400 Date: Mon, 12 Apr 1993 16:25:33 -0400 Reply-To: psyc@pucc.bitnet Sender: "PSYCOLOQUY: Refereed Electronic Journal of Peer Discussion" From: Stevan Harnad Subject: psycoloquy.93.4.33.frame-problem.10.fetzer (402 lines) Comments: To: psyc@pucc.bitnet To: Multiple recipients of list PSYC psycoloquy.93.4.33.frame-problem.10.fetzer Monday 12 April 1993 ISSN 1055-0143 (24 paragraphs, 22 references, 395 lines) PSYCOLOQUY is sponsored by the American Psychological Association (APA) Copyright 1993 James H. Fetzer PHILOSOPHY UNFRAMED Reply to Van Brakel, Grush, and Morris on the Frame Problem James H. Fetzer Department of Philosophy University of Minnesota Duluth, MN 55812 jfetzer@ub.d.umn.edu 1.0 Van Brakel (1993), Grush (1993), and Morris (1993) dispute the analysis of the frame problem which is advanced in Fetzer (1991a) and (1991b). There I suggest that the frame problem can best be understood as a special case of the problem of induction, a problem that has preoccupied philosophers at least since the time of David Hume. My reason for thinking so stems from the realization that the frame problem concerns our prospects for successful predictions about the future on the basis of our past experience. Of course, there are other aspects to the frame problem, including dimensions of representation and of implementation, which I acknowledge, but at rock bottom there is a profound similarity which (in my view, at least) justifies viewing the frame problem as "a special case" of the problem of induction. 2.0 Somewhat to my surprise, this suggestion of mine, which I considered to be sufficiently well-founded as to be almost beyond serious debate, provoked a negative response, first from the editors who were reviewing the proceedings of the Pensacola Conference for possible inclusion in a book -- I have in mind Patrick Hayes especially, but also another referee, who has remained anonymous, a disagreement mediated by Ken Ford that culminated in the publication of the exchange between us -- and now van Brakel and Grush, both of whom reply to my prior remarks on van Brakel, and Morris, who like Hayes, presumes that the frame problem is a matter of representation. What I would like to do here, therefore, is to explain the reasons why the frame problem may be viewed as a special case of the problem of induction and to respond to the criticism of these commentators. 3.0 Let us assume that at least three interrelated issues are involved here; these might be thought of as the problem of change, the problem of representation, and the problem of implementation, respectively. The problem of implementation can be solved if a suitable representation can be designed and implemented in the form of a computer program. If there were no suitable representation to implement in the form of a computer program, however, it would be impossible to solve the problem of implementation. Similarly, the problem of representation can be solved if there is a suitable language (or representation scheme) for representing solutions to the problem of change. If there were no suitable solution to the problem of change, however, then (even given a representation scheme) there would be nothing to represent. 4.0 A much simpler response to van Brakel (1992), therefore, might have been to observe (as Hadley [1988], among others, has previously observed) that while some computer scientists, such as Patrick Hayes, want a narrow, technical definition of the frame problem, philosophers tend to "include any problem whose solution is PRESUPPOSED by a solution to the narrow problem" within its scope (Hadley 1988, p. 34; original emphasis). Thus, if the problem of implementation cannot be solved without solving the problem of representation, and if the problem of representation cannot be solved without solving the problem of change, then (as I see it) the frame problem has three dimensions in the absence of solutions to which it cannot be solved, where the most basic of the three (from a logical point of view) turns out to be the problem of change. 5.0 In retrospect, I now believe that 4.0 above is most of what I wanted to say about van Brakel (1992) and that I came across as excessively provocative in Fetzer (1993a). The electronic media have their distinctive strengths and weaknesses, as I observed in Fetzer (1992a), and I appear to have succumbed to the temptation to say what I had to say more forcefully than I ought to have said it. Nevertheless, while I concede to excesses in the form of my presentation, I maintain the content of my position. If there is a "family of frame problems" that van Brakel (1992) identifies with [A] "Which things change and which don't?", [B] "How can (solutions to) [A] be represented?", and [C] "How can/do we reason about [A]?", this "family" seems to be close enough to my "dimensions" for me to again affirm in 4.0 the views of Fetzer (l993a). 6.0 Yet the position advanced by Hayes (1991), for example, might possibly be based on the perception that the problem of representation can be solved if we can design a suitable language (or representation scheme) for representing solutions to the problem of change, whether or not the problem of change itself is amenable to solution. A distinction of this kind, I suppose, would enable Hayes to contend that the problem of induction -- which I take to be the genus (or general problem) of which the problem of change is a species (special case) -- is "logically irrelevant" to the frame problem, when it is strictly defined as a problem of representation in this fashion. This might make sense of Hayes (1991), but it appears to be a "Pickwickian" pose to adopt if there is no solution to the problem of change to represent. 7.0 I do not take van Brakel to be assuming a "Pickwickian" stance, and he does acknowledge that the problem of induction has some relevance here. He seems to think that by describing his [A], [B], and [C] as "three dimensions" of the frame problem, I am thereby committing a mistake, but apparently because NOTHING, including the frame problem, can be precisely defined (van Brakel 1993). Insofar as I am maintaining that the frame problem is SUBSUMED by the problem of induction, he suggests, I have misrepresented their relations, because they are more loosely connected. I would grant that the frame problem cannot be COMPLETELY subsumed by the problem of induction, because it has the representational and implementational aspects that are not elements of the problem of induction, as that problem is traditionally understood. 8.0 The point of describing "the frame problem" as "a special case" of the problem of induction, therefore, was to emphasize that the frame problem cannot be solved without a solution to the problem of change, which is the DIMENSION of the frame problem that is "a special case" of the problem of induction (except when the frame problem is given the "Pickwickian" twist described in 6.0). To this extent, I do not want to contest van Brakel's denial that the problems are identical. But I do want to insist that a COMPLETE SOLUTION to the frame problem (except in its "Pickwickian" guise) presupposes an adequate solution to the problem of induction. Thus, a solution to the problem of induction is necessary (essential) to resolve the frame problem. 9.0 Nothing here, however, mitigates my skepticism about the possibility of complete descriptions for concrete events as features of the world's history. I take it that van Brakel and I agree on this matter, which Hempel (1965), especially, has patiently explained, but that we disagree on its significance. Thus, as Hempel emphasizes, we can never completely describe, much less completely explain the occurrence of any concrete event, which means that at best an event can only be explained as an event under a description or perhaps as an event of A SPECIFIC KIND (Hempel 1965, p. 233, for elaboration). I would readily acknowledge that, if the explanation of any event required an explanation for every property of that event, then explanation would be impossible, since it is impossible to even describe every property of any such occurrence. 10.0 At this juncture, we appear to part ways. Van Brakel construes me as thinking that the impossibility of complete descriptions can be overcome by appealing to "a panacea like relevance or salience." Insofar as I did not specifically contest this description in Fetzer (1993a), van Brakel infers that I agree that appeals to MAXIMAL SPECIFICITY and the like are "useless as a contribution to solving the frame problem. The problem is just pushed ahead" (van Brakel 1993, Sec. 4). Strictly speaking, of course, I do not think that anyone can "break out" of the problem of complete descriptions, which appears to be impossible. What I think is that explanations for events as events of specific kinds or under certain descriptions can be provided without having to solve the unsolvable problem van Brakel cites. 11.0 As for relevance as a "panacea," I view the notion of RELEVANCE as among the most basic of all concepts, but it is not therefore unambiguous. In fact, a number of different conceptions must be distinguished, which range from logical relevance to evidential relevance to explanatory relevance, and a subset of explanatory relevance conceptions that range from statistical to causal to nomic relevance. The notion underlying these conceptions of explanatory relevance, for example, is that a property F is explanatorily relevant to the occurrence of an outcome E when the presence or absence of F makes a difference to the occurrence of an outcome of that kind, where making this precise is one of the objectives of the theory of explanation as it has been pursued by Hempel (1965), Salmon (1971), (1984), and Fetzer (1981), (1993b). 12.0 The theory of explanation that I propose depends on a conception of laws of nature of which Hume would have disapproved. I maintain that a distinction ought to be drawn between "permanent" and "transient" properties, where permanent properties are contingent dispositions something cannot lose without also losing a corresponding reference property. Dispositions are envisioned, in turn, as single-case causal tendencies that may be of universal or of probabilistic strength. These conceptions provide an ontological foundation for fixing the truth conditions of logically contingent subjunctive conditionals. Lawlike sentences are true only if they are maximally specific and are empirically testable by attempts to establish that they are false. I have elaborated this account in some detail, most recently in Fetzer (1993b). 13.0 Van Brakel concedes the existence of laws of nature but believes they "cannot be applied to concrete events without the addition of unspecified ceteris paribus conditions." On this point, we are in substantial disagreement. There are several approaches toward understanding the nature of laws of nature and the structure of scientific theories, some of which bear similarities to the position that van Brakel endorses. It is my position that the success of empirical science in discovering laws of nature depends upon there being no more than a finite number of kinds of factors that make a difference to the occurrence of any specific event. When there are more than a finite number of factors or we cannot discover them, science cannot succeed. 14.0 If van Brakel would like to address the problem of the nature of laws of nature and the logic of scientific explanations, I would welcome a debate within a more appropriate forum. For present purposes, however, it would probably be more suitable for me to address briefly the questions he poses about necessary and sufficient conditions for events and concepts. There are various positions like van Brakel's, some related to Wittgenstein, that hold that necessary and sufficient conditions are never available for causes (because there are infinitely many factors that influence the occurrence of an event, because ceteris paribus conditions are always required, and so forth) or for concepts (because their meaning is to be found in their use, because they are only [at most] connected by family resemblance relations, and so on). 15.0 Van Brakel claims that I appeal to "some worn out positivistic ideas if the 1930s," but I do not imagine that he has much familiarity at all with my views on the problem of meaning (Fetzer 1990, esp. Part I, 1991c, 1991d, 1991e or 1992b, for example). As for necessary and sufficient conditions in the case of concepts, I presume that nominal definitions, meaning analyses, and empirical analyses are amenable to being understood in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, as those are ordinarily understood, but that ostensive definitions, explications, and contextual definitions are not. Insofar as the situation with respect to events is closely related to Hayes's position, I shall consider this next. But I would concede that the matter of meaning is vastly more complex than was implied by my recent comments on van Brakel. 16.0 Hayes wants to maintain a distinction between "common sense" and "scientific knowledge" where the frame problem is a problem for common sense that does not require scientific knowledge. If a strong distinction were drawn between "common sense" and "scientific knowledge," the frame problem could be be said to be the common-sense version of the problem of induction and that would still be distinct, which would trivially distinguish between them. I maintain that the existence of "common sense" should not be taken for granted (Fetzer 1990, pp. 141-145), though I am less skeptical that there is something called "ordinary knowledge" that differs from scientific knowledge more in degree than in kind (Fetzer 1981, pp. xii-xiii). Here I simply want to advance some examples that seem to illustrate some differences which are at stake here: 18.0 It appears to be a matter of common sense to suppose that someone who is stabbed through the heart will die. Yet there are conditions under which people is stabbed through the heart will not die, for example, when they are connected to a heart-lung machine while undergoing heart surgery. It also appears to be a matter of common sense to suppose that all people who take a large dose of a potent poison will probably kill themselves and that people who take twice as much will almost certainly kill themselves. Yet if one were to take a large dose of an alkaline poison and another large dose of an acidic poison, one would actually reduce rather than increase the probability that of killing oneself. Other cases are not difficult to generate by including or by excluding various causally relevant conditions. 19.0 It might be "common sense" to infer that one will die if stabbed through the heart, but that is by no means always the case. And it might be "common sense" to think that those who take twice as much poison will increase their chances of killing themselves, but that is not necessarily what happens. If we happen to be surgeons, we may draw inferences that nonsurgeons would not draw. And if we happen to be chemists, we may draw other inferences that nonchemists might not draw. What qualifies as "common sense" can clearly differ from person to person and from time to time as a function of factors such as age, education, and general experiences in life. There is no specific set of beliefs that qualifies as "common sense" that is common to the old and the young, the educated and the ignorant, rich and poor alike. 20.0 If we are considering an appeal to "common sense" as a foundation for solving the frame problem, we have to ask, "Common sense for whom?" As soon as we recognize that the presence or the absence of causally relevant factors makes a difference in each specific case, we ought to consider the prospect of discovering the complete range of relevant factors in the kind of cases that make a difference to us. If empirical science is an attempt systematically to discover complete sets of relevant conditions that make a difference in various domains (such as physics, chemistry, biology, and so forth) then it should be obvious that scientific knowledge might provide a more reliable foundation for anticipating the course of experience than the highly variable and incomplete knowledge that passes for "common sense" can possibly provide. 21.0 The example of a match's lighting when it is struck in the presence of oxygen, provided that it is not wet, is of appropriate chemical composition, and struck with suitable force, was intended as an illustration of contingently necessary and sufficient conditions, where those conditions are individually necessary and jointly sufficient in the case of specific events (tokens) as instances of laws. Other illustrations are at hand of conditions that are individually necessary or jointly sufficient in the case of generic events (types) as instances of other laws. Animal life, for example, cannot endure without food and water, which are necessary to those forms of life. And for any system (including human beings) that wants to lose weight (or mass), it is sufficient for that system to expend more energy than it consumes. 22.0 Appeals to "common sense" may make no difference when the consequences of making mistakes are not severe. But when the effects would make a difference in our quality of life or its continuance (whether in an individual case or in relation to the species), the risks of relying upon "common sense" appear to outweigh the benefits. Scientific knowledge, after all, promises to provide knowledge of the kind that is required to enhance our prospects of success. In my response to Hayes (1991), I accordingly provided a diagram representing the relative preferability of programs based on scientific knowledge as opposed to those based upon expert opinion as opposed to those based on "common sense" (Fetzer 1991b). (Please note, however, that as published in Ford and Hayes, eds. (1991), Figures 1 and 2 are reversed.) 23.0 When Grush (1993) suggests that there may be "less disagreement between van Brakel and Fetzer than Fetzer makes out, at least on these issues," I am accordingly prepared to agree with him. I believe I was overly confrontational and consequently exaggerated some differences between us. Other differences remain, however, especially concerning the nature of laws, the requirement of maximal specificity, and the conditions that definitions must satisfy. Morris (1993), of course, provides a review of the entire book, including a commentary on my exchange with Hayes. In his view, my response to Hayes does little more than restate the main themes of my original piece. I think that Morris has not appreciated what I have said there, but one hopes that he will find something of substance that merits further consideration here. [Minor technical point: in Sec. 4.8, Morris mistakenly claims that inferences involving "closed systems" (which satisfy maximally specific descriptions) are "deductively valid," but that is the case only when the laws of systems of those kinds happen to be universal rather than probabilistic.] 24.0 Those who persist in maintaining that the frame problem is exclusively a problem of representation (or a problem of implementation), therefore, appear to miss the point, namely, that without a solution to the problem of change, even the availability of a representation scheme serves no suitable purpose, because there is no solution to the problem of change to represent. And those who persist in maintaining that the frame problem is one of "common sense" rather than one of scientific knowledge need to understand that changes in the world come about as a causal consequence of the operation of natural laws, which are the objects of scientific discovery. Surely no useful purpose can be served by restricting attention to "common sense" when the resources that it provides are not adequate to the problem. REFERENCES Fetzer, J. H. (1981) Scientific Knowledge: Causation, Explanation, and Corroboration (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: D. Reidel, 1981). Fetzer, J. H. (1990) Artificial Intelligence: Its Scope and Limits (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990). Fetzer, J. H. (1991a) The Frame Problem: Artificial Intelligence Meets David Hume. In: Ford and Hayes (1991). Fetzer, J. H. (1991b) Artificial Intelligence Meets David Hume: A Response to Pat Hayes. In: Ford and Hayes(1991). Fetzer, J. H. (1991c) Philosophy and Cognitive Science (New York, NY: Paragon House Publishers, 1991). Fetzer, J. H. (1991d) Aspects of the Theory of Definition. In: Fetzer (1991f). Fetzer, J. H. (1991e) Primitive Concepts: Habits, Dispositions, and Laws. In: Fetzer (1991f). Fetzer, J. H., ed. (1991f) Definitions and Definability: Philosophical Perspectives (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991). Fetzer, J. H. (1992a) Editor's Preface. Minds and Machines 2 (1992) p. iii. Fetzer, J. H. (1992b) Connectionism and Cognition: Why Fodor and Pylyshyn are Wrong. In A. Clark and R. Lutz, eds., Connectionism in Context (Heidelberg, FRG: Springer-Verlag, 1992) pp. 37-56. Fetzer, J. H. (1993a) Van Brakel's Position Appears to be Incoherent. PSYCOLOQUY 4(14) frame-problem.4. Fetzer, J. H. (1993b) Philosophy of Science (New York, NY: Paragon House Publishers, 1993). Ford, K. and P. J. Hayes, eds. (1991) Reasoning Agents in a Dynamic World: The Frame Problem (Greenwich, CT: The JAI Press, 1991). Grush, R. (1993) Van Brakel's Position is Perfectly Coherent. PSYCOLOQUY 4(24) frame-problem.8. Hadley, R. (1988) Review of Z. Pylyshyn, ed., The Robot's Dilemma: The Frame Problem in Artificial Intelligence, Canadian Philosophical Reviews VIII (1988) pp. 33-36. Hayes, P. J. (1991) "Commentary on 'The Frame Problem: Artificial Intelligence Meets David Hume'", in Ford and Hayes, eds. (1991). Hempel, C. G. (1965) Aspects of Scientific Explanation (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1965). Morris, R. (1993) The Changing Scene. PSYCOLOQUY 4(25) frame-problem.9. Salmon, W. C. (1971) Statistical Explanation and Statistical Relevance (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971). Salmon, W. C. (1984) Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). Van Brakel, J. (1992) The Complete Description of the Frame Problem. PSYCOLOQUY 3(60) frame-problem.2. Van Brakel, J. (1993) Unjustified Coherence. PSYCOLOQUY 4(35) frame-problem.7. 14-Apr-93 20:38:51-GMT,13620;000000000001 Received: from rutvm1.rutgers.edu by aramis.rutgers.edu (5.59/SMI4.0/RU1.5/3.08) id AA27368; Wed, 14 Apr 93 16:38:49 EDT Message-Id: <9304142038.AA27368@aramis.rutgers.edu> Received: from RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (IBM VM SMTP R1.2.1MX) with BSMTP id 2195; Wed, 14 Apr 93 08:18:53 EDT Received: from RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (NJE origin LISTSERV@RUTVM1) by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (LMail V1.1d/1.7f) with BSMTP id 9194; Wed, 14 Apr 1993 08:18:52 -0400 Date: Tue, 13 Apr 1993 18:41:25 -0400 Reply-To: psyc@pucc.bitnet Sender: "PSYCOLOQUY: Refereed Electronic Journal of Peer Discussion" From: Stevan Harnad Subject: psycoloquy.93.4.34.frame-problem.11.harnad (238 lines) Comments: To: psyc@pucc.bitnet To: Multiple recipients of list PSYC psycoloquy.93.4.34.frame-problem.11.harnad Tuesday 13 April 1993 ISSN 1055-0143 (13 paragraphs, references, 231 lines) PSYCOLOQUY is sponsored by the American Psychological Association (APA) Copyright 1993 Stevan Harnad PROBLEMS, PROBLEMS: THE FRAME PROBLEM AS A SYMPTOM OF THE SYMBOL GROUNDING PROBLEM Commentary on Van Brakel and Fetzer on Ford & Hayes on the Frame Problem Stevan Harnad Laboratoire Cognition et Mouvement URA CNRS 1166 I.B.H.O.P. Universite d'Aix Marseille II 13388 Marseille cedex 13, France harnad@riluminy.univ-mrs.fr 33-91-66-00-69 1. In the ongoing discussion of the "frame problem" (McCarthy 1963; McCarthy & Hayes 1969; Hayes 1992) there has been a steady proliferation of problems and problem-names (in a way that is itself reminiscent of a frame problem!): 2. Van Brakel (1992, 1993) has listed a "family of frame problems," arising from the question of "[A] [w]hich things (facts, etc.) change and which don't?", "[w]hat are the necessary and sufficient conditions for an event[?]," "How can [A] be represented?", and "How can/do we reason about [A]?" (van Brakel 1992: 1.1). The family then includes "the persistence problem, temporal projection problem, inertia problem, qualification problem, ramification problem, extended prediction problem, installation problem, planning problem, holism problem, relevance problem, and so on" (1.2). These in turn are "more or less closely related to "the general problem of stating `laws of motion' which adequately describe the world" [Ford & Hayes 1991 (F&H): p. x]; the prediction problem [Tenenberg's chapter in F&H: p. 232]; the induction problem [Fetzer in F&H: p. 55]; "the general problem of default reasoning" [Perlis: F&H p. 190]; "the larger, and uglier, counterfactual validity problem" [Stein: F&H p. 225]; the "Frame Problem" for natural language understanding, learning, and analogical reasoning [Nutter: F&H p. 177]; and other problems." (1.4) 3. Hayes & Ford (1993: 2.4) go on to raise the ante still further with "the inference problem... [and] the perception problem or the updating problem" (and they could also have tossed in the the credit assignment problem and the variable binding problem). They see many of these problems as distinct. Van Brakel (1992: 2.2) instead suggests that "[t]he frame problem is a special case of the problem of complete description" [emphasis deleted] and Fetzer (1993a, b), that it is a special case of the "problem of induction." 4. So there seem to be both ecumenical and hegemonic sentiments in the air. For my part, I'd like to cast my vote for another unitary candidate (if only in the hope of keeping problem numbers tractable), one that might likewise subsume many of the rest as special cases. It too has already been cited in this discussion, but I don't think it was characterized quite accurately: "[H]ow can we ever attach `formal' symbols to the actual world? This is what Harnad (1990) calls the `symbol grounding problem'" (Hayes & Ford 1993: 4.2). 5. The symbol grounding problem is not just the problem of attaching formal symbols to the world, for an UNGROUNDED symbol system (like English or geometry) will serve that purpose admirably well (as long as it has the right formal, syntactic properties). The way ungrounded symbol systems manage to serve such purposes, however, is in being so used by US. The symbols need not have any intrinsic meaning of their own; they need only be systematically interpretable by us as meaning what they mean, and then our own minds and actions can mediate the connection between the symbols and what they can be interpreted as being about. 6. This is perfectly fine as long as our goal is only to build systems that are useful to us, for our minds can then always bridge the gap; but if these systems are meant to be models of US -- i.e., of what's going on in our heads, unmediated by what's going on in anyone else's head -- then their symbols had better be GROUNDED directly in the real-world objects, events, and states of affairs that they are otherwise merely systematically interpretable (by us) as being about. 7. An ungrounded symbol system is essentially like a book (whether the book is static, on paper pages, or dynamic, as in, say, a computerized dictionary or encyclopedia). It's obvious that a sentence in a book does not mean something in the sense that a thought in my head does. The sentences in a book (and all their systematic inter-relations -- with other sentences in the book, with the language as a whole, and with the truths and fictions about the real world) are merely strings of arbitrary formal tokens that are systematically INTERPRETABLE as being what they are about -- interpretable by thinkers like you and me, whose thoughts, on pain of infinite regress, cannot themselves be merely strings of arbitrary formal tokens that are systematically interpretable... etc. That is the symbol grounding problem: The connection between the symbols in a symbol system and what they are interpretable as being ABOUT must be grounded in something other than just the mediation of outside interpreters if they are to be candidates for what is going on in our heads when we think. 8. My own candidate solution happens to be to try to ground a system's internal symbols in its robotic capacity to discriminate, manipulate, categorize, name, describe, and discourse coherently about the objects, events and states of affairs that its symbols are systematically interpretable as being about (at a human scale, indistinguishable from the way we do it). In short, symbolic capacities are to be grounded in robotic capacities. An ungrounded symbol system has only one set of constraints: purely formal, syntactic ones, operating rulefully on the arbitrary shapes of the symbol tokens. A grounded symbol system would have a second set constraints, bottom-up ones, causally influencing its internal symbols and symbol combinations, constraints from the internal, nonsymbolic machinery underlying its robotic capacities, especially categorization (Harnad 1987, 1992; Harnad et al. 1991), which is what would allow the system to pick out what its symbols are about without the mediation of external interpretation. 9. Now what has all this to do with the frame problem? Formal systems do very well in the world of formal, Platonic objects: An axiomatic system can successfully "second-guess" all the truths of arithmetic (I hope no one will cite Goedelian limits on provability as instances of the frame problem!). Natural language seems to do almost equally well with the world of real objects, events and states (especially since mathematics and physics are subsets of natural language). In both cases, however, it is clear that the symbol systems do not "speak for themselves" (except perhaps for the mathematical formalist who claims that the only object he is interested in is the uninterpreted formal system itself): They are USED by us according to an interpretation that we HAVE IN MIND, which itself is connected to what it is about through our bodies (in particular, through our sensorimotor systems). There is no well-formed sentence in natural language (including "colorless green ideas sleep furiously") that we cannot "gloss," as long as all its terms are grounded in thoughts that are about what the words are about. 10. What is a typical instance of the frame problem then? First, it invariably involves an ungrounded symbol system onto which we have hitherto successfully projected a systematic interpretation: we may have attributed to it, for example, an understanding of a situation, because it encodes sentences that are interpretable as our own knowledge about the situation and it draws inferences, makes predictions and performs operations on the situation that again square systematically with our own. The frame problem arises when something goes radically wrong: when the system does something that does not square with our interpretations -- and not just in a minor way that can be remedied by adding another piece of knowledge, just as we would remedy any gap in our own knowledge, but a major incoherence, something that destabilizes our entire systematic interpretation. One often repeated example is that the system, which seems to "know" so much about what's going on in a room, may, to our surprise, behave as if it "believed" that everything in the room ceases to exist when one leaves the room, a circumstance with which it does not happen to have been challenged before, when we were confirming its conformity with our systematic interpretations. 11. The problem is described as calling for a means of framing what is and is not altered by a change, but it is clear that the "change" is not especially one that is caused by an "action," like leaving the room, but, in principle, by any new data. At any point, a symbol system has only dealt with a small amount of data (relative to human scale performance). That's why such systems are often called "toy" systems. Toy performance, relative to human-scale performance, is highly UNDERdetermined (just as a specific billiard shot is underdetermined relative to all possible two-body interactions: many theoretical interpretations of that shot are possible, but much fewer are possible for the set of all physically possible two-body interactions). Yet in projecting a systematic (usually natural-language) interpretation onto such a toy, one is at the same time OVERinterpreting it (typically overinterpreting it mentalistically, in terms of what it "know," "thinks," "means"). And, in my view, a "frame" problem arises every time we run up against evidence that we have exceeded the limits of that underdetermined toy; evidence that we are overinterpreting it -- and have been all along. 12. The optimistic solution to "scaling up" is that more and more of the same -- more and more ungrounded sentences, pushing the frame's limits wider and wider -- will eventually shrink the remaining "frame problems" to only those that we, the interpreters, are also prone to. So we will either not notice them or cease to regard them as evidence that there is something wrong with this kind of model in the first place. 13. I am more pessimistic. I think the reason the frame problem keeps rearing its head is because there is something intrinsically wrong with an ungrounded symbolic approach to modeling the mind (if not to building useful tools for systems with minds). I do not think knowledge can be "framed" with symbols alone, be they ever so encyclopedic. I think nothing less than the real world of objects, events and states of affairs that the symbols aspire to be about is needed, not to "frame" the symbols, but to ground them -- in the robotic capacities that we life-size human beings so clearly have. REFERENCES Fetzer, J. H. (1993a) Van Brakel's Position Appears to be Incoherent. PSYCOLOQUY 4(14) frame-problem.4. Fetzer, J. H. (1993b) Philosophy Unframed. PSYCOLOQUY 4(33) frame-problem.10. Ford, K.M. & Hayes, P.J. (1991) Reasoning Agents in a Dynamic World: The Frame Problem, Greenwich: JAI Press. Harnad, S. (1987) The induction and representation of categories. In: Harnad, S. (ed.) Categorical Perception: The Groundwork of Cognition. New York: Cambridge University Press. Harnad, S. (1990) The Symbol Grounding Problem. Physica D 42: 335-346. Harnad, S. (1992) Connecting Object to Symbol in Modeling Cognition. In: A. Clarke and R. Lutz (Eds) Connectionism in Context Springer Verlag. Harnad, S., Hanson, S.J. & Lubin, J. (1991) Categorical Perception and the Evolution of Supervised Learning in Neural Nets. In: Working Papers of the AAAI Spring Symposium on Machine Learning of Natural Language and Ontology (DW Powers & L Reeker, Eds.) pp. 65-74. Presented at Symposium on Symbol Grounding: Problems and Practice, Stanford University, March 1991. Hayes, P.J. (1992) Summary of "Reasoning Agents in a Dynamic World: The Frame Problem" (Ford & Hayes 1991, Eds.) PSYCOLOQUY 3(59) frame-problem.1. Hayes, P.J. and Ford, K.M. (1993) Effective Descriptions Need Not Be Complete. PSYCOLOQUY 4(21) frame-problem.5. McCarthy, J (1963) Situations, Actions and Causal Laws. Stanford Artificial Intelligence Project, Memo 2. McCarthy, J and Hayes, P (1969) Some philosophical problems from the standpoint of Artificial Intelligence. In B. Meltzer & D. Michie (eds) Machine Intelligence 4. Elsevier. van Brakel, J. (1992) The Complete Description of the Frame Problem. PSYCOLOQUY 3(60) frame-problem.2. van Brakel, J. (1993) Unjustified Coherence. PSYCOLOQUY 4(23) frame-problem.7. 17-Apr-93 7:58:54-GMT,20501;000000000001 Received: from rutvm1.rutgers.edu by aramis.rutgers.edu (5.59/SMI4.0/RU1.5/3.08) id AA12219; Sat, 17 Apr 93 03:58:51 EDT Message-Id: <9304170758.AA12219@aramis.rutgers.edu> Received: from RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (IBM VM SMTP R1.2.1MX) with BSMTP id 9770; Fri, 16 Apr 93 17:20:25 EDT Received: from RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (NJE origin LISTSERV@RUTVM1) by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (LMail V1.1d/1.7f) with BSMTP id 8980; Fri, 16 Apr 1993 17:20:23 -0400 Date: Fri, 16 Apr 1993 17:20:04 -0400 Reply-To: psyc@pucc.bitnet Sender: "PSYCOLOQUY: Refereed Electronic Journal of Peer Discussion" From: Stevan Harnad Subject: PSYCOLOQUY Newsletter Section (Part 1: Announcements: 471 lines) Comments: To: psyc@pucc.bitnet To: Multiple recipients of list PSYC PSYCOLOQUY ISSN 1055-0143 Fri Apr 16 93 Newsletter Section (1) Announcement: Complete Program for TENNET IV Now Available (2) Announcement: Workshop on perspectives of imaging in psychiatry (3) Announcement: Concepts Conference, University of Maryland (4) Announcement: Book series on consciousness research (5) Announcement: Internat Summer Institute In Cognitive Science (6) Announcement: CFP: Journal of Statistics Education (7) Announcement: Conference on Evolution and the Human Sciences (8) Announcement: Internat Conference On "The Family" (9) Announcement: Internat Symposium on Organizational Development (10) Announcement: Call for Papers (NIPS*93) (11) Announcement: Ukrainian conference ---------------------------------------------------------------------- From: Whit Subject: (1) Announcement: Complete Program for TENNET IV Now Available The complete program for TENNET IV, May 12-14, 1993, in Montreal, is now available on E-mail. To receive a copy, send a request to: R12040@UQAM.BITNET If you would also like registration and hotel information, please request that file as well. Harry Whitaker ------------------------------ From: Silvio Scarone Subject: (2) Announcement: Workshop on perspectives of imaging in psychiatry A workshop on the usefulness and perspectives of brain imaging in psychiatry will be held at H S Raffaele in Milan next 1st and 2nd of April, sponsorized by the Janssen European Medical Foundation. Whoever is interested in obtaining the Proceeding of the workshop please contact Dr. Cristina Colombo at our email address. ------------------------------ From: rey@umiacs.UMD.EDU (Georges Rey) Subject: (3) Announcement: Concepts Conference, University of Maryland University of Maryland at College Park The Dept. of Philosophy in conjunction with the Committee on Cognitive Studies will present a D.C. Williams Fund conference on CONCEPTS WHO NEEDS THEM? an interdisiplinary discussion of the roles that concepts are required to play in the cognitive sciences. What laws, generalizations or explanations require them? Are they the same things in all cases? Are they really needed at all? visiting participants: Ned Block (linguistics and philosophy, MIT) Paul Bloom (psychology, University of Arizona) Martin Davies (philosophy, Oxford) Leila Gleitman (psychology, University of Pennsylvania) Jane Grimshaw (linguistics, Rutgers) Eric Lormand (philosophy, University of Michigan) Kenneth Taylor (philosopy, Rutgers) with College Park faculty: Michael Devitt (philosophy), John Horty (philosophy), Georges Rey (philosophy), Ellin Scholnick (psychology) Amy Weinberg (linguistics) Friday evening - Sunday afternoon 9-11 April 1993 University College (University & Adelphi Blvds) University of Maryland at College Park accomodations available; for further information, contact: Georges Rey, philosophy, UMCP, College Park, MD 20742 (301)-405-5707; email: rey@umiacs.umd.edu ------------------------------ From: M Stamenov Subject: (4) Announcement: Book series on consciousness research Recently an interdisciplinary Series of books "Advances in Consciousness Research" was established with the academic Publisher "John Benjamins" (Amsterdam & Philadelphia). The orientation of the Series is to provide a forum for scholars from different scientific disciplines and fields of knowledge to create and work within a coherent context for the study of the topic of consciousness in its multifaceted aspects. Basic to the orientation of the Series will be the problems associated with psychology of consciousness, linguistics, cognitive psychology and cognitive science, psychology of personality and psychology of human development, psychotherapy, psychopathology and psychiatry, neuroscience and neurophysiology, sociology of personality, cognitive and cultural anthropology, as well as the philosophical implications of the study and role of consciousness. More information about the Series and the possibilities to contribute to it could be received from the Editors: Maxim I. Stamenov The Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities The University of Edinburgh Hope Park Square Edinburgh EH8 9NW SCOTLAND E-mail: maxstam@castle.ed.ac.uk Gordon G. Globus Department of Psychiatry and HUman Behavior Medical Center University of California, Irvine 101 City Drive South Orange, CA 92668 U.S.A. Office tel.: (714) 456-7642 E-mail: gglobus@orion.oac.uci.edu ------------------------------ From: cogsci94@cs.Buffalo.EDU (SUNY Buffalo/Center for Cognitive Science) Subject: (5) Announcement: Internat Summer Institute In Cognitive Science SECOND ANNOUNCEMENT State University of New York at Buffalo CENTER FOR COGNITIVE SCIENCE announces the FIRST INTERNATIONAL SUMMER INSTITUTE IN COGNITIVE SCIENCE: Multidisciplinary Foundations of Cognitive Science to be held at the Amherst Campus of SUNY Buffalo, Buffalo, NY, USA JULY 5-30, 1994 Robert Van Valin & Barry Smith, Institute Co-Directors Leonard Talmy, Director of the Center for Cognitive Science Detailed information on the Institute, including course offerings, speaker series, workshops, fees, living accommodations, and scholarship and travel support for students, will be available in summer 1993. If you wish to receive the Institute brochure, please send your name and *postal* address (and e-mail address, if available) to either: Bitnet: cogsci94@ubvms Internet: cogsci94@ubvms.cc.buffalo.edu or 1994 Cognitive Science Summer Institute Center for Cognitive Science 652 Baldy Hall SUNY Buffalo Buffalo, NY 14260 USA (716) 645-3794 (716) 645-3825 (fax) ------------------------------ From: dietz@stat.ncsu.edu (Jackie Dietz) Subject: (6) Announcement: CFP: Journal of Statistics Education Call for Papers -- The Journal of Statistics Education The Journal of Statistics Education (JSE) is a new electronic journal on postsecondary statistics education. (See the December Amstat News, pages 31-32, for more information.) JSE will publish high-quality articles on a variety of topics related to the teaching of statistics, for instance, results of controlled experiments on pedagogical methods, case studies and anecdotal reports, review and opinion articles, discussion of the impact of new technologies and new methods of assessment on statistics education. The journal will also publish reviews of software, books, and teaching materials; reviews should be descriptions of an instructor's experiences actually using a particular book or piece of software with students. Articles which make innovative use of the electronic medium are encouraged. Articles submitted to the journal will be reviewed by three referees. Submission of manuscripts via e-mail is preferred, but materials on diskette or paper can be accommodated. The electronic format of the journal requires that articles follow certain formatting conventions; consult the Guidelines for Authors before submitting materials to JSE. The Guidelines for Authors may be obtained by sending e-mail to archive@jse.stat.ncsu.edu with the one-line message (no subject is needed): send jse/author.guide Guidelines may also be obtained by writing to E. Jacquelin Dietz, Department of Statistics, Box 8203, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC 27695-8203. E. Jacquelin Dietz, Editor, JSE ------------------------------ From: CRONIN@VAX.LSE.AC.UK Subject: (7) Announcement: Conference on Evolution and the Human Sciences LSE Centre for the Philosophy of the Natural and Social Sciences CONFERENCE ON 'EVOLUTION AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES' At the London School of Economics Thursday 24 -- Saturday 26 June 1993 Co-organisers: Helena Cronin and John Worrall CONFERENCE THEME: It is widely believed that the 'Darwinian revolution' transformed our whole view of ourselves and of our place in the universe. But, in fact, until recently the implications of Darwinian theory for humans have remained remarkably underexplored. This is partly because of the genuine problems facing Darwinian accounts of human behaviour; and partly because the enterprise has been tainted by an inglorious history, from the crude 'Social Darwinising' of the nineteenth century onwards. But over the past couple of decades, Darwinians have discovered rigorous and powerful principles of social behaviour, and have applied them successfully to a wide variety of animal species. Can this more sophisticated work lend insight into *human* behaviour -- without repeating the mistakes of earlier false starts? Recent studies -- in psychology, anthropology, economics, sociology and linguistics -- suggest that it can. This conference will bring together evolutionary biologists, social scientists, methodologists and philosophers of science to appraise the prospects for carrying through Darwin's unfinished revolution. TOPICS: Evolutionary roots of homicide, incest, sexuality, reasoning, language, consciousness, economics, medicine. FURTHER DETAILS: Pat Gardner, Centre for the Philosophy of the Natural and Social Sciences, LSE, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AEA, England Tel: 071-955 7341 Fax: 071-242 0392 Email: philcent@uk.ac.lse ------------------------------ From: RACHEL%ILNCRD@VMS.HUJI.AC.IL Subject: (8) Announcement: Internat Conference On "The Family" WE ARE PLEASED TO ANNOUNCE THAT THE MINISTRY OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY IS SPONSORING AN INTER-DISCIPLINARY CONFERENCE, ENTITLED "THE FAMILY ON THE THRESHOLD OF THE 21ST CENTURY: TRENDS & IMPLICATIONS." THE CONFERENCE WILL TAKE PLACE IN JERUSALEM, ISRAEL, FROM MAY 29 - JUNE 2, 1994 AND WILL FOCUS ON SEVERAL PERTINENT ISSUES TO CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LIFE, AMONG THEM: IMMIGRATION & THE FAMILY GENDER ISSUES IN THE CONTEMPORARY FAMILY CHANGES IN THE FAMILY LIFE-CYCLE STRESS IN THE CONTEMPORARY FAMILY FAMILY STYLES & PATTERNS IN THE ISRAELI FAMILY LAW/ECONOMIC FACTORS AFFECTING THE CONTEMPORARY FAMILY NINETEEN NINETY-FOUR HAS BEEN DESIGNATED BY THE UNITED NATIONS "THE YEAR OF THE FAMILY" AND THE CONFERENCE INTENDS TO DISCUSS VIA PLENARY SESSIONS, PANELS, WORKSHOPS AND POSTER DISPLAYS SALIENT ASPECTS OF FAMILY LIFE AS WE MOVE TO THE TURN OF THE CENTURY. UPON YOUR REQUEST, WE WILL BE HAPPY TO FORWARD MORE DETAILS ABOUT THE CON- FERENCE IN OUR FIRST ANNOUNCEMENT WHICH WE HOPE TO HAVE READY BY MAY-JUNE 1993.PLEASE SUBMIT YOUR NAME AND ADDRESS BY AIRMAIL TO DR. RACHEL LIPSKY, CONFERENCE COORDINATOR, MINISTRY OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY, P.O.B. 18195, 91181 JERUSALEM, ISRAEL, OR VIA BITNET TO RACHEL@ILNCRD. WE LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING FROM YOU. PROF. SOLLY DREMAN CONFERENCE CHAIRMAN & DIRECTOR OF THE CENTER FOR FAMILY LIFE RESEARCH & COUNSELING BEN-GURION UNIVERSITY OF THE NEGEV BEER-SHEVA, ISRAEL ------------------------------ From: Kalburgi Srinivas Subject: (9) Announcement: Internat Symposium on Organizational Development Invitation to participate in an international symposium and/or contribute to a book on Organizational Development: religio-philosophical and socio-cultural perspectives Symposium at the 23rd Congress of the International Association of Applied Psychology, Madrid, Spain, July 17- 22, 1994. And a book to follow later in 1994. The theme for the papers will be the change strategy of Organizational Development (or Action Research as it is sometimes called). The perspectives taken will be from the various "frameworks" prevalent in the "developing world." The frameworks may be religio-philosophical, socio- psychological, politico-social and such other. The objective of this critical-constructive focus is to move to a revision, reformulation, addition or alternative ideas for organizational renewal that facilitate national and regional "development" in the full sense of the term. The mental maps of a people are often identified as the blockages to development be it economic or social. But what if we started with the premise that a given framework is an opportunity rather than a hindrance? What approaches and techniques can we then identify that would take advantage of the particular framework? Thus the presentations at this proposed symposium will focus on OD whose techniques have often been regarded as lacking a "culture-fit" to contexts in the developing world. The view from the various "frameworks" will hopefully lead to the expansion of change theory and techniques for application of OD in the developing countries. Please contact: For Conference Info: Dr. Kalburgi Srinivas IAAP- 23rd Congress University of Regina College of Psychology Regina, Canada S4S 0A2 Cuesta San Vicente, 4 Tel: (306) 585-4717 Madrid 28008 FAX: (306) 585-4805 SPAIN Internet:srinivas@max.cc.uregina.ca FAX: 34-1-547-2284 Bitnet:srinivas@uregina1 Tel: 34-1-547-3097 ------------------------------ From: Bartlett Mel Subject: (10) Announcement: Call for Papers (NIPS*93) CALL FOR PAPERS Neural Information Processing Systems -Natural and Synthetic- Monday, November 29 - Thursday, December 2, 1993 Denver, Colorado This is the seventh meeting of an inter-disciplinary conference which brings together neuroscientists, engineers, computer scien- tists, cognitive scientists, physicists, and mathematicians in- terested in all aspects of neural processing and computation. There will be an afternoon of tutorial presentations (Nov 29) preceding the regular session and two days of focused workshops will follow at a nearby ski area (Dec 3-4). Submission Procedures: Original research contributions are soli- cited, and will be carefully refereed. Authors must submit six copies of both a 1000-word (or less) summary and six copies of a separate single-page 50-100 word abstract clearly stating their results postmarked by May 22, 1993 (express mail is not neces- sary). Accepted abstracts will be published in the conference program. Summaries are for program committee use only. At the bottom of each abstract page and on the first summary page indi- cate preference for oral or poster presentation and specify one of the above nine broad categories and, if appropriate, sub- categories (For example: Poster, Applications-Expert Systems; Oral, Implementation-Analog VLSI). Include addresses of all au- thors at the front of the summary and the abstract and indicate to which author correspondence should be addressed. Submissions will not be considered that lack category information, separate abstract sheets, the required six copies, author addresses, or are late. Mail Submissions To: Gerry Tesauro NIPS*93 Program Chair The Salk Institute, CNL 10010 North Torrey Pines Rd. La Jolla, CA 92037 Mail For Registration Material To: NIPS*93 Registration NIPS Foundation PO Box 60035 Pasadena, CA 91116-6035 ------------------------------ From: mcole@weber.ucsd.edu (Mike Cole) Subject: (11) Announcement: Ukrainian conference >Organization: Scientific Physical-Technological Center >From: deminick@sptcu.kharkov.ua (Demchenko Michael Nick.) >Date: Wed, 24 Mar 93 16:23:14 +0200 (EET) A LETTER OF NOTIFICATION In September, 1993, The kharkov State University (Ukraine) organizes International Psychologikal Reading devoted to the 60th anniversary of the Kharkov psychologikal school which laid a basis for psychologikal science in this country (L.S.Vygotsky, A.R.Luria, A.N.Leontyev etc.), and to the 90th anniversary of P.I.Zinchenco - the founder of the Department of psychology of the Kharkov University, an outstandding researcher of the problems of memory psychology. A range of problems covered by the Readings includes: 1. Hictory, Theory and Methodology of psychology (Methodology of modern psychology. L.S.Vygotsky and world psychology. Theory of activity. Memory and personality. History and traditions of the Kharkov psychological school). 2. Psychology and Society (Personality and modern world. Political psychology. Ethnopsichologi. Psychology of deviational behavior). 3. Psychology and Education (Humanistic Approaches in pedagogics and psychology. Psycholody of developing education. Psychological aspects of multi-stage education). 4. Psychology and Health (Psychology and Ecology. Pathopsychology. Neuropsychology. Defectology. Psychocorrection and Psychotherapy. Psychological aspects of sexology. Psychological problems of Narcology and Alkoholism.). 5. Applied psychology (Psychodiagnostics. Computer diagnostics. Counselling. Professional orientation. Marcet psychology). You are welcome at one of the largest higher education ectablishments of Ukraine - the Kharcov State University. Your participation should be confirmed up to April, 1. Please supply the subject of your report (paper). The main items of your paper should be submitted up to April, 25, to be published. Ucrainian, Russian and English are the working languages of the conference. Supplementary information will be provided as soon as your application for participation is accepted. Mailing address: Ukraine 310077 Kharcov sq.Svoboda, 4 Kharcov State University Psychology Department Organizationl Committee of Psychological Readings Phone: (0572) 45-71-53 Demchenko Michael Nick. | deminick%sptcu.kharkov.ua@relay.ussr.eu.net Kharkov State University | (0572) 37-91-04 ------------------------------ PSYCOLOQUY is sponsored by the Science Directorate and the Office of Publications and Communication of the American Psychological Association (202) 955-7653 Editors: (scientific discussion) (professional/clinical discussion) Stevan Harnad Cary Cherniss (Assoc Ed.) Psychology Department Graduate School of Applied Princeton University Professional Psychology Rutgers University Assistant Editor: Malcolm Bauer Psychology Department Princeton University End of PSYCOLOQUY Digest ****************************** 17-Apr-93 8:07:22-GMT,15181;000000000001 Received: from rutvm1.rutgers.edu by aramis.rutgers.edu (5.59/SMI4.0/RU1.5/3.08) id AA13799; Sat, 17 Apr 93 04:07:18 EDT Message-Id: <9304170807.AA13799@aramis.rutgers.edu> Received: from RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (IBM VM SMTP R1.2.1MX) with BSMTP id 9800; Fri, 16 Apr 93 17:28:56 EDT Received: from RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (NJE origin LISTSERV@RUTVM1) by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (LMail V1.1d/1.7f) with BSMTP id 9361; Fri, 16 Apr 1993 17:28:55 -0400 Date: Fri, 16 Apr 1993 17:28:39 -0400 Reply-To: psyc@pucc.bitnet Sender: "PSYCOLOQUY: Refereed Electronic Journal of Peer Discussion" From: Stevan Harnad Subject: PSYCOLOQUY Newsletter Section (Part 2: 327 lines) Comments: To: psyc@pucc.bitnet To: Multiple recipients of list PSYC PSYCOLOQUY ISSN 1055-0143 Fri Apr 16 93 Newsletter Section (1) Query: Humiliation in School Settings (2) Query: Impact of Lack of Privacy on Early Childhood Development (3) Employment: Professor of Psychology, Macquarie University, Australia (4) Query: Theory and Psychology (5) Employment: Visiting, Organizational Behavior and Theory, CMU (6) Employment: Tenure-track, Connectionist Modelling, McMaster U. (7) Employment: Clinical Psychology, University of Montana (8) Employment: Tenure-Track, Cognitive Science, University of Alberta (9) Announcement: New Discussion List: Psyche-D ---------------------------------------------------------------------- From: AGATTI@BRUSP.ANSP.BR Subject: (1) Query: Humiliation in School Settings Thank you every body. I asked this list information about humiliation in school settings (being humiliated because of low scores, for instance, for racism, etc. The role of humiliation regarding school achievement, etc ( it occurred to me just now the self image problem, etc). I received a lot a suggestions. Thank you again. If anyone else could tell me more about the subject, muito obrigado. Antonio ------------------------------ From: uu0600!turing!carley@uu5.psi.com Subject: (2) Query: Impact of Lack of Privacy on Early Childhood Development I am looking for anyone who is doing, has done, or is familiar with work on the following question: What is the impact on early childhood development of lack of privacy? For example, children sharing a room with their parents (or other primary care-giver). Work on children growing up in shelters, etc., may also be relevant. Please reply directly. Thanks. Regards, W. Brennan Carley, Vice President Director of Instinet Systems, Integration, and Support Instinet Corporation 757 Third Ave. New York, N.Y. 10017 voice: (212) 310-9568 fax: (212) 371-2067 carley@instinet.com ------------------------------ From: max@currawong.bhs.mq.edu.au (Max Coltheart) Subject: (3) Employment: Prof. of Psychology, Macquarie University, Australia PROFESSOR OF PSYCHOLOGY SCHOOL OF BEHAVIOURAL SCIENCES MACQUARIE UNIVERSITY SYDNEY NSW AUSTRALIA Applicants with interests in any area of psychology will be considered. The major areas of strength within the Discipline of Psychology are developmental, clinical and social psychology, personality, cognition, perception, neuropsychology, animal behaviour, and psychometrics. Initial enquiries may be directed to the Head of School, Professor John Collins (tel (02) 805 8030) or to the Head of the Psychology Discipline, Professor Max Coltheart (tel (02) 805 8086, email max@currawong.bhs.mq.edu.au). The salary for the post will be $77,900 per annum. Applications close 4 June 1993. ------------------------------ From: AGATTI@BRUSP.ANSP.BR Subject: (4) Query: Theory and Psychology I would like to get in touch with networks dealing specifically with philosophical issues, theoretical psychology, philosophy of science, etc. Could anyone help me? Merry...Oster ( sorry, I forgot it in English ) bonne P^aques, boa P'ascoa! Thank you Antonio PS I am developing a personnal theoretical point of view which I presented in several international congresses and published several articles in Brazilian philosophy and psychology journals. An article of mine will appear in Theory and Psychology ( "The identity of Theoretical Psychology" ), journal of the Intern'l Society for Theoretical Psychology, begining 1994. If anyone knows of an opportunity for me to exchange ideas, please let me know. ------------------------------ From: Mark Fichman Subject: (5) Employment: Visiting, Organizational Behavior and Theory, CMU Visiting Faculty Positions Available for September 1993. The Organizational Behavior and Theory group at Carnegie-Mellon's Graduate School of Industrial Administration is seeking two persons for visiting appointments at any level. Both positions require teaching experience in Organization Behavior or Organization Theory. The teaching is primarily in our Masters program, with some undergraduate teaching. The salary is competitive. The teaching load is the normal faculty load (3 semesters of teaching over the 9 month academic year) at Carnegie-Mellon University. Opportunities for research in the Graduate School and the University are available. Carnegie-Mellon University is an equal opportunity/affirmative action employer with particular interest in identifying women and minority applications for faculty positions. Candidates should send a curriculum vita, 3 papers, and have 3 letters of reference sent to: Mark Fichman Graduate School of Industrial Administration Carnegie-Mellon University Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890 Phone:412-268-3699 Fax:412-268-6837 e-mail: mf4f@andrew.cmu.edu ------------------------------ From: becker@cs.toronto.edu Subject: (6) Employment: Tenure-track, Connectionist Modelling, McMaster U. McMaster University Department of Psychology McMaster University invites applications for a tenure track position at the Assistant Professor rank starting July 1, 1994, in the Department of Psychology with associate status in the De partment of Computer Science and Systems. This position is sub- ject to final budgetary approval. Candidates' interest should be in artificial intelligence, specifically in empirical studies and connectionist modelling of language abilities or language acquisition in normal and brain- damaged individuals. Candidates must have expert modelling and computational skills and be prepared to teach in both computer science and psychology. In accordance with Canadian Immigration requirements, priority will be given to Canadian citizens and permanent resi- dents. McMaster University is committed to Employment Equity and encourages applications from all qualified candidates, including aboriginal people, people with disabilities, members of visible minorities, and women. Please forward applications, consisting of c.v., publica- tions list, a short statement of research interests, and arrange to have three letters of reference sent to the Chair, Department of Psychology, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, L8S 4K1, Canada. ------------------------------ From: py_das@selway.umt.edu (David A. Schuldberg) Subject: (7) Employment: Clinical Psychology, University of Montana JOB OPENING IN MONTANA: CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST, Ph.D., Department of Psychology. The University of Montana is searching for a visiting assistant professor for our APA-accredited doctoral program in clinical psychology to begin Fall, 1993. The position has the possibility of converting to tenure-track in the following year. Duties include: teaching graduate and undergraduate courses in psychology, conducting research and supervision of MA and doctoral research. We are particularly interested in a candidate with a strong commitment to the scientist-practitioner model. Preferred areas of clinical and research interests include (but are not limited to): 1) health psychology and 2) community psychology. Interested applicants should submit a vita, statement of clinical and research interests, all transcripts of graduate work, and three letters of reference to Christine Fiore, Ph.D., Personnel Committee Chair, Department of Psychology, University of Montana, Missoula, Montana 59812-1041. Tel: (406) 243-4521. Review of applications and the selection process will begin April 30, 1993, but applications will be accepted until the position is filled. The University of Montana is situated in a community of 70,000 located in a scenic Rocky Mountain valley. Noted for its high quality of life, Missoula offers a variety of cultural, recreational, and outdoor opportunities. The University of Montana is an Equal Opportunity, Affirmative Action Employer. Minorities and women are encouraged to apply. For information Please write or call Dr. Christine Fiore at the address above, or send e-mail (internet) to: Dr. David Schuldberg py_das@selway.umt.edu ------------------------------ From: mike@psych.ualberta.ca (Mike Dawson) Subject: (8) Employment: Tenure-Track, Cognitive Science, University of Alberta The University of Alberta, Department of Psychology, is seeking applications from candidates who can contribute to the further development of a leading program in Cognitive Science. Individuals will be hired into tenure-track positions at the Assistant Professor level, salary range $40,035 to $57,003. Appointments take effect July 1, 1994; PhD should be completed by that date. Special consideration will be given to candidates who have expertise both in basic research and in applied, problem-oriented areas. Candidates should have significant interdisciplinary interests; the individuals hired will have the potential to further develop links across existing areas in the Department, as well as with other Departments and the extramural research community. The Department of Psychology has members within both the Faculties of Arts and Science and has outstanding infrastructure for research. Decisions will be made on the basis of demonstrated research capability, teaching ability, and the potential for interactions with colleagues. We encourage applicants from the following five areas; we currently have vacancies to fill in four of these areas: (1) COGNITION AND AGING: Expertise in memory, language, or cognition as they relate to normal aging or to age-related pathologies. (2) COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE: Expertise in the relation between neural processes and cognitive processes such as memory, language, perception, attention, visual cognition and/or psychophysiology. (3) COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY: Expertise in any area of cognition. Individuals with broad interests in language processing and cognitive science, and research expertise in psycholinguistics, discourse processing, speech comprehension and production, word perception and/or reading will be given special consideration. (4) COGNITIVE MODELING: Expertise in the computational modeling of cognitive, perceptual, and/or neural processes. Individuals with the demonstrated ability to relate these models to empirical observations are especially encouraged to apply. (5) SOCIAL COGNITION: Experts in such areas as social judgment and decision- making, social memory, beliefs and attitudes, affect, motivation, social psychophysiology, and/or interpersonal relations are especially encouraged to apply. In accordance with Canadian Immigration requirements, priority will be given to Canadian citizens and permanent residents of Canada. Applicants should include a curriculum vitae, statement of research interests, three letters of recommendation, and reprints or recent publications. These materials should be sent to the Chair of the appropriate search committee (e.g., Chair, Cognition and Aging Search Committee), Department of Psychology, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, CANADA T6G 2E9. To receive full consideration, all materials must be received by October 15, 1993. The University of Alberta is committed to the principle of equity in employment. The University encourages applications from aboriginal persons, disabled persons, members of visible minorities, and women. Michael R.W. Dawson email: mike@psych.ualberta.ca Biological Computation Project, Department of Psychology University of Alberta, Edmonton, AB CANADA T6G 2E9 Tel: +1 403 492 5175 Fax: +1 403 492 1768 ------------------------------ From: X91007@phillip.edu.au Subject: (9) Announcement: New Discussion List: Psyche-D PSYCHE is a refereed electronic journal dedicated to supporting the interdisciplinary exploration of the nature of consciousness and its relation to the brain. PSYCHE publishes material relevant to that exploration from the perspectives afforded by the disciplines of Cognitive Science, Philosophy, Psychology, Neuroscience, Artificial Intelligence and Anthropology. Interdisciplinary discussions are particularly encouraged. A new discussion list PSYCHE-D has been created to aid people that are interested in the subject of consciousness. It is hoped that it will allow members to share ideas, do common research and so on. 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If you would like to have any further information regarding the electronic journal please contact the Executive Editor of PSYCHE: Patrick Wilken E-mail: x91007@phillip.edu.au For further information regarding PSYCHE-D, or if you have problems subscribing via LISTSERV, contact the moderator of PSYCHE-D: David Casacuberta E-mail: ILFF3@cc.uab.es ------------------------------ PSYCOLOQUY is sponsored by the Science Directorate and the Office of Publications and Communication of the American Psychological Association (202) 955-7653 Editors: (scientific discussion) (professional/clinical discussion) Stevan Harnad Cary Cherniss (Assoc Ed.) Psychology Department Graduate School of Applied Princeton University Professional Psychology Rutgers University Assistant Editor: Malcolm Bauer Psychology Department Princeton University End of PSYCOLOQUY Digest ****************************** 17-Apr-93 21:02:07-GMT,9651;000000000001 Received: from rutvm1.rutgers.edu by aramis.rutgers.edu (5.59/SMI4.0/RU1.5/3.08) id AA20778; Sat, 17 Apr 93 17:02:05 EDT Message-Id: <9304172102.AA20778@aramis.rutgers.edu> Received: from RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (IBM VM SMTP R1.2.1MX) with BSMTP id 1248; Sat, 17 Apr 93 17:00:50 EDT Received: from RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (NJE origin LISTSERV@RUTVM1) by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (LMail V1.1d/1.7f) with BSMTP id 6333; Sat, 17 Apr 1993 17:00:49 -0400 Date: Sat, 17 Apr 1993 17:00:38 -0400 Reply-To: psyc@pucc.bitnet Sender: "PSYCOLOQUY: Refereed Electronic Journal of Peer Discussion" From: Stevan Harnad Subject: psycoloquy.93.4.35.categorization.6.levenick (169 lines) Comments: To: psyc@pucc.bitnet To: Multiple recipients of list PSYC psycoloquy.93.4.35.categorization.6.levenick Saturday 17 April 1993 ISSN 1055-0143 (13 paragraphs, 4 references, 162 lines) PSYCOLOQUY is sponsored by the American Psychological Association (APA) Copyright 1993 James Levenick A WELCOME CHANGE FROM BACK-PROPAGATION MODELS OF COGNITION Book Review of Murre on Categorization James Levenick Computer Science Department Willamette University (D186) Salem, OR 97301 levenick@willamette.edu 1.0 OVERVIEW: Building a computational model of cognition is a daunting task. As one gains even the beginnings of an approximate understanding of the mechanisms, sophistication, subtlety, and raw processing power of the human mind, the prospect of true artificial intelligence appears increasingly remote; this in spite of various optimistic pronouncements and the apparently exponential growth rate of microprocesser speed. Murre's (1992a, b) CALM (Categorization and Learning Model) (and its several variants introduced herein) is clearly an advance over the simple feedforward back-propagation networks (of various stripes and colors) that have been so prominent in the past several years. CALM has a number of intriguing and laudable attributes including: (1) a means of doing unsupervised competitive learning; (2) the possibility of resolving the "stability/plasticity" dilemma; (3) some measure of psychological and neurophysiological plausibility; (4) a mechanism to provide automatic arousal and thus more rapid learning in response to novelty; and, (5) an appropriate application of a genetic algorithm. This review will consider each of these five and then turn to several questions and more contentious issues. 1.1 A MEANS OF DOING UNSUPERVISED COMPETITIVE LEARNING: Any memory model which purports to simulate human memory, even in the weakest sense must be capable of learning without being provided the correct answer or category. This is the most glaring weakness of back-propagation networks as models of human memory. The CALM models appear to be able to learn to categorize very well without being provided with the correct answers. 1.2.0 THE POSSIBILITY OF RESOLVING THE "STABILITY/PLASTICITY" DILEMMA. 1.2.1 The stability/plasticity dilemma is endemic to learning systems, be they genetic algorithms, classifier systems, or artificial neural networks. The learning system may succeed in learning correct outputs, or responses to one set of situations or inputs, but after it subsequently learns to handle some other set of inputs (or, more broadly, when it encounters a different environment) it will fail to respond appropriately to the old, previously learned inputs. 1.2.2 The mechanism for this failure is easy to understand in the case of "catastrophic forgetting" in back-propagation networks. In that case, weights are modified repeatedly until the network gives correct outputs for every input in a data set. With any difficult input set it typically takes many hundreds of repetitions to achieve a correct array of weights. Outputs are determined by a set of weighted sums; when all of those sums exceed (or fall below) the appropriate thresholds, even by a tiny fraction, training is terminated. Unfortunately, in most cases, any subsequent weight adjustment will cause some (or most) of those weighted sums to no longer exceed (fall below) the thresholds (in some cases even a single small weight change will cause numerous incorrect answers - again because training only occurs in cases where the net produces incorrect answers -- there is no overlearning). Thus, the network forgets most of what it knew. This problem is exacerbated by the distributed nature of the representations and the lack of intralevel competition. 1.2.3 Murre presents two avenues of attack on this problem. His CALM models create modular representations and allow competition and feedback between modules at the same level. These two measures appear to solve the problem (at least in the cases he investigates). These results may point neural network researchers in what seems a useful direction. 1.3.0 SOME MEASURE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL AND NEURO-PHYSIOLOGICAL PLAUSIBILITY. The basic CALM modules are designed to model neocortical minicolumns. The constraints embodied in the model include: (1) Dale's principle (that individual neurons emit only one type of transmitter), (2) learning as a local phenomenon that does not require knowledge of the correct response, and (3) the capacity to differentiate between novel and familiar input and behave differently on that basis. The second and third constraints represent an advance over simple back-propagation models. 1.4 A MECHANISM TO PROVIDE AUTOMATIC AROUSAL AND THUS MORE RAPID LEARNING IN RESPONSE TO NOVELTY. This is an important feature of human cognition that is simply not addressed by most models to date. It is a means of focussing the attention of the system to facilitate learning. The problem of how a learning system can determine what to attend to is mysterious and abstruse; Murre's mechanism offers an avenue to attack this difficult problem. 1.5 An application of a genetic algorithm to the problem of tuning multiple interacting parameters in attempting to evolve a network to solve a nontrivial problem. This is the class of problems that genetic algorithms were designed to solve. It is an eminently reasonable approach. 2.0 SOME QUIBBLES. 2.1 Chapter 4, Psychological Models, tests CALM-based simulations on what are termed implicit and explicit memory tasks; the results are compared with similar experiments involving human subjects. The thesis of the chapter is that "multiple memory" explanations (such as the semantic-episodic, or procedural-declarative dichotomies) are inferior to "multiple-process" explanations of the effect. The results of the CALM experiments serve only as a proof in principle; they demonstrate that the effect can be produced with a single representational structure, but not that the representational structure used is the only one that can produce the effect. 2.2 Other multiple-process explanations spring immediately to mind, the best known being short-term memory (STM). It is well known that representations of things that have been experienced recently remain more reactive, more easily brought into consciousness and more likely to influence categorization decisions than other things. It has not yet been established whether this effect is due to residual activity in those representations or to some form of short term connection, or to a combination of the two, or to some other mechanism entirely. Perhaps CALM connections from context nodes could be construed as a kind of short term connection strength, but in CALM no distinction is made between those connections and the category learning connections (that presumably model long term memory). 2.3 Dale's law, mentioned on page 9, does not appear in the index of the Eccles (1957) reference cited; perhaps this is due to my having found the 1964 edition, which does refer to Dale's principle. 2.4 The V-nodes are reminiscent of Milner's (1956) regional inhibitory nodes, except that Milnerian nodes are driven by all the nodes they inhibit (as opposed to one per R-node). Later in the book (p. 121) Murre discusses a simulation where the ratio of V-nodes to R-nodes is reduced thus moving the model closer to Milner's formulation. 3.0 CONCLUSION: This book represents a tremendous amount of work by an organized research team who may yet construct a revolutionary model of cognition. It reads rather like a work in progress, offering the results of a number of simple experiments that demonstrate the model's potential. It seems to have great promise -- CALM is clearly an advance over feedforward back-propagation networks. Its attention to psychological and neurophysiological constraints, its attentional mechanism based on novelty (which offers a solution to the stability/plasticity dilemma), modularity, and its apparent generality are certainly encouraging. Nevertheless, many models of cognition have appeared that accomplished simple tasks but subsequently could not be extended to handle more difficult tasks. Whether CALM based models will prove a stepping stone to true artificial intelligence remains to be seen. REFERENCES Eccles, J. E. (1964) The Physiology of Synapses. New York: Springer-Verlag Milner, P. M. (1956). The Cell Assembly Mark II. Psychological Review, 62: 242-252. Murre, J.M.J. (1992a) Learning and Categorization in Modular Neural Networks. UK: Harvester/Wheatsheaf; US: Erlbaum Murre, J.M.J. (1992b) Precis of: Learning and Categorization in Modular Neural Networks. PSYCOLOQUY 3(68) categorization.1 17-Apr-93 22:29:15-GMT,25519;000000000001 Received: from rutvm1.rutgers.edu by aramis.rutgers.edu (5.59/SMI4.0/RU1.5/3.08) id AA25580; Sat, 17 Apr 93 18:29:13 EDT Message-Id: <9304172229.AA25580@aramis.rutgers.edu> Received: from RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (IBM VM SMTP R1.2.1MX) with BSMTP id 1369; Sat, 17 Apr 93 18:27:59 EDT Received: from RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (NJE origin LISTSERV@RUTVM1) by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (LMail V1.1d/1.7f) with BSMTP id 6809; Sat, 17 Apr 1993 18:27:58 -0400 Date: Sat, 17 Apr 1993 18:27:35 -0400 Reply-To: psyc@pucc.bitnet Sender: "PSYCOLOQUY: Refereed Electronic Journal of Peer Discussion" From: Stevan Harnad Subject: psycoloquy.93.436.categorization.7.powers (473 lines) Comments: To: psyc@pucc.bitnet To: Multiple recipients of list PSYC psycoloquy.93.436.categorization.7.powers Saturday 18 April 1993 ISSN 1055-0143 (40 paragraphs, 18 references, 466 lines) PSYCOLOQUY is sponsored by the American Psychological Association (APA) Copyright 1992 David MW Powers CALM, CHAOS AND SURPRISE! Book Review of Murre on Categorization David M.W. Powers Informatique Department Telecom Paris (ENST) Paris, France powers@acm.org 1.0 INTRODUCTION 1.1 Murre's "Learning and Categorization in Modular Neural Networks" is very nearly two books, not in virtue of its size, but in that the chapters which comprise the body of the text discuss a particular neural network model in terms of the psychological plausibility of the model, whilst the appendices (amounting to well over a third of the volume) are devoted to questions of implementation, specific and general. 1.2 There is a tendency to regard appendices as superfluous, or at best as a source of further detail about points raised in the text. In this case, the 5 Appendices B which deal with general questions relating to implementation really address an entirely different issue from the book proper, and the reader needs especial encouragement to look at what is in them -- particularly if he has used one or another of the implementational techniques or environments or approaches discussed, on the one hand, or if his ideas of models of neurophysiological processes have remained unrealized or unrealizable in any computational form. Perhaps it would have been better if Murre had included at least the main points of B1 in the text and introduced the content of the remaining appendices in overview form. 1.3 This review, however, will concentrate on the theoretical content on the book, although I will point out at the end some connections to the theory and practice of parallel computing, which Murre does not elucidate himself. 2.0 CALM 2.1 CALM is an acronym for an anagrammatic variant of the title of the book: Categorizing And Learning Module. In both his introduction and his concluding evaluation chapter, Murre makes it clear that modularity, and indeed one particular approach to modularity (which contrasts sharply with that of Fodor 1983, 1988), represents his main thesis and the unique contribution of his work. The terms "categorizing" and "learning" are also not lightly chosen: the particular type of learning that CALM captures is based on the type of categorization performed by self-organizing neural nets, and the type of modularity is inspired by that of the cortical columns (or what might underlie them). Indeed, the stronger claim of CALM is that this sort of learning can achieve more than it is given credit for, and is more plausible than the traditional Neural Net (NN) approaches to learning. 2.2 The problems that existing NN models have, and which existing experiments have demonstrated, lead not only to the selection of this particular class of model, but to a number of enhancements -- most of which have a prior pedigree but have not hitherto been brought together in this combination. 2.3 It is worth considering this motivation for the model in some detail, as it lays the foundation for the experiments and results which follow -- indeed, the subsequent demonstrations are simple experiments designed to support the motivation presented earlier. In particular, various problems are used to justify the introduction of randomly (or chaotically) firing arousal nodes, although there is also a side excursion into a combination with genetic algorithms. 2.4 In general, I like the approach (in part because it accords well with my own in several respects: Powers & Turk 1989, Powers 1992). In addition, the problems identified are significant -- although many alternatives and variants are possible in dealing with them. As this is basically a friendly review, I will try to broaden the perspective taken by the book and to provide further support for the approach whilst being less critical of the experiments than would be possible if one neglected to see them as illustrations of a broader approach. In the following, I will focus on the problem Murre is seeking to deal with, and his general approach, rather than on the specific instantiations or implementations (CALM, CALSOM, ELAN, etc.) 3.0 PROBLEMS 3.1 NEGLECT OF LEARNING. 3.1.1 Traditional AI, and in particular traditional approaches to natural language and vision, have tended to leave learning out of the equation. This is not so much for lack of consideration of learning, but because of the intractability of the approach (and the spectra of formidable formal impossibility results: Chomsky 1963, Gold 1967, Minsky and Papert 1969). The definition of intelligence has also been a problem. It took AI quite a while to recognize that the real problems of AI lay not in "expert" knowledge, as in solving mathematical equations or playing chess or diagnosing diseases, but in the basics of cognition -- understanding sentences and scenes. Large subfields have built up in this area based on ad hoc approaches, or arbitrarily chosen psychological or linguistic theories, but they fail to address the dynamics of the problem -- that we are always encountering new words and objects as well as new combinations thereof. 3.1.2 Seeing how learning algorithms, and in particular the black box neural network techniques, actually get beyond the daunting formal results, and can in practise allow learning to be used, is quite an art in itself. There is a field of machine learning, with its own journal of that name, but it tends not to address even such issues, let alone the place of learning in cognitive science in general. 3.1.3 Traditional connectionist work is conducted in a paradigm which emphasizes associations at a single level and fails to consider how more complex learning systems -- e.g., a system for learning language rather than learning plurals -- can be formed. In fact, the impression we sometimes get is that people are throwing the black box at random problems and if it works, a paper gets published; otherwise, we look for another problem. 3.1.4 What we need is thus some sort of implementable theory of modularity. It is not sufficient just to introduce a couple of dozen more hidden layers and hope for the best. We need an approach which is both efficacious (in the sense that it is theoretically capable of learning what we want it to learn) and efficient (capable of learning it in the time we are willing to wait). Modularity offers an additional bonus: that parallel implementations can maintain a reasonable independence and a well-defined interdependence between modules. 3.2 INTERFERENCe 3.2.1 Another major problem is interference, that is, that once a system has learnt something, and proceeds to something else, there is a tendency for that to cause unlearning of the established information. Modularity again has something to contribute here, in that different modules can have different learning coefficients. But part of the problem is the more complex use of existing learnt concepts and the fact that the system has been receiving over-simplified data until this point. 3.2.2 At a given level of complexity, some algorithms are not well behaved in relation to the occurrence of items with some uneven probability distribution. The use of categorizing, self-organizing nets has distinct advantages in this respect. An additional arousal node which reacts to the surprise value of the input and facilitates learning has been introduced in CALM. The external evidence of arousal due to unexpected events does not necessarily suggest the sort of direct feedback CALM provides. Not all unexpected events are worthy of learning, that is, of transfer to long term memory or incorporation into schemas. 3.2.3 The other feature of the arousal node in CALM is that it is not completely deterministic. In the original self-organizing systems (Turing 1952, von der Malsburg 1973) random initial values provided the ability to break ties. The most important property of such networks, though, was the allocation of neural resources in (not necessarily linear) proportion to the relative frequency of that (range of) inputs -- with correspondingly greater capacity for discrimination of such inputs. 3.2.4 An alternative way of controlling the learning coefficient (plasticity) is in terms of the relative saturation of the module, or by invoking maturational factors (e.g., it is harder to learn a language in one's thirties than as an infant). The saturation effects of a normalizing model can actually make it difficult to learn new material once the old is really well established. Thus, the effect of an arousal node may not be so much to prevent interference, but to allow later learning at all (as Murre(p.5) mentions in relation to ART). 3.2.5 The distinction between elaboration learning and activation learning is a useful one, but it would be interesting to investigate the behaviour of the system in the absence of the arousal node (and, in fact, some of Murre's genetic learning experiments did build just such systems, which still performed acceptably -- the main value of these genetic trials is seeing what use is made of the special features of CALM). 3.2.6 An important function of (all) self-organizing systems is that the allocation of many cells to the same class -- either in one column or multiple columns -- allows discrimination at a finer level with continued learning. Murre's experiments provide exactly the same number of neuron pairs (cells) as the number of classes he is trying to learn (ten); Murre then discusses the fact that it doesn't always find all of them. He should be using at least twice as many cells as the number of classes he wants to learn in a module that needn't have full connectivity but inhibits maximally at a radius of the order of that number of cells (e.g., with a radius of 75% the number of classes, which shouldn't necessarily be uniformly distributed, this allows a full cycle in which each class is recognized by an expected 1.5 cells). 3.3 SUPERVISION 3.3.1 The biggest single problem with the majority of today's symbolic and connectionist learning techniques is that they require supervision. The question of supervision, however, is glossed over a bit too quickly by Murre, and admits of more detailed analysis. 3.3.2 Supervision has two components, providing in general both a source of examples and a source of criticism. This may take the form of providing positive and negative examples, with association of a true/false rating. This is just a special case of a general categorization problem in which we provide a set of examples with multicategory taxonomy (e.g. cats, dogs, cows, pigs). The criticism (whether true/false or multivalued) can be provided independently of the examples (e.g. the Marvin system of Sammut and Banerji, 1986, invents its own examples -- intelligently choosing one which tests the latest generalization it has proposed). 3.3.3 Supervision may also be explicit or implicit. When I try to open a door by just pulling on the handle, I get an implicit no -- if the correct procedure for opening the door involves turning, or pushing or sliding. This is implicit learning provided by the external world in which the learning system is embedded. Similarly, the examples may occur naturally in the world. The difference between explicit and implicit examples is, in practice, largely the way in which the focus of the learner is brought to bear on the significant aspects of the work. 3.3.4 As an example, backpropagation systems are usually regarded as involving supervised learning, although at times they seem to be doing unsupervised learning (e.g., where input and output are the same and we are just interested in the hidden layers, or in what the net does with patterns which weren't present in the input). Conversely, Rumelhart and McClelland (1986) used a self-organizing net (usually thought of as an unsupervised learning system) to learn associations between present and past tense of the verb. 3.3.5 Thus, it is not the system which determines the question of supervision per se, but the paradigm with which it is used. When it is mostly used following one paradigm, however, focussing particularly on the critical aspect of supervision, a method tends to become associated with that specific paradigm. 3.3.6 Yet a system is also supervised when it gets a highly consistent, selected set of examples which reflects only the set of concepts or associations to be learnt. Thus, von der Malsburg (1973) provides a set of images each of which consists of exactly one line, and Murre provides a set each of which consists of a single character. How is this different from providing a set which consists of a sequence of characters, whether it represents one word or two? In both cases, the teacher has done the job of focussing the strategy by filtering out extraneous information (the other letters on the page, the edges of the other pages, the book, the desk, the reader's fingers, etc.). There are paradigmatic examples in nature -- where, for example, different verb forms frequently occur in successive clauses ("Yesterday, you played in the sand, so just play with your toys! Maybe tomorrow you can go and play with Tom, who's playing football today.") 3.3.7 Nonetheless, I agree with Murre that self-organizing systems are the appropriate modular building blocks for at least the lowest levels of cognition. The reason is not so much that backpropagation could not be used as that that paradigm amounts to overkill, and that the job we have in hand at these lower levels is classification on the basis of the internal structure of the input; in particular, self-organizing systems can do auto-focussing (e.g. in Powers & Turk 1989, Powers 1992): given just sentences as sequences of, respectively, words or characters, without preselection, significant classes emerge automatically. 3.4 CONSTRAINTS 3.4.1 Constraints seems to fall naturally under the heading of problems, but I agree with Murre that the problem is actually lack of constraint. This is the main fallacy in the application of the theoretical results of Gold and Chomsky, Minsky and Papert (op. cit.) to cognitive questions: any constraints reflected in the presuppositions have more to do with particular, very simplistic classes of computers than the constraints imposed by our cognitive mechanisms and our environment. 3.4.2 To clarify this further, there are two fallacies: One is that we are closed systems, and can't just "learn" new structure where there wasn't something "innate" before; the other is that results applying to classes allowing infinite recursion and infinitely long sentences, nestings, parse trees etc. have anything to do with "languages" which are customized for our finite brains -- and the very finite constraints which show up empirically (cf. Miller's [1957] "magical number seven"). The trap is also related to a focus on the syntactic, and a formal syntactic idea of semantics, failing to recognize the function of syntactic structure or the need for grounding of and through an ontology. 3.4.3 Conversely, it is ironic that the results of Minsky and Papert (1969) were founded on a principal of locality that has largely gone by the board in mainstream connectionism today. It is not that Minsky and Papert were wrong but that people have since changed the rules of the game, sweeping away any semblance of neurological validity. Minsky and Papert were in fact right, but what does it matter if local nets can't learn parity functions: We have to count things consciously to learn parity; it is not an unconscious or autonomous function of our visual cortex! Similarly, the result concerning connectivity shouldn't be a surprise, given our predilection for puzzles relating to this feat in our newspapers and our children's books and comics (the puzzles are known as mazes). On the other hand, the fact that nets can achieve the rather esoteric notion of convexity should be no surprise either -- we do detect holes and wholeness without conscious computation! 3.4.4 The use of delays and decays also introduces small constants which one would expect to relate to some of these magic-number-seven constraints. The advantage of modelling decay is not just a form of limited parallel-to-serial conversion (p. 70), but that it opens up a window of past tokens which can be taken into account (perhaps by other modules) in learning more complex, and (temporal or sequential) context-sensitive relations. 4.0 CHAOS 4.1 The main criticism I would make, as is reflected fairly indirectly in the above, is that there is more work and more support for Murre's approach than is reflected in his book. 4.2 A module needn't be so small as to require full connectivity. The modifications in Part III deal with a separate plausibility problem, the one-to-one association of inhibitory and excitatory neurons. In fact, a probablistic connection model can be applied to both classes of neurons, and can model many different lateral interaction functions in an extremely simple way (Powers, 1983). Neither the CALM nor the CALSOM model reflects the usual sombrero. Moreover, this deviation from empirical tradition is not justified (except implicitly on the basis of simplicity and sufficiency). 4.3 There is other work which seeks to model lesion effects and disorders, e.g. that of Gigley (1982) on Aphasia. 4.4 The mixing of genetic algorithms and CALM is a brave step, but one which is somewhat poorly motivated. In particular, there is no motivation for either psychological or genetic plausibility. In particular (p. 107), there is no mechanism in view which could explain the connection that "in ontogenesis evolution guides learning, in phylogenesis learning guides evolution": Appealing to survival of the fittest is a very vague way to support the latter part of this claim, and there are many missing links in the chain of mechanism. A better motivated example of the connection between innate specification and self-organization is Willshaw and von der Malsburg's (1979) model and their subsequent work. 4.5 The use of a randomized source (arousal node) in CALM is not completely convincing: it is moreso in the motivation than in the implementation Murre presents. However, there is evidence for such elements. Nicolis (1991), for example, discusses various phenomena (e.g. in relation to language) and relates the behaviour of an element to the attractors of chaos theory. 5.0 SURPRISE 5.1 Many neural models are characterized by parameters expressed to four significant digits or more. The robustness of Murre's CALM simulation is indicated by the variety of different functional versions found (e.g. by genetic learning) as well as by the fact that the parameters in Appendix A are expressed to one significant figure or less! 5.2 The relationship between neural network approaches and statistical approaches is one that has not been adequately undertaken to date and Murre is to be commended for his (albeit brief) treatment of this (p. 88). The successes and failures of different connectionist and stochastic approaches may be related to deeper considerations in information theory. 5.3 This issue is not unconnected with that of redundancy (p. 93) and novelty (p. 5). If we model the communication process as a tension between efficacy of communication (getting the message across without corruption) and efficiency of communication (maximizing speed and minimizing memory requirements and transmission time), we get a model in which there is an asymmetry, with a small closed class of very frequent symbols interacting with larger (potentially infinite) open classes of less frequent symbols with a much higher information content (viz. surprise value; Powers, 1991, 1992). 5.4 These closed classes can be recognized with a totally unsupervised self-organizing, or minimal length representation, or bigram-based, learning algorithm and have a minimum of semantic content, while pointing to the content "words" they consort with. They also show up in terms of prosodic effects, where the closed class "words" tends to have less stress, or to be less reliably distinguishable. 5.5 The role closed classes play in self-organizing modules also seems to turn the traditional syntactic concept of headship on its head: the closed class units seem to occupy the nuclear syntactic slot whereas traditional theories tend to allocate this slot to the primary carrier of information (viz., the most open class). 6.0 CONCLUSIONS 6.1 Murre has put together an interesting and useful model based on a number of reasonable assumptions, some of which, though by no means widely accepted, seem incontrovertible. The assumptions are presented in the first chapter and the model in the second. The remainder of the book presents some small experiments showing that the model is useful, and has some psychological validity (though not an overwhelming amount). 6.2 The hints in the appendices about implementing parallel nets should be of considerable value, but I have not taken the time to consider them here. Some aspects of Murre's model, in particular, the loosening of the RV pairs in 7.2.1 (p. 121), use techniques which are of theoretical importance in the field of parallelism per se (this halving technique is essential to the only known network structure with constant degree nodes which allows arbitrary communication -- permutations of messages from all nodes to all other nodes -- in time proportional to the diameter of the network, viz. the multibutterfly), and both this observation and the discussion in the appendices are evidence of the interrelationship between the field of parallel distributed processing and mainstream parallel computing. Murre is to be praised for the breadth of his examination of this area; the amount of space I have devoted to it is not an indicator of the amount of time the reader should. To review that material would be to write a whole other review! REFERENCES Chomsky, Noam (1963) Formal Properties of Grammars. In: Handbook of Mathematical Psychology, R. A. Luce, R. R. Bush and E. Galanter (eds.) vol. II, pp. 323-418, Wiley, New York. Fodor, J. (1983) The Modularity of Mind. MA: MIT Press. Fodor, J. (1988) Psychosemantics. MA: MIT Press. Gigley, H. M. (1982) Neurolinguistically Constrained Simulation of Sentence Comprehension: Integrating Artificial Intelligence and Brain Theory. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Massachusetts, Amherst Massachusetts. Gold E. M., (1967) Language Identification in the Limit. Information and Control 10:447-474. Malsburg, C. von der (1973) Self-Organization of Orientation Selective Cells in the Striate Cortex. Kybernetik 14: 85-100. Minsky, M. & Papert, S. (1969) Perceptrons. MIT Press. Murre, J.M.J. (1992) Learning and Categorization in Modular Neural Networks. UK: Harvester/Wheatsheaf; US: Erlbaum Murre, J.M.J. (1992) Precis of: Learning and Categorization in Modular Neural Networks. PSYCOLOQUY 3(68) categorization.1 Nicolis, John S. (1991) Chaos and Information Processing. World Scientific. Singapore/London. Powers, David M. W. (1983) Lateral Interaction Behaviour Derived from Neural Packing Considerations, DCS Report No 8317, Department of Computer Science, University of NSW, Australia. Powers, David M. W. & Turk, Christopher C. R. (1989) Machine Learning of Natural Language, Springer, London/Berlin, December. Powers, David M. W. (1991) How far can self-organization go? Results in unsupervised language learning. pp.131-136, Proc. AAAI Spring Symposium on Machine Learning of Natural Language and Ontology, DFKI:Kaiserslautern FRG. Powers (1992) A Basis for Compact Distributional Extraction THINK 1(2): 51-63. ITK:Tilburg. Rumelhart, D. & McClelland, J. (1986) On learning the past tenses of English verbs. In: McClelland, J. and Rumelhart, D. (eds.) Parallel Distributed Processing. Vol. 2: Psychological and Biological Models. Cambridge: MIT Press. 216-271. Sammut, Claude & Banerji, R. (1986) Learning concepts by asking questions. In: Machine Learning: An Artificial Intelligence Approach. R. S. Michalski, J. G. Carbonell and T. M. Mitchell (eds), vol. 2. Turing, A. (1952) The chemical basis of morphogenesis. Phil. Trans. Roy. Soc. London Ser. B 237:37-72. David J. Willshaw and C. von der Malsburg (1976) How patterned neural connections can be set up by self-organization. Proc R. Soc. London Ser. B 194:431-445. 17-Apr-93 23:49:49-GMT,23815;000000000001 Received: from rutvm1.rutgers.edu by aramis.rutgers.edu (5.59/SMI4.0/RU1.5/3.08) id AA28761; Sat, 17 Apr 93 19:49:48 EDT Message-Id: <9304172349.AA28761@aramis.rutgers.edu> Received: from RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (IBM VM SMTP R1.2.1MX) with BSMTP id 1451; Sat, 17 Apr 93 19:48:33 EDT Received: from RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (NJE origin LISTSERV@RUTVM1) by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (LMail V1.1d/1.7f) with BSMTP id 7130; Sat, 17 Apr 1993 19:48:33 -0400 Date: Sat, 17 Apr 1993 19:48:18 -0400 Reply-To: psyc@pucc.bitnet Sender: "PSYCOLOQUY: Refereed Electronic Journal of Peer Discussion" From: Stevan Harnad Subject: psycoloquy.93.93.4.37.human-animal-bond.2.bekoff (409 lines) Comments: To: psyc@pucc.bitnet To: Multiple recipients of list PSYC psycoloquy.93.4.37.human-animal-bond.2.bekoff Saturday 17 April 1993 ISSN 1055-0143 (12 paragraphs, 29 references, 402 lines) PSYCOLOQUY is sponsored by the American Psychological Association (APA) Copyright 1993 Marc Bekoff SHOULD SCIENTISTS BOND WITH THE ANIMALS WHO THEY USE? WHY NOT? Book Review of Davis & Balfour on Human-Animal-Bond Marc Bekoff Environmental, Population, and Organismic Biology University of Colorado Boulder, Colorado 80309-0334 bekoff_m@cubldr.colorado.edu 1. THE INEVITABLE BOND (TIB; Davis & Balfour [D & B] 1992; Davis 1993) is a useful and well-edited collection of original essays. D & B's introductory remarks and the brief summaries they provide before each chapter are helpful for keeping the central theme -- scientist-animal interactions -- in focus. They and their contributors have produced a volume that is long overdue, one that forces scientists to come to terms with how they interact with the nonhuman animals (hereafter animals) they study, and why they interact in the ways they do. For some scientists this is a topic about which they would rather think than talk, but the many issues that need to be considered in studies of scientist-animal bonds will not disappear if they are ignored. And now they can no longer be ignored; TIB brings the issues to the table for much needed open discourse. The opposing views concerning the nature of scientist-animal interactions provide needed balance; there are those who want to use standardized techniques to reduce the confounding behavioral and physiological effects of human contact with the animals who they study and those who accept the inevitability of the bonds that are formed between scientists and animals. The latter view is consistent with an approach in which the relationships can be used to make for better research; "better" means different things to different people, but the notion seems to boil down to practices that include expediting data collection, coming to understand those experiments or manipulations that are likely to work without stressing the animals to the point that they are no longer the animals on which one thinks one is working, reducing the number of animals to be studied, and providing less contrived explanations of the behavior patterns being studied. There seems to be more consensus among those who study social behavior and animal cognition than, for example, among behavioral physiologists, that the view to be exploited for the benefit of both the scientists and the animals is the one that accepts the inevitability of scientist-animal bonds (see the chapters by Pepperberg, Boysen, Oden & Thompson, Schusterman, Gisiner, & Hanggi, and also Lorenz [1991). I strongly favor this position for a number of reasons that will become clear. 2. I agree with so much of the material in TIB that my review is more of an appeal for an increased willingness on the part of those who use animals in research to recognize that bonding exists, and and for an attempt to use this to the mutual advantage of the scientists and the animals they use. This is not what all scientists believe, however, nor has this view enjoyed a lot of popularity for a long time; many still operate on the basis of what Rollin (1989) calls the "common sense of science," according to which science is a value-free, objective enterprise. Thus, D & B's recognition that neither their book nor the main topic of interest would have been viewed favorably as few as 20 years ago is realistic. As Deborah Gordon (1992, p. 23) has pointed out, "The way that scientists see animals' behavior occurs... [in] a system embedded in the social practices of a certain time and place." Why has there been a change in attitudes concerning the discussion and analysis of scientist-animal interactions? There seem to be at least three reasons: (i) Many researchers are no longer offended by the fact that they and the animals they use in research form tight social relationships; (ii) many scientists realize that the bonds formed with their research animals are likely to influence how data are collected, interpreted, and explained, and they want to learn more about this phenomenon so to help their research; and (iii) many researchers recognize that they are responsible for the animals' welfare, and that their decisions about how to treat animals are informed by how they feel about the animals themselves. D & B's main agenda concerns points (i) and (ii), although they do pay some attention to (iii). I will mainly be concerned with (iii), namely, how the inevitability of bonding with many/most of the animals one interacts with closely in a research setting bears on many animal welfare issues. 3. Many different species of animals (rodents, canids, monkeys, apes, birds, octopi, reptiles, pigs, goats, horses, pinnipeds, bears) are considered in TIB, and this is a strong positive feature; laboratory rodents, domestic dogs, and nonhuman primates are not the only animals with whom we need to be concerned (for a consideration of many of the same issues discussed in this volume, see Gordon 's [1992] discussion of ant-watching). However, by studying the ways humans interact closely with familiar animals, a lot can be learned that can be used in studies of human encounters with other animals. For example, Clinton Sanders's (1993; Sanders & Arluke 1993) work with domestic dogs supports the idea that intense emotional bonds between humans and dogs are central to contemporary social life. (Sanders also notes, in response to a skeptical critic of his work, that the people he studied were not "wacky and lonely people who are over-involved with their pets.") Sanders's work supports the notion (see below) that not allowing bonds to be formed with at least some animals, especially those who might expect a bond to be formed, such as members of domesticated species, could be stressful to the animals and could affect research findings. Along these lines, Lorenz (1991, p. xvi) recalls an incident in which a hand-reared gosling was merely deprived of being greeted by the person who reared her "during an apparently harmless experiment." The deprived gosling became so stressed that Lorenz and his coworkers never repeated the experiment. Lorenz also points out that bonds can be formed as a result of very subtle and seemingly unimportant exchanges between scientists and animals, interactions about which we know little. 4. Among the common themes covered in TIB are anthropomorphism and anecdotalism, and questions such as "should humans form bonds with the animals they use in research" and "does allowing bonds to form between scientist and animal result in 'good' or 'bad' science"? On my view and that of others, anthropomorphism is not only an unavoidable part of behavioral research, but necessary if humans are to come to a better understanding of the behavior and mental lives of the animals they study. Even those who take care not to use anthropomorphic explanations usually resort to them anyway because they make the behavior of diverse animals accessible to humans (for a useful discussion, see Myers 1991, pp. 200ff). Or those who frown on anthropomorphic descriptions or explanations might place objectionable terms such as dominating, submitting, helping, or retreating in scare quotations, and then tell readers that the words should not be taken literally but metaphorically. Occasionally they simply declare "Oh, you know what I mean." The great challenge to those who believe we can dispense with anthropomorphism is to develop other ways to describe and explain animal behavior and the mental and affective states of animals in a way that is as accessible to humans as anthropomorphic descriptions and explanations; this is a very difficult task (Bekoff 1993a). With respect to the main topic of D & B's book, Lehman (Chapter 24) points out that using cumbersome terminology to avoid using the term "bond" really doesn't help matters. Furthermore, he notes that (i) those who criticize others for being anthropomorphic are not necessarily being good scientists, (ii) the desire to be rigorous may lead one to overlook the fact that animals have bonded to the researchers, and that this bonding influences results, and (iii) for many of the animals who are used in research, not allowing them to bond may be stressful and may likewise influence results. A plethora of data show clearly that we are part of the picture, like it or not, and attempts to detach ourselves totally from the animals are fruitless. What is called objective science is not necessarily better science than science that is done with animals to whom one feels close. 5. Anthropomorphic terms should certainly be used with care (see Burghardt's chapter in TIB and Burghardt 1991, Lorenz 1991, and Bekoff & Allen 1994), but I do not think that (i) anthropomorphic explanations are dangerous (Estep & Hetts, Chapter 2, p. 23), that (ii) the "dangers of anthropomorphism in science are widely known" (Estep & Hetts, p. 23) or broadly feared, or that (iii) anthropomorphism should be avoided at all costs. Thus, I do not agree with Estep and Hett's admonition that "Scientists must keep a constant vigil against anthropomorphic thinking and interpretation when performing animal research" (p. 23), if this vigil is motivated by a fear of the supposed dangers of anthropomorphism. (Kennedy [1992, p. 167] also fears anthropomorphic tendencies because they fly in the face of objective, hard science, but he then goes on to claim, in the absence of any hard data, that anthropomorphism is genetically programmed into humans, [but] "that does not mean that the disease is untreatable".) Perhaps it is Estep & Hett's confused conception of anthropomorphism that is at the root of their worry. For example, they write (i) about "anthropomorphic or zoopomorphic behavior" (p. 15), (ii) about "an organism [is] behaving anthropomorphically," and (iii) that "anthropomorphism and zoopomorphism are little more than descriptions of the behavior of organisms toward one another" (p. 15). I suggest that interested readers see Hugh Lehman's chapter in the TIB volume and John Andrew Fisher's papers (1990, 1991) for more informed discussions of anthropomorphism. Lehman correctly notes that anthropomorphism entails attributing "a human affective, emotional, or cognitive capacity to animals" (p. 388); animals do not behave anthropomorphically, nor are there anthropomorphic behaviors. 6. Anecdotalism also should not receive the bad press it frequently incurs. My colleague Dale Jamieson quips that "the plural of anecdote is data," but one can also correctly claim that anecdotes are, in and of themselves, data; they just may not be the sorts of data with which some feel comfortable. But few are happy to stop with the collection of anecdotes; most people realize that anecdotes provide the material out of which more rigorous research grows, in all fields, including both the behavioral and the physical sciences (see Fentress's discussion, p. 44). The claim that anecdotes are useless is unjustified. 7. The species of animals with which people form close bonds are diverse, as noted in many chapters, but do humans form bonds with some species more readily than with others? And, if so, why? Scott (p. 89) writes: "It should be easier for a human to become attached to another mammal than to an insect. Although I have no proof that this is true, it should be easier to extend human-human relationships to similar species than to distantly related ones." No one seems to have any hard data concerning this thought. I have often been asked if I felt closer to the domestic dogs, coyotes, or wolves I studied than to the birds (Adelie penguins, western evening grosbeaks, house finches, juncos, cowbirds) I observed, or whether I identified more with the former than the latter. At first these questions made no sense to me, but I came to learn that most people who asked them had already decided that I felt closer to the coyotes and wolves than to the birds. They were wrong. I did identify differently with the canids than I did with the birds, but I did not feel less closer to the birds than the canids. 8. Another issue that receives some attention in TIB is the naming of research animals. Although some believe that naming animals is a bad idea (because named animals will be treated differently, less objectively, than numbered animals), others believe just the opposite, that naming animals is permissible and even expected when working closely with at least certain species, especially with the same individuals over long periods of time. Early in her career, Jane Goodall had trouble convincing reviewers of one of her early papers that naming the chimpanzees she studied should be allowed. Goodall refused to make the changes they suggested, including dropping names and referring to the animals as "it" rather than "he" or "she," or "which" rather than "who"; her paper was published (Montgomery 1991, pp. 104ff). It seems noteworthy that researchers working with nonhuman primates and some cetaceans usually name the animals they study; we read about Kanzi, Austin, Sherman, Koko, Phoenix, and Akeakamai (and see pictures of them with their proud human companions; Linden 1993). We also read about Alex, an African gray parrot (Pepperberg). Yet most people do not seem to find naming these individuals to be objectionable. Is it because the animals who are named have been shown to have highly developed cognitive skills? Not necessarily, for these and other animals are often named before they are studied intensively. Or, in the case of most nonhuman primates, is naming permissible because these individuals are more similar to humans than are members of other species? Why is naming a rat or a lizard or a spider more off-putting than naming a primate or a dolphin or a parrot? We need to know more about why this is so. 9. It is also worth asking whether there is any relation between the resistance to forming bonds with and to naming animals, on the one hand, and the type of research in which one is engaging, on the other. Do field workers differ from laboratory workers? Do those who restrain, isolate, or shock animals differ from those who merely observe them? Do those who have to kill animals differ from those who do not? Does one's familiarity with a given species influence one's resistance or desire to form bonds and to name the animals with whom one works? These ae, of course, empirical questions that need further study. However, as Serpell (1986) has noted, increasing the distance between themselves and nonhuman animals is a common practice among scientists and nonscientists. Among the devices used are objectifying animals by referring to them with "it" and "which," and using terms such as collecting, euthanizing, sacrificing, and culling to refer to killing (see Lynch 1988; Verhoog 1991; Bekoff 1993b). Likewise, D & B point out, bonding with an animal may make it impossible to subject them to different forms of treatment (pp. 1-2). Dewsbury also mentions that an interest in scientist-animal interactions may lead to less exploitative studies (p. 27). Furthermore, for those who want to learn more about animals' mental states, it seems reasonable to treat animals as subjects rather than objects (Bekoff & Jamieson 1991; Bekoff 1993a; Jamieson & Bekoff, 1993). 10. Scientists also show different attitudes toward animals of the same species depending on whether they are encountered in the laboratory or at home. Rollin (1989) and others have noted that many scientists who name and praise the cognitive abilities of the companion animals with whom they share their home are likely to leave this sort of baggage at home when they enter their laboratories to do research with members of the same species. In addition, there are those who inform their laboratory research using anecdotes that stem from observations of their companion animals, with whom they are freely anthropomorphic (Rollin 1989). Based on a series of interviews, Phillips (1993) reported that many scientists socially construct a "distinct category of animal, the 'laboratory animal,' that contrasts with nameable animals (e.g., pets) across every salient dimension... the cat or dog in the laboratory is perceived by researchers as ontologically different from the pet dog or cat at home." Rajecki, Rasmussen, & Craft (1993) found that the ways in which animals are labelled and categorized influences the level of tolerance with which people view different forms of mistreatment. All in all, bonding with animals and naming them seems to influence how the animals are viewed and treated, and I agree with those who believe that these practices should be exploited for the benefit of the scientists and the animals. It seems unnatural not to do so. 11. Calling animals by name and bonding with them are steps in the right direction for both the scientists and the animals; both sides will benefit greatly from a deeper examination and understanding of the nature of scientist-animal interactions. The knowledge gained by viewing animals as individuals and learning more about each individual's characteristics should work against wholesale species-centred decisions concerning animal welfare (Bekoff & Gruen 1993). "Speciesists" make decisions about how humans (moral agents) are permitted to treat nonhuman animals (moral patients) based on species membership and not on individual characteristics (Ryder 1975/1983, 1989). For example, James D. Watson, is quoted in 1993 for his sweeping dismissal of the animal rights movement, claiming that all those who are interested in how animals are used by humans want to "spend all our resources making monkeys happy," and further, that "I don't like monkeys." Does Watson mean all monkeys? I am sure a lot of other people also wouldn't like monkeys if the only monkeys with whom they had had contact were caged ones. Perhaps there are some individual monkeys Watson would come to like? Some scientists may not like (or want to bond with or name) the individual animals on whom they work, and they may extend their dislike to all members of the same species, but their personal views cannot settle questions about the morality of animal use. 12. TIB is one of those rare finds, an edited volume that is worth reading in its entirety. One area that needs much more detailed study concerns the bonds, and the effects of the bonds, that develop between field researchers and the animals they study. Nancy Caine's informative chapter is a good place to begin for those interested in scientist-animal interactions in the wild (other references can be found in Bekoff & Jamieson [1991, 1994]). A combination of information from studies on captive and wild animals is needed to come to a fuller understanding of the many different aspects of scientist-animal interactions. NOTE: I thank Colin Allen and Susan Townsend for comments on this essay. REFERENCES Bekoff, M. (1993a) Cognitive ethology and the explanation of nonhuman animal behavior. In J.-A. Meyer & H. L. Roitblat, eds. Comparative approaches to cognitive science. MIT Press. Bekoff, M. (1993b) Experimentally induced infanticide: The removal of birds and its ramifications. Auk, In press. Bekoff, M. & Allen, C. (1994) Cognitive ethology: Slayers, skeptics, and proponents. In R. W. Mitchell, N. Thompson, & L. Miles, eds. Anthropomorphism, anecdotes, and animals: The emperor's new clothes? University of Nebraska Press. Bekoff, M. & Gruen, L. (1993) Animal welfare and individual characteristics: A conversation against speciesism. Ethics & Behavior, in press. Bekoff, M. & Jamieson, D. (1991) Reflective ethology, applied philosophy, and the moral status of animals. Perspectives in Ethology 9: 1-47. Bekoff, M. & Jamieson, D. (1994). The ethics of studying carnivores. In J. Gittleman, eds. Carnivore behavior, ecology, and evolution. Cornell University Press. Burghardt, G. (1991) Cognitive ethology and critical anthropomorphism: A snake with two heads and hognose snakes that play dead. In C. Ristau, ed. Cognitive ethology: The minds of other animals. Lawrence Erlbaum, pp. 53-90. Davis, H. (1993) Precis of "The Inevitable Bond." PSYCOLOQUY 4(12) human-animal-bond.1. Davis, H. & Balfour, D. (1992) The Inevitable Bond. New York: Cambridge University Press. Fisher, J. A. (1990).The myth of anthropomorphism. In Interpretation and explanation in the study of animal behavior, Volume I, Interpretation, intentionality, and communication. Westview Press, pp. 96-116. Fisher, J. A. (1991) Disambiguating anthropomorphism: An interdisciplinary review. Perspectives in Ethology 9: 49-85. Gordon, D. M. (1992) Wittgenstein and ant-watching. Biology and Philosophy 7: 13-25. Jamieson, D. & Bekoff, M. (1993) On aims and methods of cognitive ethology. Philosophy of Science Association 2: In press. Kennedy, J. S. (1992) The new anthropomorphism. Cambridge University Press. Linden, E. (1993) Can animals think? Time Magazine, 22 March: 54-61. Lorenz, K. (1991) Here am I -- where are you? Harcourt Brace Jovanovitch Lynch, M. (1988) Sacrifice and the transformation of the animal body into a scientific object: Laboratory culture and ritual practice in the neurosciences. Social Studies of Science 18: 265-289. Montgomery, S. (1991) Walking with the great apes: Jane Goodall, Dian Fossey, and Birut Galdikas. Houghton-Mifflin. Myers, G. (1991) Writing biology: Texts in the social construction of scientific knowledge. University of Wisconsin. Phillips, M. T. (1993) Proper names and the social construction of biography: The negative case of laboratory animals. Qualitative Sociology, In press. Rajecki, D. W., Rasmussen, J. L., & Craft, H. D. (1993). Labels and the treatment of animals: Archival and experimental cases. Society & Animals, 1: 45-60. Rollin, B. E. (1989) The unheeded cry: Animal consciousness, animal pain and science. Oxford University Press. Ryder, R. D. (1975/1983) Victims of science: The use of animals in research. National Antivivisection Society. Ryder, R. D. (1989) Animal revolution: Changing attitudes towards speciesism. Blackwell. Sanders, C. (1993) Understanding dogs: Caretakers' attributions of mindedness in canine-human relationships. Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, In press. Sanders, C. & Arluke, A. (1993a) If lions could speak: Investigating the animal-human relationship and the perspective of non-human others. The Sociological Quarterly 34, In press. Serpell, J. (1986) In the company of animals: A study of human-animal relationships. Basil Blackwell. Verhoog, H. (1991) The scientific perception of animals as objects. Between the Species 7: 208-212. Watson, J. D. (1993) Quotation in Time Magazine, 22 March: 27. 17-Apr-93 23:58:13-GMT,4443;000000000001 Received: from rutvm1.rutgers.edu by aramis.rutgers.edu (5.59/SMI4.0/RU1.5/3.08) id AA29303; Sat, 17 Apr 93 19:58:12 EDT Message-Id: <9304172358.AA29303@aramis.rutgers.edu> Received: from RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (IBM VM SMTP R1.2.1MX) with BSMTP id 1455; Sat, 17 Apr 93 19:56:58 EDT Received: from RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (NJE origin LISTSERV@RUTVM1) by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (LMail V1.1d/1.7f) with BSMTP id 7176; Sat, 17 Apr 1993 19:56:58 -0400 Date: Sat, 17 Apr 1993 19:56:46 -0400 Reply-To: psyc@pucc.bitnet Sender: "PSYCOLOQUY: Refereed Electronic Journal of Peer Discussion" From: Stevan Harnad Subject: psycoloquy.93.4.38.human-animal-bond.3.shapiro (75 lines) Comments: To: psyc@pucc.bitnet To: Multiple recipients of list PSYC psycoloquy.93.4.38.human-animal-bond.3.shapiro Saturday 17 April 1993 ISSN 1055-0143 (4 paragraphs, 2 references, 68 lines) PSYCOLOQUY is sponsored by the American Psychological Association (APA) Copyright 1993 Kenneth Shapiro SCIENTIST-ANIMAL BOND: BETTER LATE THAN NEVER Book Review of Davis & Balfour on Human Animal Bond Kennneth Shapiro Executive Director Psychologists for the Ethical Treatment of Animals PO Box 1297 Washington Grove MD 20880 kshapiro@orlith.bates.edu 1. I see Davis & Balfour (1992) as an extended brief against vestiges of the ideal that individual investigators are neutral entities, divorced from any relation with their object of study. I offer first a historical and then a prospective comment; both are from the point of view of a psychologist interested in the ethics of the use of nonhuman animals in invasive laboratory-based research. 2. At the turn of the century the emerging field of psychology attempted to define itself as a natural science primarily through the construction of the laboratory as the site of research and the laboratory animal as the object of research. It is important to understand that both lab and lab animal are constructs and that both developed in the service of establishing the neutrality and objectivity of the investigator, a desideratum defined by a then regnant philosophy of science: logical positivism. 3. Through selective breeding of albino Norway rats, psychologists developed a more tractable object of study which they could insert into an increasingly mechanized and instrumentalized lab. The metaphor of the lab and the lab animal embodied the ideals of detached, impartial observer and of experimental control. In the new field of experimental laboratory psychology, animal "subjects" were "organisms" or "preparations" or "models" of general behavioral and, later, physiological processes. In this construction, individual and even species-specific behavior (not to mention any form of scientist-animal bond or relation) were denied. In the context of our current understanding of the capabilities of nonhuman animals and the reexamination of the ethics of our use of them, these constructions are a profound embarrassment. Psychology's discovery of the "inevitable bond" is belated, owing to the continuing power of these constructions to conceal what everyone outside the laboratory already knows: Human and nonhuman animals form stable, affectively based relations. We can only understand them within and through those social structures. 4. Prospectively, we must give up the strategy of understanding ourselves through the study of nonhuman animals as models of us. The animal model strategy assumes that animals are like test tubes and can be "related" to as containers or carriers of germs. We now understand that the more appropriate regulative ideal is that animals are individuals embedded in interspecies social structures that include the investigator. I believe that adopting this ideal will result in a more veridical and useful understanding of animals and human-animal relations. In any case, as it is more burdensome ethically to the investigator, its adoption will diminish the suffering and waste of lives of laboratory animals. REFERENCES Davis, H. (1993) Precis of "The Inevitable Bond" (Davis & Balfour 1992) PSYCOLOQUY 4(12) human-animal-bond.1.davis Davis, H. & Balfour, D. (1992) (eds) The Inevitable Bond. Cambridge University Press 29-Apr-93 22:45:27-GMT,25863;000000000001 Received: from rutvm1.rutgers.edu by aramis.rutgers.edu (5.59/SMI4.0/RU1.5/3.08) id AA08990; Thu, 29 Apr 93 18:45:25 EDT Message-Id: <9304292245.AA08990@aramis.rutgers.edu> Received: from RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (IBM VM SMTP R1.2.1MX) with BSMTP id 2067; Thu, 29 Apr 93 18:44:10 EDT Received: from RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (NJE origin LISTSERV@RUTVM1) by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (LMail V1.1d/1.7f) with BSMTP id 0551; Thu, 29 Apr 1993 18:44:07 -0400 Date: Thu, 29 Apr 1993 18:09:37 EDT Reply-To: psyc@pucc.bitnet Sender: "PSYCOLOQUY: Refereed Electronic Journal of Peer Discussion" From: Stevan Harnad Subject: PSYCOLOQUY Newsletter Section (497 lines) Comments: To: psyc@pucc.bitnet To: Multiple recipients of list PSYC PSYCOLOQUY ISSN 1055-0143 Thu, 29 Apr 93 Newsletter Section (1) Query: child abuse - resources on the Internet (2) Announcement: TENNET 5; University of Quebec, Montreal (3) Employment: Post/pre-docs, Educational Technology, Nottingham, U.K. (4) Announcement: International Conference on the Family, Israel (5) Announcement: Call for papers: GALA (6) Query: Russian Non-Verbal Communication (7) Query: AN APPEAL FOR PSYCHOLOGY BOOKS FOR THE PEOPLE OF VIETNAM (8) Announcement: International Psychological Reading, Ukraine (9) Announcement: Conference: Society for Philosophy and Psychology ---------------------------------------------------------------------- From: EM0872@ALBNYVMS.BitNet Subject: (1) Query: child abuse - resources on the Internet Dear friends, I am compiling a list of the child abuse resources available on the internet. The list will include discussion lists, research, data, and other resources. The scope may be international, if the info is available. Thank you for your help. Ed Maguire EM0872@ALBNYVMS ------------------------------ From: Whit Subject: (2) Announcement: TENNET 5; University of Quebec, Montreal TENNET 5: May 29-31, 1994 History of Neuropsychology Fest: June 1, 1994 CHEIRON Society: June 2-5, 1994 All three meetings will be held at the University of Quebec at Montreal (UQAM) under the auspices of the Laboratory of Cognitive Neuroscience and the Department of Psychology at UQAM; for additional information, please contact: Dr. Harry A. Whitaker Departement de Psychologie Universite du Quebec a Montreal Case postale 8888, Succursale A Montreal, Quebec, Canada H3C 3P8 E-mail: R12040@UQAM.BITNET ------------------------------ From: Frank Ritter Subject: (3) Employment: Post/pre-docs, Educational Technology, Nottingham, U.K. ESRC CENTRE FOR RESEARCH IN DEVELOPMENT, INSTRUCTION & TRAINING RESEARCH FELLOWS/ASSISTANTS Applications are invited for up to ten research posts in the ESRC funded Centre, based in the Department of Psychology. Opportunities exist for research workers in the following areas: A: Post-Doctoral Research Fellows in 1. Teacher Training 2. Industrial Training 3. A.I./HCI and the development of educational technology 4. Collaborative learning and educational technology B: Graduate Research Assistants in 1. Children with learning difficulties 2. Peer tutoring 3. Fundamental processes of learning 4. Mathematics and/or science education The Centre provides an inter-disciplinary research environment and applicants from any contributing discipline (eg Psychology, A.I., Cognitive Science, Computer Science, Education) are invited. For senior positions, previous inter-disciplinary research experience will be an advantage. Applications from graduates with relevant joint degrees will also be well received. Apply with full curriculum vitae and names of two referees, or for details to: Professor David Wood, Director, ESRC Centre for Research in Development, Instruction and Training, Department of Psychology, University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD, Telephone ++ 44 (0602) 515302 ------------------------------ From: solly dreman Subject: (4) Announcement: International Conference on the Family, Israel We are pleased to announce that the Ministry of Science & Technology is sponsoring an inter-disciplinary conference entitled "The Family on the Threshold of the 21st Century: Trends and Implications". The conference will take place in Jerusalem, Israel from May 29-June 2, 1994 and will focus on several pertinent issues relevant to the contemporary family including: Immigration & the contemporary family, Gender Issues in the contemporary family Changes in the family life-cycle, Stress in the contemporary family, Legal, economic and historical trends affecting the contemporary family Life styles and patterns in the contemporary Israeli family Nineteen ninety-four has been designated by the United Nations as "The Year of the Family" and the conference intends to discuss via plenary sessions, panels, workshops and poster displays, salient aspects of family life as the turn of the century approaches. Upon request we will be happy to forward more details about the conference in our first announcement which should be ready by May-June 1993. Please submit your name and address via airmail to Dr. Rachel Lipsky, Conference Coordinator, Ministry of Science Technology, P.O.B. 18195, Jerusalem 91181 or via E-Mail to Rachel@ilncrd We look forward to hearing from you. Prof. Solly Dreman, Conference Chairperson Director of the Center for Family Life Research and Counselling Behavioral Sciences Department Ben Gurion University of the Negev Beer Sheva 84105 ISRAEL (E-Mail: DREMAN@BGUMAIL.BGU.AC.IL Fax: 972-57-232-766 Telephone: 972-57-472067) ------------------------------ From: Durham Linguistics Subject: (5) Announcement: Call for papers: GALA CALL FOR PAPERS G A L A GENERATIVE APPROACHES TO LANGUAGE ACQUISITION G A L A 17-19 September 1993 UNIVERSITY OF DURHAM ENGLAND The conference aims to bring together research within a generative framework on first language development, second language development, signed language development, and impaired language development. Abstracts are invited on all aspects of language acquisition concerned with the relation between development and linguistic theory, including but not limited to syntax, phonology, morphology, the lexicon and semantics--as well as the interfaces. Papers will be 30 minutes followed by a 10-minute discussion session. Guest Speakers: Prof. Juergen Meisel, University of Hamburg Prof. Ken Wexler, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Prof. Lydia White, McGill University Those interested in presenting a paper should send 4 copies of a one-page abstract (3 anonymous; 1 camera-ready, with name(s) and affiliation(s)) to: GALA 1993 Coordinators School of English and Linguistics University of Durham, Elvet Riverside New Elvet, Durham DH1 3JT ENGLAND Please also include a 3" x 5" card containing the following information: a. author(s) d. address g. fax j. summer e-mail b. affiliation(s) e. phone h. summer address k. summer fax c. title of paper f. e-mail i. summer phone l. audiovisual needs GALA will provide bed and breakfast for all speakers during the conference. Several awards towards travel and expenses will be granted to selected 1994 applicants to the Ph.D. programs in Linguistics at the University of Durham. For information and Ph.D. application forms, write to the address above. * GALA is the follow-up to the 1991 "Crossing Boundaries" conference * * on language development held in Tuebingen, sister-city of Durham, * * and is sponsored by the University of Durham. Organizing Committee: * * Joseph Emonds (Durham), Bonnie D. Schwartz (Durham), Rosemarie Tracy * * (Tuebingen) and Martha Young-Scholten (Durham). Queries should be * * sent to the above mailing address or: * * * * e-mail: Durham.Linguistics@durham.ac.uk * * phone: (44-91) 374-2315; (44-91) 374-2643 * * fax: (44-91) 374-7471 * DEADLINE FOR RECEIPT OF ABSTRACTS: *POSTMARKED* BY 15 JUNE 1993 Notification of acceptance to be sent by 15 July ------------------------------ From: mcole@weber.ucsd.edu (Mike Cole) Subject: (6) Query: Russian Non-Verbal Communication >From: "Vladimir P. Morozov" We send you the annotation to the problems elaborating in the Laboratory of Non-Verbal Communication which was recently organized in IPRAS. We'll be very obliged if you inform your collegues about this annotation. We are looking for the contacts with the scientists dealing with the same problems or interested in them. Sincerely yours Professor Vladimir P. Morozov THE LABORATORY OF NON-VERBAL COMMUNICATION Institute of Psychology of Russian Academy of Sciences Head of the Laboratory - Professor Vladimir P. Morozov,Dr.Sci(Biol) The Laboratory of non-verbal communication (NVC) was organized in 1987 with the aim to study the non-verbal means and processes of communication, known as the non-verbal and extralinguistic communication. The specialization of the NVC Laboratory lies in the studies of the problem on the non-verbal communication not only by means of the models that are traditional for the western and our science (colloquial speech), but also with the help of the model of creative activities, in particular,the vocal and musical art, drama, ballet and other kinds of art. For this purpose the ART and Science interdisciplinary Centre was formed on the basis of the NVC Laboratory within which the researches are carried on with the participation of a number of the organizations-coexecutives. The main principles of the research activity of the NVC Laboratory are the following: a) a combination of the fundamental-theoretical aspects, b) a broad application of the modern means of research, including the new experimental-methodical apparatus for studies, specially elaborated in the NVC Laboratory, c) the realization of the system and integrated approach to the elaboration of the problem. The most complete classification of various kinds of non-verbal information has been worked out in the NVC Laboratory. The psychoacoustic and psychophysiological patterns of their perception by people of different age and professional categories also have been studied. The model of the two-channel (verbal - non-verbal) system of communication between people has been proposed. The NVC Laboratory has been doing the researches on the originally proposed concept of the emotional hearing as one of the most important perceptive part of the NVC system. Also the notion of the artistic type of a person is under study in the light of the theory of non-verbal communication. The studies on the creation of the psychophysiological portrait of the person on the base of the peculiarities of his speech and voice by means of both subjective and objective (apparatus) methods of analysis are carried on. The theoretical studies are aimed at the solution of a number of the applied problems in the field of the professional selection, pedagogy, criminology, medical psychology. The key words: non-verbal communication, extralinguistic communication, personality, emotions, creative activity, psychology of art, speech, voice, psychoacoustics, psychophysiology. Address: 13, Yaroslavskaya Str. 129366, Moscow, Russia Tel.: (095) - 282-73-03 e-mail: vmorozov@ipras.msk.su ------------------------------ From: David.Baldwin Subject: (7) Query: AN APPEAL FOR PSYCHOLOGY BOOKS FOR THE PEOPLE OF VIETNAM My husband and I have just returned from a People to People peace delegation to Vietnam. We were received by the Vietnamese people (not just the government officials) with love and what I can only term an amazing capacity for forgiveness. While in Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon), we were privileged to meet a woman I would describe as a Great Soul. Her name is Dr To Thi Anh. She is a Professor of Psychology at Saigon University,a psychologist and one of the only two practising psychotherapists in Vietnam. Trained at San Diego University in the late sixties where she was much influenced by one of her teachers, Dr Victor Frankl, author of "Man in Search of Meaning," she has used Frankl's work very successfully in her practice, assisting survivors of what are now euphemistically termed "reeducation camps" but which most people know as "concentration camps." Dr To Thi Anh said that because of the way the country has been plagued by wars, the psychological toll on the people has been immense. She has found that Group Psychotherapy, Group Dynamics and Psychodrama are techniques that have brought some benefits to her patients. She asked us to send her some books on those subjects. My husband and I are not psychologists but wish very much to assist her in her work. We don't know what is current with regard to texts in these areas, but I did a library search and came up with a few titles. We are sending her copy of "Existential Psychotherapy" by Irwin Yalom, a book that makes reference to Frankl's ideas. We would like to appeal to the people on this bulletin board system to send her one or more of the books listed below, or any others on the subjects that you feel are relevant. If our appeal results in multiple copies, so much the better, since she stressed that they have few books with which to teach students of psychology. Used books are definitely acceptable. The titles I was able to find in print and to price are: 1. Change in the Context of Group Therapy. Mary W. Nicholas. New York: Brunner/Mazel, 1984. $35.95 2. Group Psychotherapy: A Peer-Focused Approach. Richard A. Hogan. New York: Holt Rhinehart Winston, 1980. $42.95 3. Group Psychodynamics: New Paradigms and New Perspectives. Edited by David Halperin. Chicago: Year Book Medical Publishers, 1989. $49.00 4. Handbook of Behavioral Group Therapy. Edited by Dennis Upper and Steven M. Ross. New York: Plenum Press, 1985. $75.00 5. Personal Transformations in Small Groups: A Jungian Perspective. Robert Boyd, with contributions from John Dirk et al. London, New York: Tavistock/Routledge, 1991. $49.95 6. The Theory and Practice of Group Psychotherapy. Irwin D. Yalom. New York: Basic Books, 1975. $32.00 My library search showed nothing current on psychodrama, and quite a lot of the literature under the heading of Group Dynamics had to do with drug rehabilita- tion therapy -- a problem we have here but which is not so common in Vietnam. My cursory knowledge of psychological terms tells me they would benefit from any current texts on Post Traumatic Stress Syndrome, but I was not able to find books with that specific title or subject classification. Plus I think one needs to be a psychologist to assess whether the text is universal enough in application that it would be useful to people of a different culture. If you have better suggestions than the above books, please feel welcome to send them to Dr Tho Thi Anh. Her mailing address is: Dr Tho Thi Anh Psychologist 82A Ly Chinh Thang Ho Chi Minh City Vietnam Although there is still a United States trade embargo on Vietnam, there was no problem sending books by mail -- sea mail (called surface mail at the U.S. Post Office) is less expensive. Please let me know by E-Mail if you plan to/decide to respond to this appeal. I know Dr Anh and her students thank you in advance for any assistance you can provide. Shauna Singh Baldwin ------------------------------ From: UAP001@DDOHRZ11.BITNET Subject: (8) Announcement: International Psychological Reading, Ukraine A LETTER OF NOTIFICATION In September, 1993, The kharkov State University (Ukraine) organizes International Psychologikal Reading devoted to the 60th anniversary of the Kharkov psychologikal school which laid a basis for psychologikal science in this country (L.S.Vygotsky, A.R.Luria, A.N.Leontyev etc.), and to the 90th anniversary of P.I.Zinchenco - the founder of the Department of psychology of the Kharkov University, an outstandding researcher of the problems of memory psychology. A range of problems covered by the Readings includes: 1. History, Theory and Methodology of psychology (Methodology of modern psychology. L.S.Vygotsky and world psychology. Theory of activity. Memory and personality. History and traditions of the Kharkov psychological school). 2. Psychology and Society (Personality and modern world. Political psychology. Ethnopsichologi. Psychology of deviational behavior). 3. Psychology and Education (Humanistic Approaches in pedagogics and psychology. Psycholody of developing education. Psychological aspects of multi-stage education). 4. Psychology and Health (Psychology and Ecology. Pathopsychology. Neuropsychology. Defectology. Psychocorrection and Psychotherapy. Psychological aspects of sexology. Psychological problems of Narcology and Alkoholism.). 5. Applied psychology (Psychodiagnostics. Computer diagnostics. Counselling. Professional orientation. Marcet psychology). You are welcome at one of the largest higher education ectablishments of Ukraine - the Kharcov State University. Your participation should be confirmed up to April, 1. Please supply the subject of your report (paper). The main items of your paper should be submitted up to April, 25, to be published. Ucrainian, Russian and English are the working languages of the conference. Supplementary information will be provided as soon as your application for participation is accepted. Mailing address: Ukraine 310077 Kharcov sq.Svoboda, 4 Kharcov State University, Psychology Department Organizationl Committee of Psychological Readings Phone: (0572) 45-71-53 Demchenko Michael Nick. | deminick%sptcu.kharkov.ua@relay.ussr.eu.net Kharkov State University | (0572) 37-91-04 ------------------------------ From: HORGANT@MSUVX1.MEMST.EDU Subject: (9) Announcement: Conference: Society for Philosophy and Psychology SOCIETY FOR PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY 19th Annual Meeting Simon Fraser University (Harbour Centre Campus) 515 West Hastings Street, Vancouver, BC, Canada June 2-5, 1993 WEDNESDAY, JUNE 2 10-12:30 Invited Symposium: Moral Psychology Alvin Goldman (Philosophy, University of Arizona) Dennis Krebs (Psychology, Simon Fraser University) Discussant: Owen Flanagan (Philosophy, Wellesley College) 1:30 - 3:30 Invited Symposium: Spatial Representation: New Directions Chair: John Campbell (Philosophy, New College, Oxford) Jim Jennings (Computer Science, Cornell University) Linda Hermer (Psychology, Cornell University) John OKeefe (Anatomy and Dev. Biology, University College, London) 4 - 6 Contributed Papers Session A. Intentional Interpretation 1. Speaker: Frances Egan (Rutgers University) "Intentionality and the Theory of Vision" Commentator: TBA 2. Speaker: Lawrence Shapiro (Philosophy, University of Wisconson, Madison), Taking it From the Top: A Criticism of Dretske's Bottom Up Approach to Representational Content" Commentator: Fred Dretske (Philosophy, Stanford University) Session B. Conscious States and Their Empirical Investigation 1. Valery Hardcastle, Determining the Moment of Consciousness (Philosophy, Virginia Tech) Commentator: TBA 2. Craig Purdue, (Philosophy, Wayne State University) Are Some Pains Empirical Givens? Commentator: TBA THURSDAY, JUNE 3 9 - 12* Invited Symposium: Bodily Sensations and the Body Image Chair: Naomi Eilan (Kings College Research Centre, Cambridge, U.K.) Anthony Marcel (MRC Applied Psychology Unit, Cambridge, U.K.) John Campbell (Philosophy, New College, Oxford) Jonathan Cole (Dept. of Clinical Neurophysiology, Poole Hospital, U.K.) 1-3:00 Invited Symposium: Beyond Grice: The New Pragmatics of Discourse Kent Bach, (Philosophy, San Fransico State University) Stephen Neale, (Philosophy, University of California, Berkeley) 3:30 - 4:30 Contributed Papers A. Hysteria in a Neural Network, Dan Lloyd (Philosophy, Trinity College) and Karalyn Kinsella (Program in Neuroscience, Trinity College) Commentator: William Fulford, (Psychiatry, Warneford Hospital, Oxford University) B. Cognitivism qua Scientific Revolution, John Bickle (Philosophy, East Carolina University) Commentator: Kenneth Aizawa (Central Michigan University) 4:45 Invited Address Daniel Sperber (Cognitive Anthropology, Centre National de la Recherche Scientific/Universite de Paris) FRIDAY, JUNE 4 9:30 - 12:30* Invited Symposium: How to think Cognitively About Scientific Theories Ronald Giere, (Philosophy, University of Minnesota) Paul M. Churchland (Philosophy, University of California at San Diego) Robert Cummins (Philosophy, University of Arizona) Ed Wisnewiski, (Psychology, Northwestern, University) 1:30 - 3:30 Contributed Papers A. Connectionism and Psychological Explanation 1. Robert Matthews (Philosophy, Rutgers University), Three-Concept Monte: Explanation, Implementation, and Systematicity Commentator: Ted Warfield (Philosophy, Rutgers University) 2. Tim Van Gelder, (Philosophy, University of Indiana) Connectionism and the MInd-Body Problem Commentator: Bill Ramsey (University of Notre Dame) B. The Self-ascription of Beliefs and Desires 1. Robert Gordon (Philosophy, University of Missouri) Simulation Without Introspection or Inference from You to Me Commentator: Martin Davies (Philosophy, Corpus Christi College, Oxford) 2. Victoria McGeer (Philosophy, Vanderbilt) "Knowing Ourselves: An Externalist Account of Authorative Self-Knowledge 4 - 5 Contributed Papers A. Cognitive Ethology: Slayers, Skeptics and Proponents, Marc Beckoff (Environmental, Population, and Organism Biology, University of Colorado Boulder) & Colin Allen Philosophy Texase A&M) Commentator: Kim Sterelney (Philosophy, University of Victoria at Wellington, N.Z.) B. The Dynamic Mind: A New Paradigm for Cognitive Science, Jim Garson (philosophy, University of Houston) Commentator: Terry Horgan (Philosophy, Memphis State University) 8:30 Presidential Address: Ruth Millikan (Philosophy, U Connecticut) SATURDAY, JUNE 5 9:30 - 12:30* Invited Book Symposium: Consciousness Explained Georges Rey (Philosophy, University of Maryland) Bjorn Ramberg (Philosophy, Simon Fraser University) David Rosenthal (Philosophy, CUNY) Discussant: Daniel C. Dennett (Center for Cognitive Studies, Tufts University) 1:30-3:45 Invited Symposium: Cognitive Ethology in Action: New Views of Bird Brains Chair: Colin Beer (Animal Behavior, Rutgers University, Newark) Irene Pepperburg (Ethology, Univeristy of Arizona) Christopher Evans (Ethology, Univeristy of California at Davis) Discussant: Carolyn Ristau (Ethology, Rockerfeller University) Inquiries to Terry Horgan at: HORGANT@MEMSTVX1.BITNET Terry Horgan Secretary/Treasurer, SPP Memphis State University Philosophy Dept. 327 Clement Hall Memphis TN 38152 ------------------------------ PSYCOLOQUY is sponsored by the Science Directorate and the Office of Publications and Communication of the American Psychological Association (202) 955-7653 Editors: (scientific discussion) (professional/clinical discussion) Stevan Harnad Cary Cherniss (Assoc Ed.) Psychology Department Graduate School of Applied Princeton University Professional Psychology Rutgers University Assistant Editor: Malcolm Bauer Psychology Department Princeton University 6-May-93 20:35:20-GMT,26638;000000000001 Received: from klinzhai.rutgers.edu by aramis.rutgers.edu (5.59/SMI4.0/RU1.5/3.08) id AA04166; Thu, 6 May 93 16:35:02 EDT Received: by klinzhai.rutgers.edu (5.59/SMI4.0/RU1.5/3.08) id AA07118; Thu, 6 May 93 16:35:00 EDT Received: from aramis.rutgers.edu by klinzhai.rutgers.edu (5.59/SMI4.0/RU1.5/3.08) id AA23697; Mon, 3 May 93 16:47:48 EDT Received: by aramis.rutgers.edu (5.59/SMI4.0/RU1.5/3.08) id AA15810; Mon, 3 May 93 16:47:38 EDT Resent-Message-Id: <9305032047.AA15810@aramis.rutgers.edu> Received: from rutvm1.rutgers.edu by aramis.rutgers.edu (5.59/SMI4.0/RU1.5/3.08) id AA04256; Fri, 30 Apr 93 08:31:25 EDT Message-Id: <9304301231.AA04256@aramis.rutgers.edu> Received: from RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (IBM VM SMTP R1.2.1MX) with BSMTP id 3143; Fri, 30 Apr 93 08:30:10 EDT Received: from RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (NJE origin LISTSERV@RUTVM1) by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (LMail V1.1d/1.7f) with BSMTP id 4855; Fri, 30 Apr 1993 08:30:08 -0400 Date: Thu, 29 Apr 1993 18:09:37 EDT Reply-To: "PSYCOLOQUY: Refereed Electronic Journal of Peer Discussion" Sender: "PSYCOLOQUY: Refereed Electronic Journal of Peer Discussion" Comments: Warning -- original Sender: tag was NETNEWS@AUVM.AMERICAN.EDU From: Stevan Harnad Subject: PSYCOLOQUY Newsletter Section (497 lines) To: Multiple recipients of list PSYC Resent-To: mcgrew@aramis.rutgers.edu Resent-Date: Thu, 6 May 93 16:34:59 EDT Resent-From: Charles Mcgrew PSYCOLOQUY ISSN 1055-0143 Thu, 29 Apr 93 Newsletter Section (1) Query: child abuse - resources on the Internet (2) Announcement: TENNET 5; University of Quebec, Montreal (3) Employment: Post/pre-docs, Educational Technology, Nottingham, U.K. (4) Announcement: International Conference on the Family, Israel (5) Announcement: Call for papers: GALA (6) Query: Russian Non-Verbal Communication (7) Query: AN APPEAL FOR PSYCHOLOGY BOOKS FOR THE PEOPLE OF VIETNAM (8) Announcement: International Psychological Reading, Ukraine (9) Announcement: Conference: Society for Philosophy and Psychology ---------------------------------------------------------------------- From: EM0872@ALBNYVMS.BitNet Subject: (1) Query: child abuse - resources on the Internet Dear friends, I am compiling a list of the child abuse resources available on the internet. The list will include discussion lists, research, data, and other resources. The scope may be international, if the info is available. Thank you for your help. Ed Maguire EM0872@ALBNYVMS ------------------------------ From: Whit Subject: (2) Announcement: TENNET 5; University of Quebec, Montreal TENNET 5: May 29-31, 1994 History of Neuropsychology Fest: June 1, 1994 CHEIRON Society: June 2-5, 1994 All three meetings will be held at the University of Quebec at Montreal (UQAM) under the auspices of the Laboratory of Cognitive Neuroscience and the Department of Psychology at UQAM; for additional information, please contact: Dr. Harry A. Whitaker Departement de Psychologie Universite du Quebec a Montreal Case postale 8888, Succursale A Montreal, Quebec, Canada H3C 3P8 E-mail: R12040@UQAM.BITNET ------------------------------ From: Frank Ritter Subject: (3) Employment: Post/pre-docs, Educational Technology, Nottingham, U.K. ESRC CENTRE FOR RESEARCH IN DEVELOPMENT, INSTRUCTION & TRAINING RESEARCH FELLOWS/ASSISTANTS Applications are invited for up to ten research posts in the ESRC funded Centre, based in the Department of Psychology. Opportunities exist for research workers in the following areas: A: Post-Doctoral Research Fellows in 1. Teacher Training 2. Industrial Training 3. A.I./HCI and the development of educational technology 4. Collaborative learning and educational technology B: Graduate Research Assistants in 1. Children with learning difficulties 2. Peer tutoring 3. Fundamental processes of learning 4. Mathematics and/or science education The Centre provides an inter-disciplinary research environment and applicants from any contributing discipline (eg Psychology, A.I., Cognitive Science, Computer Science, Education) are invited. For senior positions, previous inter-disciplinary research experience will be an advantage. Applications from graduates with relevant joint degrees will also be well received. Apply with full curriculum vitae and names of two referees, or for details to: Professor David Wood, Director, ESRC Centre for Research in Development, Instruction and Training, Department of Psychology, University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD, Telephone ++ 44 (0602) 515302 ------------------------------ From: solly dreman Subject: (4) Announcement: International Conference on the Family, Israel We are pleased to announce that the Ministry of Science & Technology is sponsoring an inter-disciplinary conference entitled "The Family on the Threshold of the 21st Century: Trends and Implications". The conference will take place in Jerusalem, Israel from May 29-June 2, 1994 and will focus on several pertinent issues relevant to the contemporary family including: Immigration & the contemporary family, Gender Issues in the contemporary family Changes in the family life-cycle, Stress in the contemporary family, Legal, economic and historical trends affecting the contemporary family Life styles and patterns in the contemporary Israeli family Nineteen ninety-four has been designated by the United Nations as "The Year of the Family" and the conference intends to discuss via plenary sessions, panels, workshops and poster displays, salient aspects of family life as the turn of the century approaches. Upon request we will be happy to forward more details about the conference in our first announcement which should be ready by May-June 1993. Please submit your name and address via airmail to Dr. Rachel Lipsky, Conference Coordinator, Ministry of Science Technology, P.O.B. 18195, Jerusalem 91181 or via E-Mail to Rachel@ilncrd We look forward to hearing from you. Prof. Solly Dreman, Conference Chairperson Director of the Center for Family Life Research and Counselling Behavioral Sciences Department Ben Gurion University of the Negev Beer Sheva 84105 ISRAEL (E-Mail: DREMAN@BGUMAIL.BGU.AC.IL Fax: 972-57-232-766 Telephone: 972-57-472067) ------------------------------ From: Durham Linguistics Subject: (5) Announcement: Call for papers: GALA CALL FOR PAPERS G A L A GENERATIVE APPROACHES TO LANGUAGE ACQUISITION G A L A 17-19 September 1993 UNIVERSITY OF DURHAM ENGLAND The conference aims to bring together research within a generative framework on first language development, second language development, signed language development, and impaired language development. Abstracts are invited on all aspects of language acquisition concerned with the relation between development and linguistic theory, including but not limited to syntax, phonology, morphology, the lexicon and semantics--as well as the interfaces. Papers will be 30 minutes followed by a 10-minute discussion session. Guest Speakers: Prof. Juergen Meisel, University of Hamburg Prof. Ken Wexler, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Prof. Lydia White, McGill University Those interested in presenting a paper should send 4 copies of a one-page abstract (3 anonymous; 1 camera-ready, with name(s) and affiliation(s)) to: GALA 1993 Coordinators School of English and Linguistics University of Durham, Elvet Riverside New Elvet, Durham DH1 3JT ENGLAND Please also include a 3" x 5" card containing the following information: a. author(s) d. address g. fax j. summer e-mail b. affiliation(s) e. phone h. summer address k. summer fax c. title of paper f. e-mail i. summer phone l. audiovisual needs GALA will provide bed and breakfast for all speakers during the conference. Several awards towards travel and expenses will be granted to selected 1994 applicants to the Ph.D. programs in Linguistics at the University of Durham. For information and Ph.D. application forms, write to the address above. * GALA is the follow-up to the 1991 "Crossing Boundaries" conference * * on language development held in Tuebingen, sister-city of Durham, * * and is sponsored by the University of Durham. Organizing Committee: * * Joseph Emonds (Durham), Bonnie D. Schwartz (Durham), Rosemarie Tracy * * (Tuebingen) and Martha Young-Scholten (Durham). Queries should be * * sent to the above mailing address or: * * * * e-mail: Durham.Linguistics@durham.ac.uk * * phone: (44-91) 374-2315; (44-91) 374-2643 * * fax: (44-91) 374-7471 * DEADLINE FOR RECEIPT OF ABSTRACTS: *POSTMARKED* BY 15 JUNE 1993 Notification of acceptance to be sent by 15 July ------------------------------ From: mcole@weber.ucsd.edu (Mike Cole) Subject: (6) Query: Russian Non-Verbal Communication >From: "Vladimir P. Morozov" We send you the annotation to the problems elaborating in the Laboratory of Non-Verbal Communication which was recently organized in IPRAS. We'll be very obliged if you inform your collegues about this annotation. We are looking for the contacts with the scientists dealing with the same problems or interested in them. Sincerely yours Professor Vladimir P. Morozov THE LABORATORY OF NON-VERBAL COMMUNICATION Institute of Psychology of Russian Academy of Sciences Head of the Laboratory - Professor Vladimir P. Morozov,Dr.Sci(Biol) The Laboratory of non-verbal communication (NVC) was organized in 1987 with the aim to study the non-verbal means and processes of communication, known as the non-verbal and extralinguistic communication. The specialization of the NVC Laboratory lies in the studies of the problem on the non-verbal communication not only by means of the models that are traditional for the western and our science (colloquial speech), but also with the help of the model of creative activities, in particular,the vocal and musical art, drama, ballet and other kinds of art. For this purpose the ART and Science interdisciplinary Centre was formed on the basis of the NVC Laboratory within which the researches are carried on with the participation of a number of the organizations-coexecutives. The main principles of the research activity of the NVC Laboratory are the following: a) a combination of the fundamental-theoretical aspects, b) a broad application of the modern means of research, including the new experimental-methodical apparatus for studies, specially elaborated in the NVC Laboratory, c) the realization of the system and integrated approach to the elaboration of the problem. The most complete classification of various kinds of non-verbal information has been worked out in the NVC Laboratory. The psychoacoustic and psychophysiological patterns of their perception by people of different age and professional categories also have been studied. The model of the two-channel (verbal - non-verbal) system of communication between people has been proposed. The NVC Laboratory has been doing the researches on the originally proposed concept of the emotional hearing as one of the most important perceptive part of the NVC system. Also the notion of the artistic type of a person is under study in the light of the theory of non-verbal communication. The studies on the creation of the psychophysiological portrait of the person on the base of the peculiarities of his speech and voice by means of both subjective and objective (apparatus) methods of analysis are carried on. The theoretical studies are aimed at the solution of a number of the applied problems in the field of the professional selection, pedagogy, criminology, medical psychology. The key words: non-verbal communication, extralinguistic communication, personality, emotions, creative activity, psychology of art, speech, voice, psychoacoustics, psychophysiology. Address: 13, Yaroslavskaya Str. 129366, Moscow, Russia Tel.: (095) - 282-73-03 e-mail: vmorozov@ipras.msk.su ------------------------------ From: David.Baldwin Subject: (7) Query: AN APPEAL FOR PSYCHOLOGY BOOKS FOR THE PEOPLE OF VIETNAM My husband and I have just returned from a People to People peace delegation to Vietnam. We were received by the Vietnamese people (not just the government officials) with love and what I can only term an amazing capacity for forgiveness. While in Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon), we were privileged to meet a woman I would describe as a Great Soul. Her name is Dr To Thi Anh. She is a Professor of Psychology at Saigon University,a psychologist and one of the only two practising psychotherapists in Vietnam. Trained at San Diego University in the late sixties where she was much influenced by one of her teachers, Dr Victor Frankl, author of "Man in Search of Meaning," she has used Frankl's work very successfully in her practice, assisting survivors of what are now euphemistically termed "reeducation camps" but which most people know as "concentration camps." Dr To Thi Anh said that because of the way the country has been plagued by wars, the psychological toll on the people has been immense. She has found that Group Psychotherapy, Group Dynamics and Psychodrama are techniques that have brought some benefits to her patients. She asked us to send her some books on those subjects. My husband and I are not psychologists but wish very much to assist her in her work. We don't know what is current with regard to texts in these areas, but I did a library search and came up with a few titles. We are sending her copy of "Existential Psychotherapy" by Irwin Yalom, a book that makes reference to Frankl's ideas. We would like to appeal to the people on this bulletin board system to send her one or more of the books listed below, or any others on the subjects that you feel are relevant. If our appeal results in multiple copies, so much the better, since she stressed that they have few books with which to teach students of psychology. Used books are definitely acceptable. The titles I was able to find in print and to price are: 1. Change in the Context of Group Therapy. Mary W. Nicholas. New York: Brunner/Mazel, 1984. $35.95 2. Group Psychotherapy: A Peer-Focused Approach. Richard A. Hogan. New York: Holt Rhinehart Winston, 1980. $42.95 3. Group Psychodynamics: New Paradigms and New Perspectives. Edited by David Halperin. Chicago: Year Book Medical Publishers, 1989. $49.00 4. Handbook of Behavioral Group Therapy. Edited by Dennis Upper and Steven M. Ross. New York: Plenum Press, 1985. $75.00 5. Personal Transformations in Small Groups: A Jungian Perspective. Robert Boyd, with contributions from John Dirk et al. London, New York: Tavistock/Routledge, 1991. $49.95 6. The Theory and Practice of Group Psychotherapy. Irwin D. Yalom. New York: Basic Books, 1975. $32.00 My library search showed nothing current on psychodrama, and quite a lot of the literature under the heading of Group Dynamics had to do with drug rehabilita- tion therapy -- a problem we have here but which is not so common in Vietnam. My cursory knowledge of psychological terms tells me they would benefit from any current texts on Post Traumatic Stress Syndrome, but I was not able to find books with that specific title or subject classification. Plus I think one needs to be a psychologist to assess whether the text is universal enough in application that it would be useful to people of a different culture. If you have better suggestions than the above books, please feel welcome to send them to Dr Tho Thi Anh. Her mailing address is: Dr Tho Thi Anh Psychologist 82A Ly Chinh Thang Ho Chi Minh City Vietnam Although there is still a United States trade embargo on Vietnam, there was no problem sending books by mail -- sea mail (called surface mail at the U.S. Post Office) is less expensive. Please let me know by E-Mail if you plan to/decide to respond to this appeal. I know Dr Anh and her students thank you in advance for any assistance you can provide. Shauna Singh Baldwin ------------------------------ From: UAP001@DDOHRZ11.BITNET Subject: (8) Announcement: International Psychological Reading, Ukraine A LETTER OF NOTIFICATION In September, 1993, The kharkov State University (Ukraine) organizes International Psychologikal Reading devoted to the 60th anniversary of the Kharkov psychologikal school which laid a basis for psychologikal science in this country (L.S.Vygotsky, A.R.Luria, A.N.Leontyev etc.), and to the 90th anniversary of P.I.Zinchenco - the founder of the Department of psychology of the Kharkov University, an outstandding researcher of the problems of memory psychology. A range of problems covered by the Readings includes: 1. History, Theory and Methodology of psychology (Methodology of modern psychology. L.S.Vygotsky and world psychology. Theory of activity. Memory and personality. History and traditions of the Kharkov psychological school). 2. Psychology and Society (Personality and modern world. Political psychology. Ethnopsichologi. Psychology of deviational behavior). 3. Psychology and Education (Humanistic Approaches in pedagogics and psychology. Psycholody of developing education. Psychological aspects of multi-stage education). 4. Psychology and Health (Psychology and Ecology. Pathopsychology. Neuropsychology. Defectology. Psychocorrection and Psychotherapy. Psychological aspects of sexology. Psychological problems of Narcology and Alkoholism.). 5. Applied psychology (Psychodiagnostics. Computer diagnostics. Counselling. Professional orientation. Marcet psychology). You are welcome at one of the largest higher education ectablishments of Ukraine - the Kharcov State University. Your participation should be confirmed up to April, 1. Please supply the subject of your report (paper). The main items of your paper should be submitted up to April, 25, to be published. Ucrainian, Russian and English are the working languages of the conference. Supplementary information will be provided as soon as your application for participation is accepted. Mailing address: Ukraine 310077 Kharcov sq.Svoboda, 4 Kharcov State University, Psychology Department Organizationl Committee of Psychological Readings Phone: (0572) 45-71-53 Demchenko Michael Nick. | deminick%sptcu.kharkov.ua@relay.ussr.eu.net Kharkov State University | (0572) 37-91-04 ------------------------------ From: HORGANT@MSUVX1.MEMST.EDU Subject: (9) Announcement: Conference: Society for Philosophy and Psychology SOCIETY FOR PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY 19th Annual Meeting Simon Fraser University (Harbour Centre Campus) 515 West Hastings Street, Vancouver, BC, Canada June 2-5, 1993 WEDNESDAY, JUNE 2 10-12:30 Invited Symposium: Moral Psychology Alvin Goldman (Philosophy, University of Arizona) Dennis Krebs (Psychology, Simon Fraser University) Discussant: Owen Flanagan (Philosophy, Wellesley College) 1:30 - 3:30 Invited Symposium: Spatial Representation: New Directions Chair: John Campbell (Philosophy, New College, Oxford) Jim Jennings (Computer Science, Cornell University) Linda Hermer (Psychology, Cornell University) John OKeefe (Anatomy and Dev. Biology, University College, London) 4 - 6 Contributed Papers Session A. Intentional Interpretation 1. Speaker: Frances Egan (Rutgers University) "Intentionality and the Theory of Vision" Commentator: TBA 2. Speaker: Lawrence Shapiro (Philosophy, University of Wisconson, Madison), Taking it From the Top: A Criticism of Dretske's Bottom Up Approach to Representational Content" Commentator: Fred Dretske (Philosophy, Stanford University) Session B. Conscious States and Their Empirical Investigation 1. Valery Hardcastle, Determining the Moment of Consciousness (Philosophy, Virginia Tech) Commentator: TBA 2. Craig Purdue, (Philosophy, Wayne State University) Are Some Pains Empirical Givens? Commentator: TBA THURSDAY, JUNE 3 9 - 12* Invited Symposium: Bodily Sensations and the Body Image Chair: Naomi Eilan (Kings College Research Centre, Cambridge, U.K.) Anthony Marcel (MRC Applied Psychology Unit, Cambridge, U.K.) John Campbell (Philosophy, New College, Oxford) Jonathan Cole (Dept. of Clinical Neurophysiology, Poole Hospital, U.K.) 1-3:00 Invited Symposium: Beyond Grice: The New Pragmatics of Discourse Kent Bach, (Philosophy, San Fransico State University) Stephen Neale, (Philosophy, University of California, Berkeley) 3:30 - 4:30 Contributed Papers A. Hysteria in a Neural Network, Dan Lloyd (Philosophy, Trinity College) and Karalyn Kinsella (Program in Neuroscience, Trinity College) Commentator: William Fulford, (Psychiatry, Warneford Hospital, Oxford University) B. Cognitivism qua Scientific Revolution, John Bickle (Philosophy, East Carolina University) Commentator: Kenneth Aizawa (Central Michigan University) 4:45 Invited Address Daniel Sperber (Cognitive Anthropology, Centre National de la Recherche Scientific/Universite de Paris) FRIDAY, JUNE 4 9:30 - 12:30* Invited Symposium: How to think Cognitively About Scientific Theories Ronald Giere, (Philosophy, University of Minnesota) Paul M. Churchland (Philosophy, University of California at San Diego) Robert Cummins (Philosophy, University of Arizona) Ed Wisnewiski, (Psychology, Northwestern, University) 1:30 - 3:30 Contributed Papers A. Connectionism and Psychological Explanation 1. Robert Matthews (Philosophy, Rutgers University), Three-Concept Monte: Explanation, Implementation, and Systematicity Commentator: Ted Warfield (Philosophy, Rutgers University) 2. Tim Van Gelder, (Philosophy, University of Indiana) Connectionism and the MInd-Body Problem Commentator: Bill Ramsey (University of Notre Dame) B. The Self-ascription of Beliefs and Desires 1. Robert Gordon (Philosophy, University of Missouri) Simulation Without Introspection or Inference from You to Me Commentator: Martin Davies (Philosophy, Corpus Christi College, Oxford) 2. Victoria McGeer (Philosophy, Vanderbilt) "Knowing Ourselves: An Externalist Account of Authorative Self-Knowledge 4 - 5 Contributed Papers A. Cognitive Ethology: Slayers, Skeptics and Proponents, Marc Beckoff (Environmental, Population, and Organism Biology, University of Colorado Boulder) & Colin Allen Philosophy Texase A&M) Commentator: Kim Sterelney (Philosophy, University of Victoria at Wellington, N.Z.) B. The Dynamic Mind: A New Paradigm for Cognitive Science, Jim Garson (philosophy, University of Houston) Commentator: Terry Horgan (Philosophy, Memphis State University) 8:30 Presidential Address: Ruth Millikan (Philosophy, U Connecticut) SATURDAY, JUNE 5 9:30 - 12:30* Invited Book Symposium: Consciousness Explained Georges Rey (Philosophy, University of Maryland) Bjorn Ramberg (Philosophy, Simon Fraser University) David Rosenthal (Philosophy, CUNY) Discussant: Daniel C. Dennett (Center for Cognitive Studies, Tufts University) 1:30-3:45 Invited Symposium: Cognitive Ethology in Action: New Views of Bird Brains Chair: Colin Beer (Animal Behavior, Rutgers University, Newark) Irene Pepperburg (Ethology, Univeristy of Arizona) Christopher Evans (Ethology, Univeristy of California at Davis) Discussant: Carolyn Ristau (Ethology, Rockerfeller University) Inquiries to Terry Horgan at: HORGANT@MEMSTVX1.BITNET Terry Horgan Secretary/Treasurer, SPP Memphis State University Philosophy Dept. 327 Clement Hall Memphis TN 38152 ------------------------------ PSYCOLOQUY is sponsored by the Science Directorate and the Office of Publications and Communication of the American Psychological Association (202) 955-7653 Editors: (scientific discussion) (professional/clinical discussion) Stevan Harnad Cary Cherniss (Assoc Ed.) Psychology Department Graduate School of Applied Princeton University Professional Psychology Rutgers University Assistant Editor: Malcolm Bauer Psychology Department Princeton University 8-Jun-93 1:52:14-GMT,22289;000000000001 Received: from rutvm1.rutgers.edu by aramis.rutgers.edu (5.59/SMI4.0/RU1.5/3.08) id AA13385; Mon, 7 Jun 93 21:52:12 EDT Message-Id: <9306080152.AA13385@aramis.rutgers.edu> Received: from RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (IBM VM SMTP R1.2.1MX) with BSMTP id 8419; Mon, 07 Jun 93 21:51:01 EDT Received: from RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (NJE origin LISTSERV@RUTVM1) by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (LMail V1.1d/1.7f) with BSMTP id 3222; Mon, 7 Jun 1993 21:50:58 -0400 Date: Mon, 7 Jun 1993 21:49:50 -0400 Reply-To: psyc@pucc.bitnet Sender: "PSYCOLOQUY: Refereed Electronic Journal of Peer Discussion" From: Stevan Harnad Subject: PSYCOLOQUY Newsletter Section 1 (492 lines) Comments: To: psyc@pucc.bitnet To: Multiple recipients of list PSYC PSYCOLOQUY ISSN 1055-0143 Mon, 7 Jun 93 Newsletter Section (1) Query: Neurotoxicology researchers (2) Query: Understanding Biblical Narratives (3) Employment: Open Positions, Dept. of Psychology, U of Nottingham (4) Employment: 3 Psychology Lectureships in Victoria N. Zealand (5) Employment: Clinical Neuropsychology Macquarie U. Australia (6) CFP: Representation, Analogy, Cogntion: Grad. Student Conference (7) Announcement: Conference on Music Perception and Cognition (8) Announcement: CFP: AI, Virtual Reality and the Humanities (9) Announcement: Email net: Soc for Psychol Stud of Social Issues (10) Announcement: UCLA OCCASIONAL PAPERS IN LINGUISTICS, VOL 11 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- From: toxistgo@ceniai.cu (Grupo de Toxicologia Experimental Stgo de Cuba) Subject: (1) Query: Neurotoxicology researchers I work in the Experimental Toxicology Group of the Higher Institute of Medical Sciences at Santiago de Cuba. We are just now doing the first steps for research in the field of Neurotoxicology. I would greatly appreciate receiving any information from colleagues working in this field. If possible send me a list of some of them as well as their E-mail for contact. Note: From Bitnet you should type cdp!ceniai!uunet.uu.net!toxistgo or toxistgo%ceniai%igc.org@stanford otherwise toxistgo@ceniai.cu Dr. Ulpiano Perez ------------------------------ From: Przemyslaw Jablonski Subject: (2) Query: Understanding Biblical Narratives I am looking for anyone who is doing, has done, or is familiar with work on the following question: How children (or adults) comprehend biblical narratives and what kind of factors determinate this process. What is the best framework to describe their comprehensional processes. Till this moment I have already read both books of R. Goldman (1964, 1965). I am familiar with the research tradition of Hunt and associates, too. Please reply me directly at my address below. Many thanks, Przemyslaw Jablonski home: work: ul. Sadowa 3/26 Uniwersytet Jagiellonski 31-542 Krak w Instytut Religioznawstwa Poland ul. Karmelicka 34 31-128 Krak w Poland tel. (fax): 012-345107 e-mail: UQJABLON at PLKRCY11.BITNET ------------------------------ From: Geoff Underwood Subject: (3) Employment: Open Positions, Dept. of Psychology, U of Nottingham University of Nottingham Department of Psychology We are hoping to make two new appointments. These may be at any level, teaching fellow, lecturer, senior lecturer, reader or professor. Since existing staff (26 academics at present) already provide adequate coverage of all the things we teach, the new appointments may also be in any branch of the subject. Our only concern is to find really first class people who will help us to preserve our status as a top rated research department, and ensure that our teaching is equally highly rated when this type of assessment begins. The department houses a variety of research Centres, Units and Groups. These include, Organisational Health & Development; The ESRC Centre for Research in Development Instruction and Training; Child Development; Accident Research; Artificial Intelligence; Human Computer Interaction; Human Communication; Cognitive Psychology; Animal behaviour; Human Resource Management; Action Analysis; Health Psychology. These employ 34 research staff and 36 full and part time research students. The new appointments may join any of the existing programmes, or start a new initiative. We teach 3 different types of single honours degree (Psychology; Behavioural Science; AI and Psychology), and various joint honours degrees. Some of our students spend their third year in work experience placements which lead to a diploma in Applied Psychology. We also teach four postgraduate masters courses: Developmental and Educational Psychology; Occupational Psychology; Intelligent Systems (covering HCI, AI and intelligent tutoring systems; and a 'conversion' Diploma course for non- psychologists. Again, the new appointments may join in the teaching of any of these programmes or start a new one. The department is well housed and equipped and has adequate support staff. It is an excellent environment for the academically ambitious. Enquiries in the first instance may be directed to Professor Geoff Underwood, Department of Psychology, University of Nottingham, Nottingham NG7 2RD, England (gju@psyc.nott.ac.uk). Formal applications should be addressed to the Personnel Officer, Trent Building, University of Nottingham, Nottingham NG7 2RD, England. ------------------------------ From: sikhung.ng@vuw.ac.nz Sik Hung Ng Subject: (4) Employment: 3 Psychology Lectureships in Victoria N. Zealand VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON, NEW ZEALAND. Department of Psychology LECTURESHIPS IN PSYCHOLOGY (Three positions) The University invites applications from suitaboy qualified persons for three Lectureships in Psychology. The appointments, subject to a probationary period, are permanent ones. The Department of Psychology, having upgraded its accommodation and research facilities, is now embarking on a strategic plan to broaden the curriculum, expand the graduate school, and promote research and staff development. The Department's current strengths are in: clinical psychology, criminal justice psychology, cognitive psychology, industrial and organisational psychology, information processing, language and communication, learning, perception, psychometrics, psychophysics and social psychology. Appointees will have opportunities to supervise student research up to PhD level, and to teach in areas of personal specialisation provided that this flexibility is compatible with the overall teaching requirements of the Department. Appointees will be expected to carry out research and to contribute to the management of the Department's teaching and research programmes. Applicants should have a doctorate in psychology, and a developing research record as well as some teaching experience preferably in one or more of the following areas: brain and behaviour, cognitive science, developmental psychology, and psychology of language. The ability to teach research methods will be an added advantage for one of the positions. The salary scale for Lecturers is NZ$37,440-45,448 per annum, where there is a bar; then NZ$46,800-NZ$49,088 per annum. Further enquiries may be made to the Chairperson, Professor Sik Hung Ng (tel: +64 4 495 5225, fax: +64 4 471 2070, email : Sikhung.Ng@vuw.ac.nz). Applications should be forwarded to the Appointments Administrator, Personnel Office, Victoria University of Wellington, PO Box 600, Wellington, New Zealand, with whom applications close on 15 July 1993. Her email is: munroa@matai.vuw.ac.nz The Appointments Administrator should also be contacted for information on the procedure of application. Prof. Sik Hung Ng Chairperson, Psychology Department ph : (04) 495-5225 Victoria University of Wellington fax : (04) 471-2070 P.O. Box 600 email: SikHung.Ng@vuw.ac.nz Wellington, New Zealand ------------------------------------- From: max@currawong.bhs.mq.edu.au (Max Coltheart) Subject: (5) Employment: Clinical Neuropsychology Macquarie U. Australia SENIOR LECTURER/LECTURER IN CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGY MACQUARIE UNIVERSITY, SYDNEY, NSW, AUSTRALIA. The appointee will mainly conduct postgraduate teaching in the area of clinical neuropsychology. Applicants must have an honours degree in psychology or equivalent, with postgraduate qualifications and experience in clinical neuropsychology, along with relevant research experience. A PhD is required for appointment at Senior Lecturer level. Salary range: Lecturer Aus$ 41,000-48,688 Senior Lecturer Aus$ 50,225-57,913 Further information about the University, conditions of appointment, and method of application may be obtained from the Recruitment Manager, Personnel Office, Macquarie University, NSW 2109, Australia or by telephoning (02) 805 9746 or fax (02) 805 9748. Enquiries: Professor Max Coltheart tel (02) 805 8086 fax (02) 805 8062 email max@currawong.bhs.mq.edu.au ---------------------------------------------------------- From: Timothy Buczak Subject: (6) CFP: Representation, Analogy, Cogntion: Grad. Student Conference Call for Papers: Representation, Analogy, and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Graduate Student Conference at Binghamton University February 18-19 1994, Binghamton University, Binghamton, New York Purpose: This conference is intended to bring together graduate students and post-doc students interested in related issues of representation, analogy, and cognition. Submission can be original work, dissertations abstracts, and/or extension to established work. The areas of submission will be in but are not limited to the following: Artificial Intelligence, Cognitive Science, Cognitive Neuro-science, Cognitive Psychology, Cognitive Ethology, Connectionism, Linguistic, Philosophy, Psychology Panel discussion organized thus far: - Implicit/Explicit Information - Concepts and Categories formation - Developmental and Scaffolded Connectionist Models - High-level Perception and Analogical reasoning: Is there a relation? - Structure mapping and representation building in analogy - Indeterminancy of meaning: Semantic Ambiguity and Vagueness - Comparative cognition/Cognitive Ethology - Language Development and Acquistion - Constructivism and Situated Action Submissions: A three or four page extended abstract will be due October 15. Each paper or presentation should be 10-12 pages and should be about 20 minutes long. Interested Panel organizers can send a panel suggestion with a description of proposed panel discussion to conference organizers. E-mail submission of quality will be accepted in plain text format with return snail-mail and e-mail address clearly stated. Include subject line 'Submission R,A, and C: grad conference'. email: timothy@turing.pacss.binghamton.edu Travel and Expenses: Each participant will have to provide their own travel cost. Some accommodation will be provided by other graduate students on a first come first serve basis. The conference fee (to cover organization cost) will be kept to a minimum (circa $25). Important dates: Deadline for Extended abstract submission: October 15 1993 Notice of acceptance: December 15 1993 Conference: February 18-19 1994 Addresses: Timothy Buczak Binghamton University Department of Philosophy Program in Philosophy and Computers and System Science Hinman College/HN-129 P. O. Box 6000 Binghamton, NY 13902-6000 Phone: (607) 775-2860 email: timothy@turing.pacss.binghamton.edu John Guichelaar Binghamton University Department of Philosophy Program in Philosophy and Computers and System Science Hinman College/HN-129 P. O. Box 6000 Binghamton, NY 13902-6000 Phone: (607) 775-2860 email: johnguic@turing.pacss.binghamton.edu ------------------------------ From: scarboro@newell.psych.upenn.edu (Don Scarborough) Subject: (7) Announcement: Conference on Music Perception and Cognition Society for Music Perception and Cognition Annual Conference June 16-19, 1993 The 1993 Annual Meeting of the Society for Music Perception and Cognition will be held June 16-19 at the International House, 3701 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, PA (adjacent to the University of Pennsylvania). REGISTRATION: Registration for the conference is $90. Register by sending a check made out to SMPC 93 Philadelphia to: Eugene Narmour Department of Music 201 South 34th Street University of Pennsylvania Philadelphia, PA 19104 Registration will also be possible at the conference. ACCOMMODATIONS: Accommodations are available at the Sheraton Hotel (single, per day, $93; double, $103; Tel: 215-387-8000), two blocks from the International House, and at the Penn Tower Hotel ($85 per day; Tel: 1-800-356-7366)) about a 15-minute walk across campus to the International House. Some dormitory-style housing (private rooms, shared bath) will be available at International House for $42 per night (call 215-387-5125 between 9 AM and 5 PM EST, ask for housing, and identify yourself as an SMPC participant). BANQUET: A banquet and presidential address will be held on Friday evening, June 18, at the Faculty Club of the University of Pennsylvania (cost: $40). Interested parties should remit funds for this occasion along with their registration fees. Conference Schedule Wednesday, June 16, 1993 Reception and Cocktail Party Institute for Contemporary Art 118 South 36th Street 5:30 - 7:00 PM Thursday morning, June 17, 1993 Tonal patterns and musical performance, Chair:Bruno Repp Models of meter and rhythm, Chair: Jacqueline Jones Models of pitch and tonality, Chair: Fred Lerdahl Musical expression, Chair: Mari Riess Jones Thursday afternooon, June 17, 1993 Musical preference and affect, Chair: William Thomson Perception of meter and rhythm, Chair: Saul Sternberg Philosophical treatments of music, Chair: Elizabeth West Marvin Cross-cultural studies, Chair: Michael Lynch Friday morning, June 18, 1993 Timbre, pitch and tuning, Chair: David Huron Tempo, rhythm and meter, Chair: Eric Clarke Models of music learning, Chair: Daniel Ellis Tonal patterns, Chair: Robert Gjerdingen Friday afternoon, June 18, 1993 Neuropsychological studies, Chair: Kathryn Vaughn Tonality, Chair: Justin London Cross-modal studies, Chair: Burt Rosner Musical development, Chair: James Carlsen Friday, June 18, 7:30 PM Cocktails and Banquet Faculty Club of the University of Pennsylvania 200 S. 36th Street Presidential Address David Wessel University of California-Berkeley Saturday morning, June 19, 1993 Musical expectancy, Chair: Lola Cuddy Pitch structures, Chair: Ed Hantz Musical expectancy, Chair: Don Scarborough Representations of music, Chair: Richard Parncutt ------------------------------ From: Stefano Franchi Subject: (8) Announcement: CFP: AI, Virtual Reality and the Humanities CALL FOR PAPERS Stanford Humanities Review special issue: Constructions of the Mind Artificial Intelligence, Virtual Reality, & the Humanities The Stanford Humanities Review is inviting papers to be considered for publication in a special issue entitled Constructions of the Mind due to appear in Winter 1994. The goal of the special issue is to provide a forum for discussion between the Artificial Intelligence (AI) and the Virtual Reality (VR) communities, and scholars in the Humanities. Although AI research has been confined primarily to computer science and to a lesser extent to psychology and philosophy, the AI community has historically claimed that the use of computational concepts and models provides a privileged approach to the traditional subject matter of the humanities. "Pre-computation philosophy", it has been said, just lacks the proper methodological tools to investigate the crucial questions about human nature. However, questions about the dividing line between humans and machines, about the nature and evolution of human reason and creativity (or lack thereof), and about the conception of human intelligence in different historical and cultural settings have been fruitfully pursued in anthropology, history, literary and cultural studies, religious studies, art history, aesthetics, etc. Moreover, the ontological and epistemological assumptions about the nature of mind and intelligence are at odds with those of the AI research programme. Does it make sense, for instance, to view or model intelligence as a computational process independent of its embodiment, or can it be more properly understood as a construction grounded in cultural practice? Or is there a middle way? We believe that a dialogue between the Humanities disciplines and those traditionally involved in AI could prove beneficial to both sides. AI may benefit from scrutiny of its basic assumptions from a humanities perspective and possibly gain some insight into why it has not quite lived up to its expectations. Conversely, the advances and struggles of AI may provide new perspectives on traditional humanities debates: the construction of an intelligent and embodied artifact which AI has actively sought throughout its history may lead to the reexamination of classical humanistic assumptions about the nature of rationality, humanity, and the mind-body dichotomy. Furthermore, Artificial Intelligence and Virtual Reality may actually show unexpected convergences (in their practices, at least, if not in their theories) with recent post-modern trends, insofar as they all seem to reject the traditional philosophical framework centered on the sovereign, autonomous human subject. Can the Humanities learn and possibly exploit anything from the AI/VR theory and practice (intelligent robots, etc.)? Conversely, how far can AI go with postmodernism? Issues to be considered include (but are not restricted to) the following: Historical perspectives: From Deus ex Machina to Commander Data - The birth and evolution of the "automaton" in fiction, public perception, and collective imagination. - Cybernetics' forgotten promise: principles of systematic self-organization common to the living and the artifact. Current issues: Constructions of the Mind - Mind as Computer; Computer as Mind: The fundamental assumptions of AI. - Is "Artificial Intelligence" really "artificial" "intelligence"? What the AI community has learned in 40 years of research; how the Humanities community can make use of it. Future prospects: Redrawing the Boundaries - The holy trichotomy of humans, animals, and machines: are cyborgs allowed? - Life in Cyberspace: constructing the culture of the next century? The issue will also contain a target article (to be announced separately at a later time) with peer commentary and author's responses. Anyone interested in receiving a copy of the target article as a prospective peer commentator may contact the editors. Manuscripts not exceeding 25 double-spaced pages should be submitted to the Review editorial office at the address below by *September 30, 1993*. Prospective authors are encouraged to contact the editors for further information such as style guidelines, submission via e-mail or on disk, etc. Stanford Humanities Review Attn. Guven Guzeldere Stefano Franchi Mariposa House, Stanford, CA 94305-8630, USA Phone: (415) 812-4728 E-mail: sfranchi@leland.stanford.edu Fax: (415) 812-4334 ---------------------------------------------------- From: Daniel.Perlman@mtsg.ubc.ca Subject: (9) Announcement: Email net: Soc for Psychol Stud of Social Issues The Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (SPSSI), Division 9 of the American Psychological Association, is pleased to announce the formation of an electronic mail network. This network will be a forum for discussion of social issues. To learn about or join the Network, contact Irene Frieze, Frieze@vms.cis.pitt.edu ------------------------------------------------------ From: Vicki Fromkin Subject: (10) Announcement: UCLA OCCASIONAL PAPERS IN LINGUISTICS, VOL 11: UCLA OCCASIONAL PAPERS IN LINGUISTICS, VOL 11: `Recent Papers in Syntax, Semantics, and Computational Linguistics' (January 1993) Eds. Filippo Beghelli and Murat Kural Content: Ed Keenan:..................Semantic Order & Semantic Answers to Syntactic Questions Murat Kural:................V-to(-I-to)-C in Turkish Anoop Mahajan:..............On Gamma-Marking Adjunct Traces in Hindi Jeannette Schaeffer:........Dutch Nominal Compounds and the Innateness of Level Ordering Ed Stabler:.................The Finite Connectivity of Linguistic Structure Andi Wu:....................A Minimalist Universal Parser $12 per copy (shipping included). For outside US, please add $5 per copy for airmail. Send checks or (international) money order to: Occasional Papers in Linguistics, Vol 11. Department of Linguistics UCLA 405 Hilgard Ave Los Angeles, CA 90024-1543 Payments in US dollars only; must be payable to `UC Regents'. End of PSYCOLOQUY Digest ****************************** ~ ~ 8-Jun-93 1:52:50-GMT,23004;000000000001 Received: from rutvm1.rutgers.edu by aramis.rutgers.edu (5.59/SMI4.0/RU1.5/3.08) id AA13398; Mon, 7 Jun 93 21:52:49 EDT Message-Id: <9306080152.AA13398@aramis.rutgers.edu> Received: from RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (IBM VM SMTP R1.2.1MX) with BSMTP id 8420; Mon, 07 Jun 93 21:51:37 EDT Received: from RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (NJE origin LISTSERV@RUTVM1) by RUTVM1.RUTGERS.EDU (LMail V1.1d/1.7f) with BSMTP id 3234; Mon, 7 Jun 1993 21:51:34 -0400 Date: Mon, 7 Jun 1993 21:50:26 -0400 Reply-To: psyc@pucc.bitnet Sender: "PSYCOLOQUY: Refereed Electronic Journal of Peer Discussion" From: Stevan Harnad Subject: PSYCOLOQUY Newsletter Section 2 (495 lines) Comments: To: psyc@pucc.bitnet To: Multiple recipients of list PSYC PSYCOLOQUY ISSN 1055-0143 Mon 7 Jun 93 Newsletter Section (1) Query: Library Skills (2) Employment: School Psychology, University of Cincinnati (3) Announcement: Electronic Journal by E.N. Sokolov (4) Announcement: New Journal: Email Communications in Psychophysiology (5) Announcement: CFP: music/creativity issue of Connection Science (6) Announcement: Russian History of Psych Conference (7) Workshop: architectures underlying motivation and emotion (8) Russian Congress: Activity Theory ---------------------------------------------------------------------- From: "J. Hartley" Subject: (1) Query: Library Skills I would be grateful if anyone who has developed a self- instructional package for training psychology students in library skills would either let me know the details, or send me a copy! I am anxious to build on the expertise of others, rather than start reinventing the wheel. James Hartley, Department of Psychology, Keele University, Staffordshire, ST5 5BG U.K. ------------------------------ From: F.Robert.Wilson@UC.Edu Subject: (2) Employment: School Psychology, University of Cincinnati School Psychology Program Department of School Psychology and Counseling University of Cincinnati Assistant/Associate Professor. The University of Cincinnati seeks to fill a full-time, tenure track position at the Assistant or Associate Professor level for the APA and NCATE accredited, NASP approved doctoral and specialist level School Psychology Programs. The position is available for a start date of September, 1993, with a January, 1994 start date also negotiable. Qualifications include: a doctoral degree in school psychology, preferably from an APA accredited program; an active research program and/or track record of research; credentials necessary for certification as a school psychologist in Ohio and for certification as a Nationally Certified School Psychologist; at least two years experience as a practicing school psychologist and demonstrated skills in a scientist-practitioner model of school psychology; a theoretical orientation consistent with the Program ecological/behavioral model; ability to teach coursework and supervise applied experiences in consultation; ability to supervise dissertation research; and ability to link collaboratively with other academic programs, local schools, and community agencies. Teaching and supervision responsibilities may include consultation, assessment, professional seminars, supervision of field experiences, doctoral dissertation advising, and linking with professional development schools and teacher education. Applicants should send a letter of application including professional interests, vita, graduate transcripts, and three letters of reference to Dr. David W. Barnett, Chair, School Psychology Search Committee, Department of School Psychology and Counseling, 522 Teachers College, ML 02, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, OH 45221-0002. Review of applications will begin May 30, 1993 and will continue until the position is filled. Women, persons of color, and persons with disabilities are especially invited to apply. The University of Cincinnati is an Affirmative Action\Equal Opportunity employer. ------------------------------ From: mcole@weber.ucsd.edu (Mike Cole) Subject: (3) Announcement: Electronic Journal by E.N. Sokolov RUSSIAN NEUROSCIENCE INFORMATIONAL CENTER Anokhin K.V. Executive Director Balaban P.M. Treasurer Nezlina N.I Executive Officer Sokolov E.N. Editor-in-Chief Butlerova 5A, Moscow 117865, Russia tel(095)334-78-10 fax(095)338-85-00 e-mail: nic@ihnerv.msk.su Follows the content of a new e-mail journal (No 1) "MAN, NEURON, MODEL: E-mail communications in psychophysiology" that is expected to be issued by RNIC in future. The whole issue or single articles can be sent to you via E-mail according to requests adressed to: E.N.Sokolov, E-mail: nic@ihnerv.msk.su CONTENTS: 1. Balaban P.M., Zakharov I.S. Two locuses of plasticity are underlying conditioned food aversion in terrestrial snail Helix lucorum L. 2. Efremova T.M., Kulikov M.A., Rezvova I.R. High-frequency rabbit's EEG contains a chaotic component, that represents the functional state of the brain. 3. Fedorovskaya E.A. Perceptual color space is isomorphic with semantic color space. 4. Fedorovskaya E.A. Memory color space is an interface between perceptual and semantic color spaces. 5. Gulyaeva N.V. Antioxidant effects of substance P and its analogs: molecular basis of adaptogenic properties? 6. Kurova N.S., Panyushkina S.V. Noradrenergic and dopaminergic agoniats and antagoniats cause mutually opposite shifts in bands of EEG spectra in rats. 7. Kuznetsova G.D., Nezlina N.I. Brain thermomapping visualize hemispheric asymmetry during sleep, hypnosis, catalepsy, stress and audiogenic seizures. 8. Shuranova Zh.P., Burmistrov Yu.M., Vekhov A.V. Heart and ventilatory responses in crayfish to sudden environmental changes. 9. Sokolov E.N. Color stimuli are represented by excitation vectors on a detector map. 10. Zhavoronkova L.A., Dobronravova I.S. Asymmetry of hemispheric EEG coherence is informative for estimation of functional state in patients with brain tumors. Please inform us if you are interested in receiving these issues in future. E.N.Sokolov ------------------------------ From: "Dr. John A. Spinks" Subject: (4) Announcement: New Journal: Email Communications in Psychophysiology EMAIL COMMUNICATIONS IN PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY This new style journal reports the results of recent psychophysiological research in Russia. Each issue contains English-language summaries of studies, compiled by Prof. E.N. Sokolov, and edited by an international editorial board. They are only distributed on email. Volume 1, issue 1 has already been completed, and interested individuals will be sent a copy, without charge, on request. Such requests should be made to John A. Spinks, The University of Hong Kong, via email at SPINKS@HKUCC.BITNET from where the journal will be distributed. Please include in your text request your exact email address, since there are some difficulties in extracting email addresses from the header here. The research surveyed by this journal falls within the neuroscience, cognitive science and psychophysiology areas. EMAIL COMMUNICATIONS IN PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY. The Contents page for the first issue follows: [See message above from Prof. E.N. Sokolov for contents - Ed.] ------------------------------ From: "Peter M. Todd" Subject: (5) Announcement: CFP: music/creativity issue of Connection Science MUSIC AND CREATIVITY Call for Papers for a Special Issue of Connection Science Over the last few years there has been a vertiginous growth in the connectionist exploration of many domains, including music. Music has traditionally been one of the least studied areas of cognition, in part because of the complexity of musical phenomena and their language-like connections between many levels and modalities of thought. But the application of network-based computational techniques to aspects of musicality and creativity has resulted in a variety of illuminating models. The time now seems right for an overview of the agenda being followed by connectionists in this area, the articulation of the central issues in the field, and a forum for the discussion of future directions. To this end, we are inviting papers covering th